The deterioration of security in West Africa results from a combination of political, social, economic and geopolitical factors that reinforce one another. Far from being a sudden phenomenon, it is a gradual process, under way since the early 2000s and accelerated after 2011, notably with the Libyan crisis.
The dynamics vary from country to country – the central Sahel, Nigeria, the coastal Gulf of Guinea – but several common mechanisms help explain why the region is today experiencing persistent insecurity, marked by the spread of armed groups, rising violence against civilians and the weakening of states.
State fragility and a crisis of governance
A first structuring factor is the weakness of many state institutions. In several Sahelian and coastal countries, the state has little presence outside the capitals and large urban centres. This “absence” translates into inadequate public services (justice, education, health), weak economic regulation and an inability to arbitrate local conflicts.
Work by the International Crisis Group, ISS Africa and the World Bank regularly highlights:
- the extreme centralisation of political and budgetary power, which marginalises rural peripheries;
- corruption and the capture of public resources, which undermine trust in institutions;
- the political instrumentalisation of the army and security forces, often perceived as partisan or predatory;
- the weakness of formal justice, pushing people to resort to customary or religious arrangements, or to armed actors.
This governance crisis feeds a sense of abandonment and injustice, particularly among young people and in border areas. Where the state is absent or perceived as illegitimate, other actors – traditional chiefs, militias, jihadist groups, traffickers – fill the space, sometimes offering an alternative form of “order”, even a coercive one.
Local conflicts, land and pastoralism
The deterioration in security is also rooted in local conflicts, often long-standing, linked to access to land, water and pastoral resources. In many rural areas of the Sahel and the north of the coastal countries, demographic pressure, climate variability and the expansion of cash crops (cotton, cashew, etc.) are intensifying competition between sedentary farmers and transhumant herders.
Studies by the OECD, IIED and several West African research centres show that:
- transhumance corridors are fragmented or closed, creating recurrent tensions;
- customary resource management systems have been weakened without being genuinely replaced by legitimate state mechanisms;
- land disputes are rarely resolved impartially, fuelling a sense of discrimination.
Armed groups, particularly jihadist ones, exploit these tensions. They position themselves as arbiters or protectors of one group against another, provide swift (though often violent) justice and recruit among populations that feel wronged. In central Mali, Burkina Faso and parts of Niger, this entanglement of communal conflicts and jihadist agendas is now well documented.
Expansion and mutation of jihadist groups
Jihadist dynamics are a central, but not exclusive, element of the security deterioration. Since the early 2010s, organisations affiliated with Al-Qaeda (such as JNIM) and with the Islamic State (notably ISGS and ISWAP) have established themselves durably in the central Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin, before gradually projecting their activities towards the Gulf of Guinea.
Research by ACLED, Clingendael and ISS Africa highlights several characteristics:
- a strong capacity to adapt: a shift from spectacular attacks to diffuse violence, harassment of security forces, and control of roads and markets;
- a strategy of local implantation: negotiation with or coercion of communities, imposition of zakat (a tax), arbitration of disputes;
- diversified recruitment profiles: marginalised rural youth, members of stigmatised pastoral groups, but also traffickers and individuals seeking protection or income.
These groups take advantage of porous borders, detailed knowledge of rural terrain and the logistical weaknesses of national armies. They are part of transnational networks while remaining deeply rooted in local conflict dynamics, which complicates any purely military response.
Trafficking, the informal economy and organised crime
The West African region is crossed by multiple illicit flows: drugs (cocaine, cannabis resin), small arms, gold and other natural resources, migrants. This trafficking is not new, but its intensification and its links with armed violence contribute to the security deterioration.
Reports by UNODC, the Small Arms Survey and the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime highlight in particular:
- the transformation of some Sahelian corridors into major transatlantic drug-trafficking routes;
- the massive circulation of weapons from Libyan stockpiles and other conflict zones;
- the intertwined involvement of corrupt state actors, non-state armed groups and criminal networks.
In some contexts, revenue from trafficking partly finances jihadist groups or local militias. In others, it is segments of the state apparatus that profit from these flows, which further weakens the legitimacy of institutions and blurs the line between public security and private interests.
