The question of a possible “reversal” of the jihadist momentum in Burkina Faso arises in a context of rapid deterioration. Since 2015, violence attributed to non-state armed groups – mainly linked to Al-Qaeda (JNIM) and the Islamic State (ISGS/ISWAP) – has turned a security crisis into a major politico-social crisis. The country is now among those most affected by terrorism in the world, with more than 2 million internally displaced people and vast rural areas beyond the effective control of the state.
The answer requires distinguishing several levels: military capabilities, governance and internal legitimacy, community dynamics, and the regional and international environment. Reversing the jihadist momentum does not depend on a single lever, but on a combination of converging developments.
A jihadist dynamic that is now entrenched
Recent research by ACLED, International Crisis Group, ISS Africa and Clingendael converges: jihadist violence in Burkina Faso is no longer a mere “spillover” from Mali, but a phenomenon rooted in the country’s internal dynamics.
Several elements shape this dynamic:
- Multiplication of fronts: after the Burkinabé Sahel, violence spread to the East, the Centre-North, then the North-West and, more recently, to areas close to the Ivorian, Ghanaian and Togolese borders.
- Diffuse territorial control: jihadist groups do not always administer visibly, but they impose rules (bans on certain activities, taxation, parallel justice, control of movement) in many rural municipalities.
- Instrumentalisation of local fault lines: tensions between farmers and herders, land rivalries and frustration with local authorities and security forces fuel recruitment and social tolerance of armed groups.
- Erosion of state presence: closure of schools, withdrawal of civil servants, dangerous roads, isolation of localities dependent on military convoys or the informal economy.
On this basis, “reversing the momentum” does not only mean reducing the number of attacks, but above all gradually restoring the capacity of the state – or other legitimate actors – to provide security, services and socio-economic prospects where jihadist groups have settled.
Military capabilities: a necessary but insufficient lever
The transitional authorities have bet on a “reconquest” approach centred on:
- a rapid build-up of the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP), a component of state-supervised self-defence militias;
- a reorientation of external alliances, with a marked rapprochement with Russia and new private security actors, against a backdrop of a break with France;
- a rhetoric of “total war” against terrorism, combined with emergency measures (general mobilisation, restrictions on civic space, tighter control of information).
This strategy produces mixed effects:
- Increased response capacity: some areas have seen a slowdown in attacks thanks to a reinforced military presence, the use of air assets and better knowledge of the terrain through the VDP.
- Human costs and risks of abuse: several reports (UN, international NGOs, think tanks) document abuses against civilians, sometimes against a backdrop of community stigmatisation. These abuses fuel grievances and offer jihadist groups a narrative of protection and revenge.
- Fatigue and vulnerability of auxiliaries: the VDP, often poorly trained and poorly equipped, are prime targets and can be instrumentalised in local rivalries.
In strictly military terms, a lasting reversal of the jihadist momentum would require not only continuous pressure on armed groups, but also a clear reduction in harm to civilians and the ability to secure rural roads and markets. Yet the current trend remains marked by a cycle of offensives and counter-offensives, without lasting stabilisation of large parts of the territory.
Governance, legitimacy and the social contract
Academic work and analyses by ICG, the World Bank and the Small Arms Survey highlight a central point: jihadist groups thrive where the relationship between the state and populations is weakened or conflictual.
In Burkina Faso, several factors weigh on this relationship:
- Distrust of institutions: successive coups, the contestation of certain political elites and the perception of regional or social inequalities fuel a sense of distance from the central state.
- Justice perceived as slow or inaccessible: in many rural areas, the resolution of land, family or commercial disputes is costly, lengthy or perceived as biased. Jihadist groups exploit this gap by offering swift justice, even if it is coercive.
- Weakened public services: closure of schools, difficulties in accessing healthcare, scarcity of formal jobs. The lack of prospects for a large youth population fuels recruitment, but also internal or external migration.
Reversing the jihadist momentum therefore involves rebuilding a minimal social contract in the affected areas:
- gradually restoring access to education and healthcare, even in modest or mobile forms;
- strengthening accessible justice mechanisms, including through supervised forms of local justice;
- involving local, customary and religious authorities in mediation and violence prevention, while limiting their political instrumentalisation.
The difficulty lies in the fact that these efforts must be deployed in the midst of conflict, with constrained budgetary resources and strong security pressure.
Community dimensions and risks of fragmentation
The jihadist dynamic in Burkina Faso is inseparable from community tensions, particularly around:
- relations between majority and minority groups in certain regions;
- pastoral and agricultural activities, in a context of land and climate pressure;
- perceptions that certain communities are aligned with the state or with armed groups.
