Understanding the JNIM–ISGS rivalry in Mali
The rivalry between the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM, affiliated with al-Qaeda) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS, a branch of the Islamic State) has for several years shaped the jihadist landscape in Mali and, more broadly, in the central Sahel. This rivalry is neither linear nor uniform: it goes through phases of open clashes, periods of tense coexistence and more or less stable local arrangements.
In Mali, the recent evolution of this competition is taking place in an environment transformed by the withdrawal of international forces, the build-up of the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) supported by Russian partners, the reshaping of the armed groups that signed the Algiers Agreement and the geographical spread of violence towards Niger, Burkina Faso and the coastal countries.
Who are JNIM and ISGS in Mali?
JNIM is a coalition formed in 2017, bringing together several Sahelian jihadist factions (including Ansar Dine, Al-Mourabitoune and the Katiba Macina), under the aegis of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The movement relies on:
- long-standing networks in northern Mali (Kidal, Timbuktu, Gao);
- a deep presence in the centre (Mopti, Ségou and Koulikoro regions) through the Katiba Macina;
- close ties with certain segments of Peul communities, but also with other groups (Dogon, Bambara, etc.), depending on local configurations.
ISGS, which emerged around 2015–2016, was initially very present in the so-called “three borders” area (Mali–Niger–Burkina Faso), notably north of Menaka, in the Gao region on the Malian side, and in western Niger. It is characterised by:
- allegiance to the Islamic State and a more centralised discourse on the “caliphate”;
- strong roots in certain cross-border Peul networks, but also opportunistic alliances with other groups;
- a strategy long marked by very high levels of violence against civilians perceived as close to militias or rival groups.
The two organisations share a jihadist ideology, but differ in their chains of command, their strategic priorities and their modes of local governance. This fuels a lasting rivalry, even when temporary arrangements emerge.
From open confrontation to shifting front lines
From 2019–2020, direct clashes between JNIM and ISGS intensified, particularly in the Gao and Menaka regions and in the border area with Niger. Several factors explain this escalation:
- competition for control of routes (trafficking, taxation of the local economy, movement of livestock and goods);
- competition for social roots among rural communities, notably Peul, but also Tuareg and Daoussahak;
- doctrinal differences over the management of alliances with local actors (community militias, signatory armed groups, notables).
In the Menaka area, ISGS conducted large-scale offensives against Tuareg armed groups (in particular those linked to the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad – MSA – and to GATIA), but also against communities considered hostile. JNIM, for its part, sometimes sought to take advantage of these clashes to consolidate its influence in other areas, notably in central Mali.
Field data and conflict databases (such as ACLED) show that inter-jihadist confrontation peaked between 2020 and 2022, with intense fighting and mass population displacement, particularly in rural areas of Menaka and Gao.
Towards a “conflictual coexistence”?
Since 2022–2023, several academic studies and reports by specialist organisations have suggested a shift towards more nuanced forms of rivalry:
- in some areas, direct JNIM–ISGS clashes appear less frequent than at the height of the internal war;
- local arrangements or tacit “non-aggression” understandings may exist, often highly pragmatic, to avoid mutual exhaustion and focus on other adversaries (state forces, militias, signatory armed groups);
- the priority both organisations give to confronting the state and its allies (Malian forces, foreign partners) can occasionally reduce the intensity of the conflict between them.
This evolution does not mean a lasting strategic alliance. The two organisations remain competitors at the ideological, organisational and territorial levels. Coexistence is often fragile, dependent on highly localised balances of power and on each group’s capacity to mobilise fighters and resources.
