The question of a lasting fragmentation of West Africa is now central for political, economic and security actors. Between coups in the Sahel, the announced withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger from ECOWAS, rising tensions between military regimes and their coastal neighbours, and the realignment of international alliances, the regional architecture appears weakened. Yet fragmentation is neither inevitable nor uniform. It results from a cluster of political, security, economic and social dynamics that interlock at several levels.
Understanding what “fragmentation” covers
Fragmentation can be defined as a lasting weakening of the mechanisms of integration, cooperation and mutual trust between the states and societies of the same region. It is not limited to institutional rupture (leaving a regional organisation) but includes:
- diverging political trajectories (military regimes vs elected governments);
- the deterioration of diplomatic and security relations;
- the disruption of economic, commercial and human flows;
- the rise of antagonistic discourses on national and regional identities.
In West Africa, this fragmentation manifests itself differently in the Sahel, in the coastal countries of the Gulf of Guinea and in rural cross-border areas. It is also fuelled by external actors with sometimes divergent interests.
A regional context marked by political ruptures
Since 2020, Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea and Niger have experienced coups. These changes of regime have led to a rapid reconfiguration of alliances and cooperation formats:
- Mali’s withdrawal from the G5 Sahel in 2022, followed by the end of the joint force;
- the announcement in 2024 of the withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger from ECOWAS;
- the creation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), with a pronounced security and political dimension;
- the termination or reduction of military cooperation with France and certain European partners, in favour of other actors (notably Russia).
These dynamics feed the idea of a “bifurcation” between a Sahelian bloc breaking with the post-Cold War regional order and coastal states more attached to the ECOWAS framework and Western partnerships. This reading, however, simplifies a more nuanced reality: economic and social interdependencies remain strong, and public opinion does not mechanically align with intergovernmental fault lines.
The security crisis as a driver and revealer of fragmentation
The advance of jihadist groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda (JNIM) or the Islamic State, documented by numerous conflict databases, has helped to weaken the states of the central Sahel. The spread of violence to northern Benin, Togo and Côte d’Ivoire underlines the regional nature of the phenomenon. Fragmentation manifests itself here at several levels:
- At state level: doctrinal divergences between Sahelian states and coastal countries on counter-terrorism, negotiation with armed groups, or the role of international partners.
- At local level: a proliferation of militias, self-defence groups, vigilantes and hybrid actors, which are redrawing power balances in rural and cross-border areas.
- At cross-border level: grey zones where neither states nor regional organisations exercise effective control, leaving room for informal economies and smuggling circuits that ignore official borders.
The security crisis is not only a cause of fragmentation; it also reveals older fractures: the marginalisation of certain regions, tensions between farmers and herders, competition for access to land and resources, and a shortfall in public services.
ECOWAS, WAEMU, AES: realignment rather than the disappearance of integration
ECOWAS and WAEMU have long been presented as models of regional integration, particularly in terms of free movement, macroeconomic convergence and collective crisis management. The sanctions imposed on military regimes (border closures, financial restrictions) have nevertheless fuelled deep resentment in some countries, where they were perceived as a punishment of the population.
The announced withdrawal of three Sahelian countries from ECOWAS illustrates this crisis of legitimacy. However, it would be premature to conclude that regional integration has ended:
- economic ties (trade corridors, cross-border markets, labour migration) remain structuring;
- WAEMU, for the countries that are members, continues to provide a monetary and financial framework;
- the AES is an attempt at realignment around a Sahelian core, rather than an outright withdrawal from regional logic.
Current fragmentation therefore takes the form of competition between integration and security formats, rather than a complete break-up. The central question is whether or not these formats are compatible, and whether they can coexist without deepening fault lines.
Economic and social pressures: a factor of unity or rupture?
West African economies are highly interconnected: intra-regional trade, labour mobility, diaspora remittances, shared dependence on certain logistics corridors. Economic sanctions and border closures have shown the vulnerability of supply chains, but also the resilience of informal circuits.
