Jihadist recruitment in rural West Africa relies neither solely on religious ideology nor solely on armed coercion. It takes place in local contexts marked by poverty, land disputes, the crisis of pastoralism, distrust of the state and competition for control of resources. Groups linked to Al-Qaeda (JNIM and affiliates) or to the Islamic State organisation (notably ISGS) adapt their methods to these realities village by village, area by area.
The best-documented examples come from Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and the border strip with the coastal countries (northern Benin, Togo or Côte d’Ivoire). The dynamics observed in these areas reveal several broad recruitment logics, while bearing in mind that local situations remain highly varied.
Fertile ground: rural marginalisation and a crisis of governance
The rural areas where jihadist groups establish themselves often combine several vulnerability factors:
- weak state presence: few public services, few schools, almost no formal justice, security forces that are distant or perceived as abusive;
- precarious economy: dependence on rain-fed agriculture or pastoralism, high climate variability, debt, limited access to markets;
- unresolved local conflicts: tensions between farmers and herders, intra-community rivalries, land disputes, competition over water points;
- young people lacking prospects: partial schooling, rural unemployment, no job opportunities, risky seasonal migration.
In this context, jihadist armed groups often present themselves as arbiters, protectors or service providers, even before seeking to recruit on a large scale. The promise is not only religious; it is also social and security-related: putting an end to livestock theft, settling disputes, opening access to certain pastures or trade routes.
Recruitment through proximity: social networks, lineages and communities
Recruitment in rural areas rarely relies on large-scale propaganda campaigns. Instead, it is based on pre-existing interpersonal relationships:
- parents, cousins, brothers-in-law already involved in an armed group;
- childhood friends, neighbours, travelling companions on transhumance routes;
- local religious teachers, itinerant preachers, influential marabouts.
Research shows that family and community ties play a decisive role: many young people join a group because a relative already belongs to it, or because the local community has gradually shifted into a form of cooperation with that group. Joining can then appear as an adaptation to the new local order rather than an initial ideological choice.
Jihadists move into rural spaces of social life: markets, weekly fairs, mosques, transhumance sites, water points. They observe tensions, identify young people who have broken with their families, those who feel victims of injustice or marginalised, and then gradually build relationships of trust.
Promises of protection, justice and social status
A central axis of rural recruitment rests on the promise of protection:
- protection of herders against livestock theft and extortion on the roads;
- protection of villages against other armed groups or militias;
- protection against real or perceived abuses by security forces.
Jihadist groups put forward a form of swift justice, based on their interpretation of sharia but also on pragmatic arbitration. They settle land disputes, punish certain behaviour (theft, domestic violence) and impose rules for sharing resources. In contexts where state justice is slow, costly or inaccessible, this parallel justice can appear as an alternative, despite its coercive dimension.
For young men, joining sometimes brings new social status: access to weapons, to a form of authority, the possibility of marrying more easily, of helping the family with the group’s resources. This dimension of social recognition is often underestimated, yet it is a powerful lever in societies where economic prospects are limited.
Material incentives: income, loot and control of resources
Recruitment also relies on material incentives, which vary by group and area:
- sharing of loot from robberies, informal taxes or ransoms;
- privileged access to certain land, pastures, transhumance corridors, artisanal mining sites;
- occasional distribution of money, livestock, fuel or food.
These incentives do not always take the form of a regular salary. Fighters instead benefit from easier access to resources controlled by the group, which can represent a significant improvement on their previous precarity. In some gold-panning areas, the jihadist presence is intertwined with the informal mining economy, creating income channels that increase the group’s appeal to unemployed young people.
Religious and ideological dimension: a framing, not the sole driver
The reference to jihad and to Salafi-jihadist ideology provides a framework of justification for the groups’ actions. It makes it possible:
- to legitimise violence against the state and its allies;
- to present the rules imposed (dress codes, social prohibitions) as religiously mandatory;
- to give the fight an overarching meaning, beyond local stakes.
However, many field studies indicate that, for some rural recruits, the primary motivation is not doctrinal. Ideological commitment may strengthen over time, through contact with the group’s cadres and internal propaganda, but entry into the organisation is often linked to more concrete factors: security, income, revenge, the search for status.
Preaching nevertheless plays an important role in structuring an “us” and a “them”: jihadists present themselves as the defenders of an oppressed community (for example, certain segments of herders or transhumant populations) against a state perceived as unjust, rival militias or “enemies of religion”. This identity-based and religious discourse feeds the group’s internal cohesion.
Recruitment through coercion: pressure, reprisals and lack of alternatives
In several rural areas, recruitment is not solely voluntary. Jihadist groups may resort to various forms of graduated coercion:
- direct intimidation of village chiefs to make them “provide” young men;
- threats of reprisals if some join the defence forces or self-defence militias;
- imposition of a “choice” between forced departure, regular payment and enlistment.
In contexts of advanced territorial control, rural communities have very little room for manoeuvre. Refusing to cooperate can expose them to collective punishment. Some young people then join armed groups to protect their relatives or to avoid being targeted as “informants” for the army or rival militias.
Coercion is not limited to direct enlistment. The imposition of strict social norms, the closure of public schools and restrictions on alternative economic activities help to reduce the options available to young people, making integration into the group more likely in the medium term.
The role of state and community violence in tipping people over
A recurring element in recruitment accounts is the dimension of revenge. Abuses committed by security forces, self-defence militias or rival community groups can push individuals or entire families towards the jihadists:
- arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial executions, destruction of villages;
- stigmatisation of certain communities equated with “terrorism”;
- unpunished intercommunal attacks, leaving a sense of impunity.
Jihadist groups exploit these episodes to present themselves as the only ones capable of defending victims or punishing those responsible. The narrative of a “persecuted us” then becomes a powerful driver of mobilisation, especially when institutional avenues of redress do not exist.
This dynamic creates a vicious circle: state and community violence fuels recruitment, which in turn strengthens the presence of armed groups, triggering new military operations and new violence.
An evolving dynamic: constant adaptation to local contexts
Jihadist recruitment strategies in rural areas are not fixed. They evolve according to:
- military pressure (national operations, international forces, private military companies);
- changes in the local economy (closure of mining sites, food crises, new trade routes);
- community realignments (alliances, ruptures, emergence of new militias).
In some areas, groups tend to step up the coercive dimension when their local legitimacy erodes or when competition with other armed groups intensifies. In others, they favour a more “political” approach, seeking to blend into community structures, co-opt local leaders and reduce the visibility of their presence.
Understanding how jihadists recruit in rural areas therefore requires combining several levels of analysis: the individual trajectories of recruits, local configurations of conflict and governance, and the broader strategies of jihadist organisations at regional level.