How are Niger–Algeria relations evolving?

Since 2023, relations between Niger and Algeria have been undergoing a rapid reconfiguration, at the crossroads of several dynamics: coups in the Sahel, the redeployment of international partners, and cross-border energy and security issues. Far from being static, these relations alternate between cautious rapprochement, diplomatic tensions and cooperation constrained by geography and shared threats.

A strategic neighbourhood shaped by geography and security

Niger and Algeria share more than 950 km of border in a desert area that is sparsely populated but highly strategic. This space is a corridor for:

• armed and jihadist groups operating between northern Mali, southern Algeria and northern Niger;
• trafficking (weapons, fuel, drugs, migrants, smuggled goods);
• migration flows heading towards Libya and then the Mediterranean.

Before 2023, security cooperation was relatively structured: information sharing, coordinated patrols, and Niger’s participation in the Joint Operational General Staff Committee (CEMOC) based in Tamanrasset, alongside Algeria, Mali and Mauritania. Algeria positioned itself as a stabilising power in the Sahel, favouring political and regional solutions over direct military intervention.

The turning point of the July 2023 coup in Niger

The coup of 26 July 2023, which overthrew President Mohamed Bazoum, changed the framework of relations. Algeria condemned the putsch, while adopting a stance distinct from that of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States).

Two elements marked this period:

• Algerian rejection of an ECOWAS military intervention: Algiers publicly opposed an armed operation aimed at reinstating Bazoum, citing the risk of greater regional destabilisation. Algeria proposed political mediation and a negotiated ‘transition plan’.
• Mediation without real results: contacts were established, but Niger’s transitional authorities were wary, considering the Algerian position to remain too closely tied to the international framework condemning the coup. The mediation did not lead to a substantive political agreement.

This phase created an ambiguity: Algeria distanced itself from the hardest ECOWAS positions, but did not fully recognise the new authorities. For their part, the latter sought to reduce their dependence on traditional partners and to redefine their alliances, which complicated the bilateral relationship.

Migration, expulsions and border frictions

Migration is another point of friction. For several years, Algeria has been conducting operations to return irregular migrants to Niger, often at the Assamaka border. NGOs and international organisations have documented mass expulsions and difficult conditions for those sent back.

For Niger, these flows represent at once:

• humanitarian and security pressure in already fragile areas;
• an issue in relations with the European Union, which supports the control of Sahelian migration routes;
• a sensitive subject for local communities involved in transit and transport economies.

Niger’s transitional authorities have sent more critical signals about Algeria’s handling of these expulsions, while remaining constrained by the balance of power: Niger remains a country of transit and push-backs, caught between migration control policies to the north and socio-economic vulnerabilities to the south.

The Trans-Saharan gas pipeline: energy cooperation under political constraints

The Trans-Saharan gas pipeline project (Nigeria–Niger–Algeria), envisaged since the 1980s and relaunched several times, remains a symbol of potential cooperation rather than a fully operational undertaking. The aim: to carry Nigerian gas to Europe via Niger and Algeria, over more than 4,000 km.

For Algeria, the project would strengthen its role as an energy corridor to Europe and consolidate its position as a strategic supplier. For Niger, it would represent:

• transit revenues;
• opportunities for infrastructure development;
• greater integration into regional energy networks.

However, several obstacles persist:

• security instability in the areas crossed (northern Nigeria, central and northern Niger, southern Algeria);
• political uncertainties linked to the military transitions in the Sahel;
• competition from other energy routes and changes in the global gas market.

Since 2023, the political relaunch of the project has continued to be mentioned in official discourse, but the conditions for concrete implementation remain fragile. The pipeline acts more as a shared strategic horizon than as an immediate lever for rapprochement.

Niger’s realignment of alliances and its impact on relations with Algiers

Niger’s transitional authorities, like those of Mali and Burkina Faso, are gradually reorienting their international partnerships:

• calling into question military cooperation with France and certain Western actors;
• rapprochement with Russia, particularly on security matters;
• announced withdrawal from ECOWAS in favour of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), grouping Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.

For Algeria, these developments have ambivalent effects:

• Partial convergence on criticism of certain external interventions in the Sahel and on the need for African regional solutions.
• Concerns about the rise of new security partners in its immediate neighbourhood, which could reduce its diplomatic room for manoeuvre and its role as a mediator.

Algiers seeks to maintain channels of dialogue with Niamey while preserving an image of relative neutrality, which leads to a cautious diplomacy, sometimes perceived as distant by the Nigerien authorities.

Security cooperation: between necessity and mistrust

Despite political tensions, security cooperation has not disappeared entirely. Realities on the ground impose a form of pragmatism: both states face shared threats in the border areas, notably:

• jihadist groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS);
• trafficking networks operating over long distances;
• risks of spillover from the Malian and Libyan crises.

This cooperation nonetheless remains opaque and receives little media coverage, for several reasons:

• the political sensitivity of any cooperation with a transitional regime contested on the international stage;
• the Nigerien authorities’ wish to assert their sovereignty and diversify their partners;
• Algeria’s preference for discreet handling of security matters.

In practice, information sharing and certain forms of field coordination appear to continue, but without a renewed political framework or structured public communication.

Outlook: towards a ‘constrained’ neighbourly relationship

In the short term, several trends are emerging:

• A relationship marked by realism rather than alignment: Niamey and Algiers show no outright rupture, but their political agendas are not fully convergent.
• The border as a key space: security, trafficking, migration and possible energy projects will continue to shape the relationship more than ideological considerations.
• Room for manoeuvre limited by regional realignments: the rise of the AES, the gradual withdrawal of certain Western actors and the arrival of new external partners are redefining the game, without Algeria losing its geopolitical centrality in the Sahara.

In the medium term, the evolution of Niger–Algeria relations will depend heavily on three variables:

• Niger’s internal trajectory (duration and nature of the transition, relations with the AES and ECOWAS);
• the ability to stabilise border areas in the face of armed groups and trafficking;
• whether or not major infrastructure projects (notably in energy) materialise, which could create stronger interdependencies.

Niger–Algeria relations thus appear as a shifting balance between diplomatic caution, security necessity and energy stakes, in a rapidly changing regional environment.

See also: the impact of the rupture between Niger and France, which is redefining all of Niamey’s external partnerships.