Field studies (Clingendael, ISS Africa, Small Arms Survey) show that jihadist groups sometimes present themselves as protectors of a stigmatised community, or as arbiters in local conflicts. At the same time, the multiplication of self-defence militias – formal or informal – can reinforce logics of revenge and stigmatisation.
From this perspective, reversing the jihadist momentum requires:
- limiting the communitarisation of the conflict, by preventing the fight against terrorism from being associated with a specific community;
- supporting local dialogue initiatives between farmers and herders and between neighbouring groups, and the regulation of the use of land and natural resources;
- monitoring the spread of small arms and militias, in order to reduce the risk of lasting intercommunal violence, even after a possible jihadist retreat.
Without a reduction in these tensions, jihadist groups will retain footholds, even under strong military pressure.
Regional environment and realignment of alliances
Burkina Faso operates within a Sahelo-Saharan space marked by:
- continuing violence in Mali and Niger;
- the weakening or reconfiguration of international arrangements (withdrawal of Barkhane, end of MINUSMA, tensions with certain Western partners);
- the rise of new security partnerships, notably with Russia, and the development of alternative regional frameworks (Alliance of Sahel States).
Jihadist groups, for their part, move widely across borders, adapt their routes and exploit areas of lesser pressure. Reversing the jihadist momentum in Burkina Faso is therefore closely linked to:
- the evolution of the balance of power in Mali and Niger;
- the capacity for coordination between Sahelian states and Gulf of Guinea countries, notably on information sharing, border management and judicial cooperation;
- the balance between bilateral security partnerships (Russia, Turkey, etc.) and African or international multilateral frameworks.
A strictly national success, isolated from the regional context, appears unlikely. Conversely, a simultaneous deterioration in Mali or Niger could increase pressure on Burkinabé territory.
Possible scenarios: what room is there to reverse the trend?
Forward-looking analyses remain cautious, but several scenarios are discussed in the specialist literature:
Relative stabilisation scenario
In this scenario, Burkina Faso manages to:
- consolidate certain strategic areas (road axes, secondary towns, key agricultural areas);
- reduce the frequency and lethality of attacks in priority regions;
- gradually relaunch basic services and economic activities.
Violence does not disappear, but it recedes enough to allow a partial reopening of humanitarian and economic space. The reversal is then partial and territorialised, with “pockets” of resilience and areas that remain highly contested.
Protracted conflict scenario
Another possibility: the confrontation drags on without a clear victory for either side. The armed forces and the VDP contain certain groups, but without neutralising them durably; the jihadists retain a high capacity to cause harm, notably through attacks on convoys, isolated localities and symbols of the state.
This scenario results in:
- a normalisation of violence as an everyday horizon;
- a war economy marked by trafficking, informal taxation and parallel markets;
- a lasting weakening of the social fabric, with prolonged displacement and interrupted schooling.
Increased fragmentation scenario
In a more pessimistic scenario, the combination of jihadist pressure, community tensions and economic constraints leads to a deeper fragmentation of the territory. Some areas become de facto semi-autonomous spaces, controlled by armed groups, militias or informal economic networks.
In this case, reversing the jihadist momentum becomes more difficult, as the conflict becomes entangled with criminal, clientelist and community logics, with armed actors pursuing diverse agendas.
Minimum conditions for a lasting reversal
In light of current trends, several conditions appear to be prerequisites for any hope of reversing the jihadist momentum, even gradually:
- Reduction of abuses against civilians by all forces involved, in order to limit jihadist recruitment driven by revenge or the search for protection.
- A clear link between military action and a political offer: each “retaken” area must quickly be associated with a minimum of services, justice and dialogue with communities.
- Calm management of community tensions, by supervising militias, supporting local mediation mechanisms and avoiding stigmatising discourse.
- Pragmatic regional cooperation, including the coastal countries, to limit spillover effects and the fallback areas of armed groups.
- Sufficient institutional stability to allow continuity of public policies and medium-term planning.
These conditions do not guarantee a rapid victory, but they increase the likelihood of a gradual retreat of jihadist influence in certain regions, and of greater resilience of local societies.
As things stand, the jihadist dynamic in Burkina Faso remains to the advantage of armed groups in several areas, but it is neither irreversible nor uniform. There is room for manoeuvre, provided that security, governance and the careful management of local dynamics are linked, within a regional framework that is being reshaped.