Have rural markets become sites of armed taxation?

Rural markets occupy a central place in the local economies of West Africa, particularly in the Sahelian and Sudanian zones. They structure agricultural trade, the livestock trade, the circulation of basic necessities and, more broadly, social life. Over the past decade or so, these spaces have become increasingly integrated into war economies: jihadist groups, militias, self-defence groups and, at times, state actors extract resources from them. The question is therefore no longer simply whether rural markets are taxed, but how, by whom, under what conditions and with what effects on communities.

Markets at the heart of local and cross-border economies

In vast regions of Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and northern Nigeria, weekly markets structure trade between farmers, herders, traders and transporters. They are often located at strategic crossing points: road junctions, transhumance zones, administrative boundaries. Work by the International Crisis Group, ISS Africa and the Small Arms Survey shows that these markets are essential logistical hubs, not only for rural economies but also for smuggling networks (fuel, livestock, cigarettes, gold, weapons, medicines).

This economic and spatial centrality largely explains the interest that armed actors take in them. Controlling a market is not only about capturing revenue: it is also about monitoring flows, imposing rules, gaining local legitimacy and, at times, competing with the state in the field of economic regulation and commercial justice.

Armed taxation: what are we talking about?

“Armed taxation” refers to levies imposed by non-state armed actors – and, in some contexts, by state agents acting informally – on people, goods or transactions. It can take several forms:

• taxes on market access (entry fees for traders, parking fees for lorries or herds);
• taxes on transactions (levy per head of livestock sold, per sack of cereals, on imported goods);
• transit taxes on the roads leading to the market (informal tolls, “security” ransoms for convoys);
• taxes on ancillary services (mills, warehouses, slaughterhouses, water points, car parks).

According to numerous academic studies and think-tank reports, jihadist groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda (JNIM and its components) or with Islamic State (ISGS, ISWAP) have systematised these practices in several rural areas, particularly where the state’s presence is weak or contested. But they are not alone: community militias, self-defence groups, organised bandits and certain elements of the security forces sometimes take part in this predatory economy.

An old phenomenon, but profoundly transformed

Levies on rural markets are not new in West Africa. Historically, customary authorities, administrative authorities and tax services have always collected market dues, livestock taxes or parking fees. What is new stems from several factors:

• the multiplication of armed actors claiming to impose their own taxation;
• competition between state taxation, customary norms and armed taxation;
• the militarisation of practices that were once essentially administrative or customary;
• the integration of these levies into strategies of territorial control and forced allegiance of populations.

In certain areas of central Mali, northern and eastern Burkina Faso or Liptako-Gourma, field studies show that markets are now accessible only with the approval of armed groups, which set opening days, rules on carrying weapons, the handling of commercial disputes and the amounts of taxes. The line between “tax”, “protection” and “extortion” becomes blurred, especially when part of the community sees it as a form of order, compared with the arbitrariness of certain state agents.

Who taxes, and on what basis?

The diversity of actors is key to understanding the dynamics of armed taxation:

• Jihadist groups: they use religious and moral discourse to legitimise taxes, sometimes presented as forms of “zakat” (obligatory almsgiving) or Islamic tax. In practice, amounts and arrangements vary greatly depending on the context, local commanders and the balance of power with communities.
• Self-defence groups and community militias: initially created to protect villages, some levy contributions at markets to finance weapons, fuel and logistics. These levies may be seen as more legitimate by some communities, but they are sometimes accompanied by abuses and ethnic or local favouritism.
• Bandits and criminal networks: in particularly unstable areas, groups with no clear ideological agenda latch onto commercial flows to impose taxes, ransoms or non-aggression “insurance”.
• State actors: reports by the UN, the OECD and several NGOs document cases in which security forces, customs officers or local officials collect illegal taxes on roads and around markets, blurring the distinction between official taxation and predation.

The basis for calculating taxes is often pragmatic: volume of goods, size of lorry, number of head of livestock, distance travelled. Amounts are negotiated, adjusted or imposed according to the strength of the armed actor, the traders’ capacity to resist and whether or not alternatives exist (other markets, other routes, temporary closure).

