The jihadist threat in the central Sahel is carried by two rival organisations: the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), affiliated with al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), now renamed the Islamic State’s “Sahel Province”. While JNIM often takes centre stage — with the blockade of Bamako or the large coordinated offensive of July 2026 — it is ISGS that, in 2026, is advancing fastest on the ground, at the cost of massacres of civilians of extreme brutality.
Understanding this group — its origins, its leaders, its areas, its financing and its trajectory — is not an academic exercise. It is a prerequisite for anticipating risk in the tri-border area and along the corridors linking Niger, Benin and Nigeria. This article provides an updated profile of the Islamic State in the Sahel.
From the Al-Mourabitoune split to the “Sahel Province”
ISGS was born on 15 May 2015 from a split in Al-Mourabitoune, when one of its commanders, Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. This allegiance was officially recognised by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi on 30 October 2016, making ISGS a fully fledged component of the Islamic State’s African network.
Around 2022, the Islamic State reorganised its African branches and elevated the group to a “Sahel Province” (Islamic State Sahel Province, ISSP, in English; État islamique au Sahel, EIS, in French). Hence the coexistence, in the press and in reports, of several acronyms for the same organisation: EIGS, ISGS, ISSP, EIS. This symbolic upgrade was accompanied by a professionalisation of its propaganda and closer integration into the organisation’s global network. It also durably established the group among the most persistent jihadist hotspots in the region.
Who leads ISGS?
The founding figure, Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, was born in 1973 in Laayoune, in Western Sahara. Having passed through the Tindouf refugee camps and the University of Constantine in Algeria, and a former Polisario Front cadre according to several biographies, he joined the jihadist insurgency in northern Mali around 2010. He embodied the group until his death, announced by Paris following a French strike, on 17 August 2021.
Contrary to the hopes raised at the time — the International Crisis Group saw a possible window for dialogue — the founder’s death did not cause the organisation to implode. Leadership passed to Abu al-Bara al-Sahrawi, who took over the Sahelian branch in late 2021. Structured in mobile katibas (units) and relatively decentralised, ISGS has demonstrated real command resilience, able to absorb the loss of cadres while maintaining, and then intensifying, its operational tempo.
Where does ISGS strike? The geography of the threat
The historical heartland of ISGS lies in the tri-border area (Liptako-Gourma), at the crossroads of south-eastern Mali (Menaka region), south-western Niger (Tillabéri region) and northern Burkina Faso (Oudalan, Séno). It is there that the group built its hold, playing on community rivalries and the absence of the state.
In 2025 and 2026, Tillabéri became the epicentre of its violence, while the group pushed south-east: the Dosso region and the corridor leading towards Benin and north-western Nigeria. This expansion is coupled with a Nigerian offshoot, the Lakurawa group, and connections with the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), active in the Lake Chad basin. This is also what distinguishes ISGS from a mere local actor: its geography now extends beyond Liptako-Gourma to threaten the northern margins of Benin and, more broadly, the coastal states.
This map of the threat is not neutral for economic actors: it overlaps precisely with the regional trade corridors and isolated mining areas. To read it zone by zone, our map of security risks remains the starting point.
How is the group financed and how does it operate?
ISGS draws most of its resources from the local economy it preys on: zakat (Islamic tax) forcibly imposed on populations and herders, cattle raids, taxation of rural markets and extortion at crossing points. Refusal to pay this zakat has, moreover, repeatedly been the reason given for collectively punishing entire villages. On top of this base come the Islamic State’s transnational financial networks: a Spanish-Moroccan cell of the organisation is reported to have provided logistical and financial support to the Sahel Province as well as to the Somali branch, illustrating the group’s anchoring in a global system.
Operationally, ISGS combines motorbike raids, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), attacks on military positions and convoys, and above all mass violence against civilians. Its trademark is the collective punishment of localities suspected of cooperating with the army or with self-defence militias. Like JNIM, it exploits poverty and local divisions to recruit in rural areas, and has now added the use of drones to its repertoire.
ISGS versus JNIM: a war within the war
A persistent misconception holds that the Sahel’s jihadist groups form a bloc. This is wrong: ISGS and JNIM are not allies, they fight each other. Born in Mali (Menaka) around 2019-2020, this intra-jihadist rivalry shifted in 2026 to Niger, where the two organisations are fighting for control of Tillabéri and the Dosso region. We analysed it in detail in our explainer on the JNIM-ISGS rivalry in Mali.
