The so-called Liptako-Gourma area, straddling Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, has become one of the main epicentres of armed violence in West Africa. Long peripheral in the eyes of the capitals, this cross-border region now concentrates chronic insecurity, a reshaping of armed actors and a profound weakening of the ties between states and societies. Understanding its security dynamics requires combining several levels of analysis – local, national and regional – while distinguishing established facts, major trends and areas of uncertainty.
A strategic but historically marginalised cross-border area
Liptako-Gourma mainly covers eastern Burkina Faso, central and north-eastern Mali (Gao, Menaka and Mopti regions) and western Niger (Tillabéri, Tahoua). It is a semi-arid Sahelo-Saharan area, structured by:
- long-standing pastoral mobility (Fulani, Tuareg, Arabs, Songhai, etc.);
- formal and informal trade routes (livestock, grain, fuel, weapons, gold, narcotics);
- a weak state presence, with public services that are hard to access and a justice system often seen as distant or unfair.
The combination of this historical marginalisation, deteriorating climatic conditions and population growth has, over several decades, fostered rising local tensions: conflicts over access to land and water, competition between farmers and herders, rivalries between traditional chieftaincies, but also frustration with national political elites. These structural fragilities provided fertile ground for the gradual establishment of jihadist armed groups and local militias.
Proliferation and reshaping of armed actors
Presence and evolution of jihadist groups
The security dynamics of Liptako-Gourma are now strongly shaped by the presence of two main jihadist poles:
- JNIM (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims), affiliated with al-Qaeda, which relies on a network of local alliances, notably through the Katiba Macina in central Mali, and is extending its influence towards eastern Burkina Faso and western Niger.
- The Islamic State in the Sahel (IS Sahel, sometimes referred to as ISGS), affiliated with the Islamic State, particularly active in the Menaka and Gao regions of Mali and in the border area with Niger (Tillabéri), with episodes of mass violence against villages and rival militias.
These organisations are not monolithic. They adapt to local contexts, sometimes negotiate with communities and engage in internal rivalries. Field research shows that the relationship between jihadist groups and populations oscillates between violent coercion, pragmatic arrangements (taxation, protection against other armed actors) and attempts to arbitrate local conflicts. This flexibility complicates strictly military responses.
Community militias and self-defence groups
In the face of insecurity and the perception that state forces have withdrawn or are partial, many self-defence groups have formed or grown stronger. Some are rooted in local traditions (hunters, brotherhoods), others are more recent and organised on a community or village basis.
In several areas of Liptako-Gourma, these militias are caught up in cycles of reprisals: jihadist attacks, retaliation by self-defence groups, then violence against communities suspected of supporting one side or the other. This dynamic contributes to a partial ethnicisation of the conflict, even though the divides remain more complex than simple oppositions between identity groups.
National armed forces and international actors
The armies of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have stepped up their presence in the region, often with international support until recently (Operation Barkhane, special forces, UN and EU missions). The successive coups in Bamako, Ouagadougou and Niamey, however, led to a profound reconfiguration of these partnerships, with:
- the gradual or abrupt withdrawal of several international deployments;
- the search for new partners, including foreign private military companies;
- more joint operations between national armies, but also political tensions within the Sahelian space.
National forces face heavy constraints: lack of resources, logistical difficulties in landlocked areas, mistrust among part of the population, and recurrent accusations of abuses against civilians. These factors sometimes feed the narratives of armed groups that present themselves as protectors or as alternatives to the state.
Changing forms of violence
From targeted attacks to mass violence against civilians
The early phases of the conflict were marked by targeted attacks on symbols of the state (gendarmerie posts, town halls, military convoys). Gradually, violence expanded to include:
- large-scale attacks on villages, often accused of supporting an opposing side;
- ambushes on civilian convoys (transport, traders, artisanal gold miners);
- intimidation campaigns targeting teachers, health workers and community leaders.
Civilians have thus become the main target of clashes between jihadist groups, community militias and state forces. Data from several conflict observatories point to a significant increase in incidents involving violence against unarmed populations, with massive forced displacement within the three countries.
Territorial control and social control
In some parts of Liptako-Gourma, the question is no longer only whether or not the state is present, but the nature of the control exercised over the population. Jihadist groups seek to:
- regulate pastoral and agricultural mobility (calendars, access to water points);
- impose taxation (zakat, levies on markets, road taxes);
- act as arbiters of local conflicts, in competition with customary or administrative authorities.
This social control is neither uniform nor total. It coexists with areas of stronger state presence, spaces contested between armed actors, and localities where residents try to maintain forms of neutrality, often very precarious ones.
Economic stakes, resources and trafficking
The economic dimension plays a central role in the security dynamics of Liptako-Gourma. Several factors combine:
- Artisanal gold mining: gold sites attract a large workforce and generate significant income. They are frequently the object of struggles for control between armed groups, militias and local economic actors, with systems of informal taxation.
- Trafficking and smuggling: fuel, livestock, cigarettes, medicines and sometimes narcotics pass through this cross-border area. Segments of these flows are captured by criminal networks and armed groups, which find in them a source of funding.
- Pastoralism and agriculture: insecurity disrupts transhumance, access to markets and farming seasons. Restrictions on movement imposed by some armed actors worsen households’ economic vulnerability.
These economic dimensions cannot be reduced to mere “terrorist financing”. They relate to local systems of survival, patronage and redistribution, into which armed actors – state or non-state – insert themselves and which they reshape.
National political crises and regional contagion effects
Political developments in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger directly influence the security dynamics in Liptako-Gourma. Coups and military transitions have several effects:
- redefinition of security priorities and international alliances;
- withdrawal or transformation of international missions, altering the balance of forces on the ground;
- a strengthened sovereigntist discourse, sometimes accompanied by a centralisation of security decision-making at the expense of local mediation mechanisms.
At the same time, formal regional cooperation (G5 Sahel, joint initiatives) has been weakened by these political changes, even though the cross-border nature of the threats would require stable coordination mechanisms. More informal forms of cooperation nevertheless persist, notably between local units or through ad hoc agreements, but their durability remains uncertain.
Major trends and signals to watch
Several structural trends emerge in the security dynamics of Liptako-Gourma:
- a persistent fragmentation of armed actors, with shifting alliances and possible splits within jihadist groups or militias;
- an erosion of the social contract between populations and states, fuelled by insecurity, documented abuses and weak provision of public services;
- increased competition for control of local resources (gold, livestock, trade routes), which fuels violence while offering some armed actors and economic intermediaries opportunities for enrichment.
Among the signals to watch in the coming years, several factors appear decisive:
- the evolution of the balance of power between JNIM and the Islamic State in the Sahel, which could translate into periods of intensified violence in certain areas;
- the strategic reorientations of the transitional authorities in the three countries, particularly regarding local dialogue, transitional justice or the reintegration of former combatants;
- the capacity of local communities to rebuild mechanisms for mediation and conflict management, with or without the support of external actors;
- the impact of climatic and economic shocks (droughts, inflation, market disruptions) on local tensions and recruitment by armed groups.
The security dynamics in Liptako-Gourma therefore remain marked by a high degree of uncertainty. The overlapping of local conflicts, jihadist rivalries, national political realignments and the interplay of cross-border actors makes it a particularly complex area, where short-term developments can be rapid, but where underlying factors – governance, justice, access to resources – remain decisive for any path towards lasting stabilisation.