Markets closed, relocated or reorganised

ACLED and several academic studies show an increase in violent incidents around rural markets: attacks targeting traders, kidnappings on roads, clashes between armed groups for control of trading places. This violence has three main effects:

• Closure or relocation of markets: long-established markets are abandoned in favour of new sites deemed safer or better controlled by a specific armed actor. This relocation reshapes economic circuits and local power relations.
• Reduced flows: fear of attacks or of multiplying taxes discourages some traders, leading to higher transport costs and reduced supply, with effects on prices.
• Community segmentation: in some contexts, markets become de facto single-community, with some populations no longer daring to frequent spaces perceived as controlled by an opposing group.

In central Mali or northern Burkina Faso, testimonies gathered by NGOs and researchers indicate that markets that were once multi-ethnic and open are now dominated by one group or a coalition of armed actors, which regulate access according to community, political or security criteria.

Economic and social impacts on communities

For rural populations, armed taxation at markets translates into a combination of economic costs and more diffuse social effects:

• Higher prices: each layer of taxation (armed groups, security forces, intermediaries) is passed on in the final price of goods. Imported products (rice, sugar, fuel) and livestock are particularly affected.
• Weakening of small traders: those with limited margins or little storage capacity are the most vulnerable. Some give up trading or fall back on riskier informal circuits.
• Greater inequality: actors with capital, networks or protection (alliances with armed groups or authorities) are better able to absorb the costs, reinforcing their dominant position.
• Pressure on households: rising food prices and difficulty in selling agricultural produce affect food security and families’ ability to invest in education, health or mobility.

Socially, markets traditionally function as places of sociability, information exchange and conflict negotiation. Their militarisation alters these functions: conversations become more cautious, the presence of armed men deters certain categories (women, young people, minorities) from participating fully in market life, and fear of surveillance limits political exchanges.

Between predation and governance: a grey zone

Armed taxation cannot be reduced to simple extortion. In several contexts, armed groups seek to present themselves as regulatory authorities, overseeing markets in order to:

• impose “floor prices” for certain agricultural products;
• limit theft and robbery inside the market;
• arbitrate commercial or land disputes;
• ban alcohol, certain practices deemed illegitimate, or the presence of certain actors (for example the security forces).

Field research in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger shows that some traders or residents perceive these arrangements as ambivalent: they denounce the financial burden and the permanent threat of violence, but sometimes acknowledge a form of “predictability” or a reduction in certain abuses compared with periods marked by banditry or unregulated corruption. This perception varies greatly according to social group, region and shifts in the balance of power.

Implications for states and international actors

The rise of armed taxation in rural markets poses several challenges for states and international partners:

• Erosion of the state’s fiscal legitimacy: when populations pay taxes to armed groups while receiving few services from the state, the legitimacy of official taxation is weakened.
• Reshaping of economic circuits: flows of goods are redirected towards corridors deemed safer or more advantageous in tax terms, sometimes under the control of armed groups, which complicates economic planning and customs control.
• Interaction with security policies: military operations that lead to market closures or restrictions on certain movements can, if not accompanied by other measures, strengthen the hold of clandestine circuits and armed actors.
• Risks for humanitarian and development interventions: projects aimed at supporting economic resilience, agriculture or pastoralism must take into account the fact that markets are contested spaces of power and potential sources of revenue for armed groups.

Debates among researchers and practitioners focus in particular on how to act in this “grey zone”: how can rural economies be supported without strengthening the financial capacities of armed groups? How can legitimate taxation be rebuilt in contexts where populations are already heavily taxed informally? The answers remain largely context-specific and experimental, and evidence of the long-term impact of the various approaches is still limited.

A strong trend, but highly variable by region

Rural markets are not everywhere places of armed taxation, and the intensity of the phenomenon varies greatly between countries and regions. In some coastal areas of the Gulf of Guinea, markets remain mainly regulated by the state and local authorities, even if forms of racketeering exist. Conversely, in Sahelian regions marked by a weak state presence, markets have become central levers of financing and control for armed groups.

The general trend, documented by think tanks and international organisations, is one of increasing integration of rural markets into the political economies of conflict: they are at once sources of revenue, places of legitimisation, spaces of surveillance and instruments of social regulation. Understanding these dynamics has become indispensable for analysing conflicts in the Sahel and West Africa, and also for designing public policies and international interventions that take account of the reality of local economies.