The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is going through a major crisis of legitimacy. Created in 1975 to foster regional integration, it is now accused of ineffectiveness, political bias and being out of touch with social realities. The withdrawals announced by Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger in 2024 made this criticism particularly visible, but the unease is older and deeper.
A reminder: what is ECOWAS for?
ECOWAS brings together 15 West African states (12 since the withdrawal announcements by Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, subject to ongoing developments). Its initial mandate was mainly economic: to create a regional common market, facilitate the free movement of people and goods, and harmonise economic policies.
From the 1990s onwards, its role broadened:
- promotion of electoral democracy and constitutional transitions;
- management of political crises (mediation, sanctions, deployment of regional forces such as ECOMOG in the 1990s, or more recently the aborted plan to send troops to Niger in 2023);
- security cooperation against terrorism, organised crime and transnational trafficking.
This growing political role raised the profile of ECOWAS, but also increased criticism of it.
A gap between stated ambitions and concrete results
A first source of criticism is the sense of a gap between the texts and reality. On paper, ECOWAS upholds:
- democracy and the rule of law;
- inclusive growth and poverty reduction;
- collective security and the fight against terrorism.
In practice, several limitations fuel scepticism:
Economically, integration remains incomplete. Non-tariff barriers, roadside harassment, corruption at borders and administrative delays restrict free movement. Economic operators and mobile populations (traders, transporters, intra-regional migrants) find that the promises of fluidity run up against persistent national practices.
Socially, ECOWAS is often seen as remote. Its policies are hard for the general public to understand, and the organisation suffers from a lack of communication and outreach. Amid mass youth unemployment, high inequality and failing public services, regional integration seems abstract in the face of everyday emergencies.
In terms of security, the rise of jihadist insurgencies in the Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and, to a lesser extent, northern Benin, northern Togo and northern Côte d’Ivoire) has reinforced the idea that regional arrangements are inadequate. Populations facing armed violence see little concrete impact from ECOWAS cooperation mechanisms, which are often overshadowed by other frameworks (G5 Sahel, bilateral initiatives, agreements with external partners).
Sanctions and the perception of a “double standard”
Criticism has crystallised in particular around the issue of sanctions. ECOWAS has developed a normative framework for responding to coups and breaches of constitutional order, with tools such as:
- suspension of member states from decision-making bodies;
- targeted or comprehensive economic and financial sanctions;
- the threat, or even announcement, of military intervention as a last resort.
Several factors feed the accusation of a “double standard”:
- a strong response to military coups (Mali 2020–2021, Guinea 2021, Burkina Faso 2022, Niger 2023), sometimes with heavy sanctions, notably against Mali and Niger;
- what is seen as greater tolerance of contested constitutional amendments, third terms or authoritarian drift by elected regimes;
- the social impact of sanctions: even when they target leaders, economic measures (border closures, trade restrictions, suspension of financial transactions) directly affect populations and local economies.
In several Sahelian countries, these sanctions were interpreted as collective punishment of societies already weakened by conflict and poverty. This perception was exploited by the ruling military juntas, which portrayed ECOWAS as an instrument hostile to popular interests.
A crisis of political legitimacy and the rise of sovereigntist rhetoric
Criticism of ECOWAS is part of a broader trend of questioning national political elites and international partnerships. In the Sahelian countries led by military regimes, but also beyond, a sovereigntist narrative is developing that combines:
- rejection of some external partners seen as too influential (notably former colonial powers);
- denunciation of economic and security “dependence”;
- promotion of regional or national strategic autonomy.
In this context, ECOWAS is sometimes portrayed as a conduit for external pressure, or even as the “political arm” of certain influential states in the region. This reading is simplistic, but it resonates with public opinion shaped by a sense of historical injustice and marginalisation.
The military regimes of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have capitalised on this sentiment by staging their break with ECOWAS as an act of “reclaiming sovereignty”. The creation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and the announcements of withdrawal from ECOWAS were accompanied by very assertive messaging on the need to “rebuild” regional cooperation on new foundations.
Heterogeneous political regimes and internal divisions
ECOWAS brings together very diverse political systems: electoral democracies of varying consolidation, hybrid regimes and states under military transition. This heterogeneity makes it difficult to define common positions on sensitive issues such as:
- the length and terms of transitions after a coup;
- presidential term limits;
- the conditions for organising “acceptable” elections;
- the place of the armed forces in political life.
Tensions between relatively stable coastal states (Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, etc.) and Sahelian states in crisis (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger) have deepened these differences. The former stress the need to protect constitutional order and regional stability; the latter denounce a failure to grasp the depth of the security and social crises they face.
This divide feeds the idea, among some segments of Sahelian public opinion, that ECOWAS is more aligned with the priorities of the coastal states and with a “legalistic” reading of the crisis, at the expense of a more political and social approach to the conflicts.
A lack of proximity to West African societies
Another dimension of the criticism concerns the perceived distance between ECOWAS and the populations. Several factors contribute to it:
- low visibility of concrete benefits: many citizens know little about ECOWAS programmes (infrastructure support, agricultural projects, mobility initiatives, etc.);
- technocratic language and institutional communication poorly suited to non-specialist audiences;
- limited systematic involvement of civil society organisations in the design and monitoring of regional policies.
In several countries, ECOWAS is thus more closely associated with summits of heads of state and decisions on sanctions than with development work or trade facilitation. This imbalance in image reinforces the criticism that it is above all a “leaders’ club” rather than an integration space driven by societies.
The weight of security crises and geopolitical realignments
Criticism of ECOWAS is unfolding in a highly unstable regional environment:
- the spread of jihadist violence from the Sahel towards the Gulf of Guinea;
- a proliferation of non-state armed actors (jihadist groups, militias, self-defence groups, traffickers);
- realignments of security partnerships, with the arrival or strengthening of competing external actors (states, private military companies, ad hoc coalitions).
These developments fuel high expectations of regional organisations, seen as potential spaces for strategic coordination. When these expectations are not met, or seem contradicted by decisions perceived as coercive or belated, disappointment turns into a challenge to the very legitimacy of the organisation.
At the same time, the emergence of alternative initiatives (such as the Alliance of Sahel States) and the multiplication of cooperation frameworks (G5 Sahel, Accra Initiative, bilateral partnerships) create a form of institutional competition. Some governments may use this plurality to bypass or weaken ECOWAS, favouring formats they consider more favourable to their immediate interests.
Towards renewal or lasting decline?
The current criticism does not necessarily mean the end of ECOWAS, but it highlights several structural issues:
- the need to clarify the balance between economic integration, political governance and collective security;
- the importance of making decisions clearer and more inclusive, by involving civil society, economic actors and local authorities more closely;
- the need to deal more consistently with breaches of constitutional order, whether they come from military coups or institutional manipulation by elected regimes;
- the urgency of improving collective capacity to respond to security crises, beyond declaratory arrangements.
Several scenarios remain open: a reconfiguration of ECOWAS around a core of coastal states, a negotiated return of some Sahelian states, lasting coexistence with new regional blocs, or a gradual weakening of the organisation in favour of narrower frameworks. Ongoing debates among researchers, practitioners and political actors focus precisely on these possible trajectories, with no established consensus at this stage.
Criticism of ECOWAS thus appears less as an outright rejection of regional integration than as a critique of the current terms of that integration, its governance and how it connects with West African social and security realities.