Regional shocks and contagion effects
The deterioration of security in West Africa is also the product of regional shocks. The 2011 Libyan crisis played a major role by facilitating the dispersal of weapons and fighters towards the Sahel. Work by the ICG and several researchers shows that this influx strengthened existing rebellions and increased the capabilities of armed groups already present.
In addition:
- repeated political crises (coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, contested transitions elsewhere) weaken security apparatuses and create windows of opportunity for armed groups;
- diplomatic tensions between states, or between some countries and their international partners, complicate regional cooperation;
- the drawdown or reconfiguration of international operations (MINUSMA in Mali, French forces, G5 Sahel initiatives) alters the security balance and the distribution of responsibilities.
These dynamics create a contagion effect: areas previously considered relatively stable, notably in the Gulf of Guinea (northern Benin, Togo and Côte d’Ivoire), are now exposed to incursions and attempts at implantation by armed groups coming from the Sahel.
Demographic, urban and social pressures
West Africa has one of the fastest-growing populations in the world. This dynamic is accompanied by rapid urbanisation and a large proportion of young people. When these transformations are not matched by economic opportunities and political inclusion, they can become factors of instability.
Several studies by the World Bank, the OECD and regional think tanks highlight:
- massive youth unemployment and underemployment, particularly in urban peripheries and isolated rural areas;
- a dominant, poorly regulated informal economy, which offers opportunities but also great precariousness;
- frustrations linked to corruption, nepotism and perceived inequalities between urban elites and rural populations.
These frustrations do not mechanically lead to violence, but they create fertile ground for mobilisation by political, religious or criminal entrepreneurs. Extremist groups, whether jihadist or not, often capitalise on these feelings of injustice and marginalisation.
Climate change and environmental vulnerabilities
Climate change is not a direct cause of violence, but it acts as a risk multiplier. In the Sahel, increased rainfall variability, soil degradation and pressure on water resources heighten tensions between user groups (farmers, herders, fishers).
Analyses by the IPCC, UNEP and Sahelian research programmes show that:
- cycles of drought and flooding disrupt traditional farming and pastoral systems;
- seasonal movements become more uncertain, increasing the risk of local conflicts;
- vulnerable households are more inclined to turn to survival economies, legal or illegal, including trafficking.
In this context, armed groups can present themselves as protectors of certain socio-professional groups, or as providers of access to resources (grazing land, water points, transhumance routes), thereby strengthening their local hold.
Limits and ambivalent effects of security responses
Faced with rising violence, West African states and their partners initially favoured essentially security-based responses: military operations, states of emergency, regional alliances, and the use of foreign forces or private military companies.
These responses have sometimes made it possible to contain certain groups or retake localities, but several limitations are widely documented:
- the limited material and human capacities of national armies, exposed to heavy losses;
- recurrent allegations of human rights violations by state forces or auxiliary militias, which fuel local resentment;
- the absence of lasting political solutions to the root causes: governance, justice, economic inclusion.
In some cases, the proliferation of armed actors – national forces, self-defence militias, jihadist groups, private military companies – further complicates the security landscape and makes it harder to protect civilians. The specialist literature stresses the risk of “militarising” the management of crises that are, at root, as much political and social as they are security-related.
A systemic and differentiated security deterioration
The deterioration of security in West Africa therefore cannot be attributed to a single factor, or to a single type of actor. It results from the interplay of:
- fragile, sometimes contested states with poorly controlled margins;
- unresolved local conflicts, exploited by various actors;
- the expansion of jihadist and criminal groups, embedded in transnational networks;
- demographic, economic and climate pressures that heighten vulnerabilities;
- and security responses that struggle to address the political and social roots of the crises.
National trajectories nevertheless remain contrasting. Some coastal countries have so far limited the spread of violence through a combination of security reforms, targeted development policies and strengthened regional cooperation. Others, on the contrary, are seeing a rapid expansion of insecure areas.
Current debates among researchers, practitioners and decision-makers focus less on the finding – widely shared – of a security deterioration than on the possible ways out: reshaping international partnerships, governance reforms, local negotiations, or new approaches to justice and reconciliation. All of these will shape how the situation evolves in the years ahead.
To go further: analyse whether West Africa can avoid lasting regional fragmentation, and explore the possible security scenarios up to 2030.