Terrorist sanctuary: what exactly are we talking about?
The term “terrorist sanctuary” traditionally refers to an area where an armed group can rest, train, recruit, plan and finance its operations, with a limited risk of outside intervention. In the 2000s, the archetypal image was that of Taliban-ruled Afghanistan before 2001.
This view rests on three main elements:
- a relatively stable territory, controlled or at least largely influenced by an armed group;
- weak external military pressure, allowing a degree of permanence for infrastructure (camps, depots, logistics circuits);
- some form of tolerance, incapacity or collusion on the part of state authorities or local actors.
However, the dynamics of contemporary jihadism, particularly in West Africa, make this model of a fixed sanctuary much less relevant. Armed groups reconfigure, move, blend into local societies and embed themselves in multiple conflicts (land, pastoralism, trafficking, local governance).
Why the idea of a “classic” sanctuary is increasingly outdated
Several major trends now limit the existence of sanctuaries in the traditional sense of the term:
- Increased international pressure: aerial surveillance, technical intelligence, regional cooperation and legal instruments (sanctions lists, combating the financing of terrorism) reduce the possibility of areas that are completely “out of reach”.
- Fragmentation of armed groups: internal splits, rivalries between factions and competition between organisations affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State make it harder to stabilise lasting sanctuaries.
- Strategic mobility: many groups favour more fluid modes of operation (small mobile katibas, dispersed caches, integration into local economic circuits) rather than fixed bases exposed to strikes or ground offensives.
- Hybridisation with local economies: taxing trade routes, controlling rural markets and levying on artisanal gold mining or transhumant livestock create forms of diffuse presence, less visible than a military camp but just as structuring.
Speaking of sanctuaries therefore only makes sense if this evolution is taken into account: fewer monolithic bases, more areas of retreat, transit and influence, often embedded in the local social and economic fabric.
Do sanctuaries still exist? A nuanced answer
There remain areas that largely fulfil the functions of a sanctuary, but in a more fragmented and more unstable way than in the past. In West Africa and the Sahel, several types of space stand out:
Peripheral rural areas and “state vacuums”
In large parts of Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and northern Nigeria, the state has little or no presence: few administrations, public services or permanent security forces. These areas offer:
- areas of retreat for fighters after operations;
- relatively discreet training and storage areas (bush, forests, hard-to-reach savannah);
- vulnerable rural populations, subject to cross-pressures (armed groups, militias, state forces) and sometimes forced into coexistence or collaboration.
These areas are not always fully secure sanctuaries: they remain exposed to military operations, shifts in local alliances and rivalries between groups. But they offer an environment relatively favourable to the resilience of armed organisations.
Cross-border areas and regional “margins”
Long, poorly controlled and poorly equipped borders are major strategic assets for armed groups. In the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea, several cross-border corridors play this role:
- the areas straddling Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, often described as a “triangle” or tri-border area;
- the border areas between Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Benin and Togo, where groups seek to establish themselves or test incursions;
- the border regions of northern Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon (Lake Chad Basin), which long served as a base for Boko Haram and its splinter groups.
These areas make it possible to:
- exploit differences in state presence between neighbouring countries;
- diversify logistics routes (weapons, fuel, livestock, gold, contraband);
- complicate the regional coordination of military and judicial operations.
These are less closed sanctuaries than areas of relatively secure movement, where groups can redeploy when pressure increases in a given country.
Forests, massifs and ecologically protective areas
Some environments offer natural advantages: rugged terrain, dense forest cover, networks of tracks that are hard to monitor. In the Sahel and the north of the Gulf of Guinea, several forests or massifs have been identified as regular anchor points for jihadist groups or armed bandits.
These areas often serve as:
- seasonal bases (retreat in the dry season or after an offensive);
- logistics centres for vehicle repair, the manufacture of improvised explosive devices, and the storage of fuel or food;
- negotiation areas for ransoms, prisoner exchanges or local arrangements.
The protection they offer nevertheless remains relative, particularly against air assets or coordinated operations between several forces.
From territorial sanctuaries to anchoring “ecosystems”
Rather than sanctuaries in the strict sense, much recent work describes ecosystems of violence combining:
- jihadist groups, community militias, bandits, traffickers;
- local elected officials, notables, religious or traditional leaders, sometimes caught between multiple pressures;
- formal and informal economic actors (transport, trade, artisanal gold mining, livestock, crafts);
- state forces whose presence is irregular, sometimes perceived as protective, sometimes as predatory.
In these configurations, the “security” of the armed group rests not only on military control of the terrain, but also on:
- tacit agreements with certain local actors, who tolerate the group’s presence in exchange for protection, income or the settlement of disputes;
- social integration strategies (marriages, mediation of disputes, parallel justice, partial redistribution of resources);
- a capacity to exploit local grievances (access to land, conflicts between farmers and herders, resentment towards the administration).
The sanctuary then becomes less a specific place than a network of complicity, fear and interests, which allows the group to move, hide and rebuild itself despite military operations.
What is at stake for states, organisations and businesses?
For state actors, NGOs and businesses present in West Africa, the question is not only whether sanctuaries exist, but how the areas of retreat and influence of armed groups are evolving.
Several strategic implications emerge:
- The end of the illusion of a linear “front”: the threat is not confined to a clearly delimited red zone. It can spread through rural corridors, trade networks or community ties, sometimes far from the most visible combat zones.
- The centrality of local dynamics: understanding who controls what, and who taxes which roads, markets or mining sites, becomes as important as following major political and military announcements.
- The volatility of risk maps: areas considered “sanctuaries” can quickly become contested spaces, and vice versa. Shifting alliances, military reconfigurations or population displacements rapidly alter the balance.
- The importance of cross-border areas: national borders do not reflect the operating territories of armed groups. Strictly national analyses risk underestimating the regional dimension of shifting sanctuaries.
For organisations and businesses, these developments call for a detailed reading of territories, integrating security, political, economic and social factors, with particular attention to weak signals: rising local violence, changes in economic circuits, and the reshaping of customary or religious authorities.
Conclusion: sanctuaries have not disappeared, they have changed shape
Terrorist sanctuaries in the classic sense – vast areas controlled unchallenged by an organisation, sheltered from any sustained external pressure – have become rare. On the other hand, the functions of the sanctuary (protection, logistics, recruitment, training, financing) persist, but are distributed across spaces that are more fragmented, more mobile and more embedded in local societies.
Speaking of sanctuaries remains relevant provided that we:
- do not reduce them to “grey zones” fixed on a map;
- view them as dynamic configurations, made up of territories, social networks, economic circuits and shifting alliances;
- acknowledge the degree of uncertainty and debate: the line between a mere area of influence, a logistics base and a fully fledged sanctuary often remains blurred.
The question is therefore not so much whether sanctuaries still exist, but to understand how they are being reshaped, and how this reshaping redraws the risks for states, populations and economic actors in West Africa.