At the social level, several trends are at work:
- a large youth population, often facing unemployment and precarity, which fuels frustration with political elites and external partners;
- citizen mobilisations and social movements that circulate from one country to another, sharing repertoires of protest;
- religious, linguistic and cultural ties that cross colonial borders and nurture a sense of regional belonging, even if implicit.
These dynamics can work both ways: fuelling nationalist withdrawal, or conversely strengthening the idea of a shared regional destiny. For now, both trends coexist, with variations depending on local contexts and political circumstances.
The role of external actors in the regional reconfiguration
External powers – former colonial powers, new emerging partners, international organisations – strongly influence West African trajectories. The gradual withdrawal of certain Western military deployments in the Sahel, the rise of other security partners and competition between models of governance and cooperation are helping to redefine alignments.
This realignment may accentuate fragmentation if:
- the states of the region position themselves in opposing bloc logics;
- external security agendas take precedence over local priorities;
- rivalries between partners translate into competing policies within the same regional space.
Conversely, it can also open up room for more autonomous policies, provided that states and regional organisations manage to articulate their own priorities and avoid over-dependence on a single partner.
What factors can limit lasting fragmentation?
Several levers can slow down or contain lasting fragmentation, even in a context of tension:
- Structural economic interdependencies: the costs of a prolonged disruption of trade are high for all states, which encourages compromise, even after phases of confrontation.
- Local cross-border dynamics: customary alliances, community solidarities and trade networks predate state and regional frameworks, and often continue to function despite diplomatic crises.
- The adaptive capacity of regional organisations: a review of sanctions mechanisms, mediation methods and collective security instruments could narrow the gap between regional norms and national political realities.
- Joint initiatives on shared issues: natural resource management, climate adaptation, regional infrastructure and the fight against trafficking can serve as less politicised areas of cooperation.
The likelihood of total and irreversible fragmentation remains low in the short term, but the risk of “low-profile” fragmentation – with persistent divides between regional sub-groups – is real.
Possible scenarios for the coming decade
Without claiming to predict, several plausible trajectories can be identified:
- Accentuated fragmentation scenario: consolidation of a Sahelian bloc in lasting rupture with ECOWAS, divergent external alignments, persistent diplomatic and security tensions, tighter border controls.
- Negotiated realignment scenario: partial or redefined reintegration of the Sahelian states into the regional architecture, reform of ECOWAS governance mechanisms, coexistence of several formats (ECOWAS, AES, others) that are linked rather than opposed.
- Differentiated fragmentation scenario: continued strong tensions in the Sahel, but intensified cooperation between coastal countries, with a risk of a lasting disconnect between Sahelian and coastal spaces.
Which scenario prevails will depend on several variables: the evolution of military regimes, the trajectory of armed violence, economic resilience, internal social pressures and the ability of regional organisations to reform.
These trajectories focus on regional cohesion and integration. For a broader reading of security dynamics – armed violence, jihadist groups, military realignments –, see our dedicated feature on security scenarios for West Africa to 2030.
Strategic insights for public and private actors
For international organisations, NGOs and companies, the question is not only whether West Africa will fragment, but how this fragmentation – already partly under way – will take shape. Several elements deserve particular attention:
- Intra-regional differentiation: risks and opportunities are not uniform across the central Sahel, the coastal countries and border areas; an approach by sub-groups and corridors is more relevant than a monolithic “West Africa” view.
- The centrality of local dynamics: power configurations at the level of communes, cercles, departments or prefectures can mitigate or amplify the effects of inter-state ruptures.
- The volatility of cooperation frameworks: security arrangements and regional regulations can change rapidly; monitoring weak institutional and political signals becomes a major issue.
- The persistence of informal networks: whether in trade, mobility or de facto governance, these networks shape the reality on the ground, sometimes independently of official fault lines.
Overall, the question is not only whether West Africa can “avoid” lasting fragmentation, but how it can manage forms of fragmentation that are already present, limiting their destabilising impact and preserving spaces for functional cooperation.
To understand the roots of this instability, see our analysis of the causes of the security deterioration in West Africa.