Impact of the international withdrawal and the Malian state’s repositioning
The withdrawal of MINUSMA and the end of Operation Barkhane have profoundly altered the security environment. The FAMa, supported by Russian partners, have increased their presence in several regions, notably in the centre and north of the country. This has several effects on the JNIM–ISGS rivalry:
- reconfigured priorities: increased military pressure in some areas prompts the groups to reallocate their forces, sometimes at the expense of inter-jihadist clashes;
- opportunities for conquest: the withdrawal of some international actors leaves security vacuums into which JNIM and ISGS seek to move, offering their own order, justice and taxation;
- effects of state strategy: operations conducted with local auxiliaries or militias can deepen community divisions, which JNIM and ISGS exploit to recruit and gain legitimacy among populations who feel marginalised or targeted.
In this context, JNIM appears to maintain a high capacity for adaptation, combining violence, local negotiation and integration into pre-existing land or community conflicts. ISGS, for its part, has experienced phases of retreat in some areas (notably following local counter-offensives or joint pressure) but retains a significant capacity to cause harm, especially in poorly controlled cross-border spaces.
Current friction zones and shifts in the rivalry
The JNIM–ISGS rivalry is not uniform across Malian territory. Several trends emerge:
- North and north-east (Gao, Menaka): these regions remain key areas of competition, owing to their strategic position towards Niger and Burkina Faso and the importance of trade routes and livestock flows. ISGS was long dominant in some rural areas there, but its position is contested by local counter-mobilisations and the combined pressure of other armed actors.
- Central Mali (Mopti, Ségou, Koulikoro): JNIM, through the Katiba Macina, remains the main jihadist actor. ISGS is more discreet there, even though movements of fighters and doctrinal influences exist. The rivalry there takes the form of a diffuse competition for recruitment and influence rather than direct fighting.
- Regional extension: the rivalry extends beyond Mali, notably into Niger and Burkina Faso, where the same jihadist networks interact, sometimes under different names but with continuities of men, families and economic circuits.
In several localities, people’s perceptions focus less on the JNIM/ISGS distinction than on each group’s ability to offer a minimal form of security, swift justice or protection against other threats (rival militias, banditry, abuses by armed forces). This local dimension puts the purely “JNIM versus ISGS” logic into perspective and shows the importance of community and economic dynamics.
Effects on local actors and risks to monitor
For populations and economic actors, the JNIM–ISGS rivalry translates into:
- a multiplication of control regimes (taxation, justice, rules of movement) depending on areas and periods;
- rapid reconfigurations of local alliances, in which some community groups, militias or traffickers may switch sides depending on the balance of power;
- a high risk of targeted violence against those perceived as collaborators of one side or the other, or of the state.
For international organisations, NGOs and companies, several strategic risks deserve particular attention:
- territorial volatility: a territory dominated by JNIM at one point may come under ISGS influence, or vice versa, with different implications in terms of governance practices and risks to civilians;
- instrumentalisation of civilian actors: competition for social control may lead each group to step up surveillance of populations, impose movement restrictions or target community leaders;
- regional contagion effect: the evolution of the rivalry in Mali directly influences dynamics in Niger and Burkina Faso and, in turn, risks in the coastal countries of the Gulf of Guinea, notably via pastoral and commercial mobility routes.
Outlook: what kind of rivalry?
In the short term, the JNIM–ISGS rivalry in Mali is likely to keep oscillating between open confrontation in some areas, pragmatic coexistence elsewhere and rapid repositioning in response to military pressure and local opportunities.
Several factors will weigh on its evolution:
- the Malian state’s capacity to consolidate a lasting territorial presence that local populations perceive as legitimate;
- the adaptation of the two organisations to changes in context (withdrawal or redeployment of international actors, shifting community alliances, regional pressure);
- cross-border dynamics with Niger and Burkina Faso, where the same jihadist networks test strategies that may later be brought back into Mali;
- the internal trajectories of the two movements (loss of cadres, local splits, emergence of competing figures), which may strengthen or weaken the cohesion of each camp.
The JNIM–ISGS rivalry thus remains a central, but not exclusive, element for understanding armed violence in Mali. It is intertwined with local conflicts, governance issues and regional realignments that go far beyond a simple face-off between two jihadist organisations.