Why the question of the link between terrorism and banditry is central
In West Africa, and particularly in the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea, the boundary between terrorism and banditry often seems blurred. In the media and in some political discourse, the two phenomena are sometimes conflated or presented as one and the same reality. Yet their logics, objectives and modes of action only partially overlap.
Understanding what distinguishes them, what connects them and how they interact has become essential to analyse the evolution of armed violence in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and northern Nigeria, but also in the border areas with Benin, Togo or Côte d’Ivoire.
Definitions: what exactly are we talking about?
Terrorism: in the academic literature and international legal frameworks, terrorism refers to the use of violence (or the threat of violence) for political, ideological or religious purposes, aimed at influencing a state, a population or an organisation. Sahelian jihadist groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda (JNIM) or the Islamic State (ISGS and Islamic State West Africa Province – ISWAP) generally fall into this category.
Banditry: the term covers criminal activities with an essentially economic purpose: armed robbery, kidnapping for ransom, looting, convoy hold-ups, smuggling, livestock trafficking, etc. The “bandits” of north-western Nigeria, or certain groups of highway robbers in the Sahel, mainly follow this logic.
In practice, the same group or the same individual can move between these two registers, or even combine them. This is precisely what fuels the confusion.
Different logics, but sometimes similar practices
The differences between terrorism and banditry lie mainly in three dimensions: objectives, claimed legitimacy and territorial footprint.
- Objectives: terrorist groups pursue a political or ideological project (imposing a religious order, rejecting the state, territorial control, challenging a regime). Criminal groups mainly seek financial profit and economic survival.
- Legitimacy: jihadist organisations justify their actions through a religious or political worldview. They produce statements, communiqués and videos, and seek to convince or coerce communities. Bandit groups rarely claim ideological legitimacy; they rely instead on fear, corruption or local alliances.
- Territory and governance: terrorist groups often seek lasting control over areas and impose rules (justice, taxation, dress code, conflict management). Bandits favour safe havens and operating corridors, without always seeking to govern the population.
In terms of practices, however, the convergences are strong: use of small arms, motorbikes, ambushes, kidnappings, informal taxation of roads or markets. Seen from the ground, these similarities feed the idea of a continuum between terrorism and banditry.
How terrorism and banditry interlock in West Africa
Recent research on the Sahel and northern Nigeria shows several types of relationship between jihadist groups and criminal actors. These relationships vary according to local contexts, available resources and pressure from security forces.
Pragmatic coexistence and an “economy of violence”
In many rural or cross-border areas, jihadist groups and criminal groups coexist and are part of the same informal economy of violence. Each controls certain segments: roads, livestock markets, artisanal mining sites, fuel or goods trafficking.
Terrorist groups may:
- tolerate the presence of bandits in exchange for taxes or services (guides, informants, smugglers);
- turn a blind eye to certain trafficking as long as it does not threaten their local authority;
- profit from kidnapping ransoms, sometimes by providing protection or mediation.
Bandits, for their part, take advantage of general insecurity to operate more easily, and can benefit from the weapons circulating as a result of jihadist conflicts.
Partial convergence: when bandits become “jihadised”… or the reverse
In some cases, criminal groups gradually adopt a religious or political discourse, or rally to an existing jihadist movement. The motivations are often mixed:
- seeking protection from military operations or self-defence militias;
- access to resources (weapons, motorbikes, fuel, intelligence, cross-border networks);
- legitimising violent practices through an ideological discourse.
Conversely, jihadist groups may resort to typically criminal practices – kidnapping for ransom, robbery, extortion – to finance their operations. The literature sometimes speaks of the criminalisation of terrorist groups or opportunistic jihadism.
An emblematic case: north-western Nigeria
In north-western Nigeria, the “bandits” were originally rural armed groups involved in cattle rustling, kidnappings and attacks on villages. In recent years, more structured links have emerged with jihadist factions such as ISWAP:
- provision of weapons and training in exchange for a share of loot or logistical support;
- movement of fighters between “bandit” areas and jihadist areas;
- use of religious rhetoric by some bandit leaders to strengthen their authority.
This case illustrates a dynamic of partial convergence, without complete fusion: many groups remain primarily motivated by profit, but they operate in an environment where jihadism offers resources, protection and frameworks of justification.
Why confusing terrorism and banditry can be problematic
Both analytically and politically, the tendency to label everything as “terrorism” carries several risks.
Security over-diagnosis: systematically classifying criminal phenomena as “terrorist” can lead to favouring military or counter-terrorism responses, when criminal investigation, economic regulation or local mediation tools would be more appropriate.
Loss of clarity on local dynamics: in some areas, violence has more to do with land or pastoral conflicts, community rivalries or illicit economies than with a structured ideological project. Conflation makes it harder to identify specific causes.
Political and symbolic effects: the “terrorist” label carries significant legal and symbolic weight. It can be used to discredit certain actors, justify emergency measures or strengthen central power, sometimes at the expense of a detailed understanding of local realities.
Grey zones: individuals, trajectories and opportunities
Beyond the categories of “terrorists” and “bandits”, many individual trajectories lie in grey zones. Field research in the Sahel shows that:
- some young people first join bandit groups for economic reasons, then switch to jihadist units;
- others join jihadist groups for reasons that combine a quest for protection, revenge, access to resources and religious conviction;
- fighters move between community militias, criminal groups and jihadist organisations according to opportunities and alliances.
These hybrid trajectories show that the boundary between criminality and ideological commitment is not always clear. They call for consideration of the social, economic and political dimensions that shape individual choices: marginalisation, lack of public services, conflicts over land or pastoralism, abuses by certain security forces, etc.
Implications for understanding crises in West Africa
In the contexts of the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea, terrorism and banditry are neither completely separate nor completely merged. They are part of a continuum of violence that combines:
- weakness or withdrawal of the state in vast rural and border areas;
- informal economies and trafficking (livestock, fuel, gold, weapons, drugs, migrants);
- long-standing local conflicts (between farmers and herders, between communities, between chieftaincies);
- broader geopolitical stakes (presence of international actors, reconfiguration of regional alliances, rivalries between powers).
Jihadist groups exploit these fragilities to take root locally, sometimes relying on pre-existing criminal networks. Bandit groups, for their part, take advantage of the erosion of public order and the massive circulation of weapons to grow stronger.
Rather than framing the question as “terrorism or banditry”, it is often more relevant to analyse:
- what the dominant motivations are (political, economic, identity-based, religious);
- how armed actors finance themselves (ransoms, trafficking, taxation of populations, external support);
- what forms of governance they impose (or not) on populations;
- what alliances they forge with local authorities, economic entrepreneurs or cross-border networks.
Conclusion: linked, but not the same
Terrorism and banditry are indeed linked in West Africa, but in complex ways that vary by context. Jihadist groups resort to criminal practices to finance their activities; bandits may lean on terrorist organisations to protect or strengthen themselves; individuals move between the criminal and militant worlds.
Nevertheless, reducing terrorism to mere banditry, or the reverse, leads to underestimating the political and ideological dimension of certain actors and to neglecting the depth of local crises. Rigorous analysis requires distinguishing the registers, while observing their points of contact and the “grey zones” that today shape many Sahelian and West African crises.