The two groups embody opposing models. JNIM favours a logic of “governance” and local negotiations — pacts, control through taxation, conditional tolerance. ISGS, for its part, relies on coercion and the elimination of competitors as well as “traitors”. In April 2026, taking advantage of the offensive by JNIM and Tuareg rebels on Kidal, ISGS exploited the vacuum for a brief incursion as far as Labbezanga and the town of Menaka, before withdrawing under pressure from the Malian army and its Russian partners. The underlying stake of this war within the war is clear: control of the Niger–Benin–Nigeria corner, the gateway to the coastal states, where the state’s presence remains thin in some border areas.
2026, a measurable rise in strength
ISGS’s numbers are estimated, in a 2024 United Nations report, at between 2,000 and 3,000 fighters — an order of magnitude that is rising. According to several analysts, including the Hudson Institute, the Sahel Province is one of the fastest-growing Islamic State affiliates in Africa, with the potential to shift from a regional to a transnational threat. As a sign of this integration, ISWAP is reported to have decided to send around a hundred fighters as reinforcements to Menaka.
This trajectory can be read above all in the human tolls in Tillabéri in early 2026:
- 18 January 2026 — Bossiye: 31 men and children executed, according to Human Rights Watch, in reprisal for refusing to pay zakat and for villagers joining pro-government militias.
- Around 20 January 2026 — Yatakala (Goroual, tri-border area): 31 civilians killed in an attack attributed to the group.
- 26 January 2026 — Alfaga Daweyzé Koira: 4 men killed and 5 injured, according to Human Rights Watch.
- Dosso region: an attack attributed to the ISSP killed 6 civilians, a sign of the push south-east.
According to Human Rights Watch and the Africa Defense Forum, deaths in Tillabéri have risen sharply in recent years, and in 2025 the region recorded the highest number of civilian casualties in the central Sahel, attributable primarily to the Islamic State in the Sahel. These tolls, often drawn from local sources that are hard to cross-check, should be handled with caution; they nonetheless point to a clear trend, confirmed by our monthly overviews.
What the ISGS threat means for exposed organisations
For a company (mining, construction, energy, logistics) or a humanitarian organisation operating in eastern Mali, western Niger or northern Burkina Faso, ISGS is not an abstraction: it is a direct risk to staff, convoys and isolated sites. Three concrete implications follow.
First, the logic of zakat, taxation and kidnapping targets local staff and subcontractors first and foremost: reducing kidnapping risk becomes imperative. Second, the Liptako-Gourma roads and the corridor towards Benin and Nigeria are exposed to ambushes, which requires rigorous convoy security procedures. Finally, fixed sites in red zones — starting with mining sites — require strengthened security arrangements, backed by a genuine duty of care policy.
The methodological rule is simple: map the presence of ISGS zone by zone, distinguish it from that of JNIM — the two have neither the same targets nor the same modus operandi — and build this differentiated reading into every exposure decision. This is precisely the kind of structured monitoring that Sahel Watch provides.
Frequently asked questions
EIGS, ISSP, EIS: which is the right name?
They are three designations for the same organisation. “EIGS” (État islamique dans le Grand Sahara, ISGS in English) is the historical name, still the most widely used in French. Since 2022, the Islamic State has officially designated it as its “Sahel Province”: Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) in English, État islamique au Sahel (EIS) in French.
What is the difference between ISGS and JNIM?
JNIM is affiliated with al-Qaeda and favours a logic of governance and local negotiations; ISGS belongs to the Islamic State and relies on coercion and mass violence. Above all, the two groups are rivals and regularly clash, particularly in Niger.
Where is ISGS most active in 2026?
Its heartland remains the Mali–Niger–Burkina tri-border area, with Tillabéri (Niger) as the epicentre in 2026, and a push towards the Dosso region and the Niger–Benin–Nigeria corridor.
How many fighters does ISGS have?
The most frequently cited estimates, including a 2024 United Nations report, put the figure at 2,000 to 3,000 fighters — a number that is rising with the arrival of reinforcements from other Islamic State branches.
Sources
- Human Rights Watch, “Niger: Islamist armed group massacred villagers in the west of the country”, 12 February 2026 — hrw.org.
- Hudson Institute, “Local Expansion, Transnational Interests? The Evolution of the Islamic State’s Sahel Province” — hudson.org.
- Africa Defense Forum, “Violence Against Civilians Surges in Niger’s Tillabéri Region”, April 2026 — adf-magazine.com.
- International Crisis Group, “The death of the leader of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara: an opportunity for dialogue?” — crisisgroup.org.