Why do some land conflicts escalate?

In West Africa as elsewhere, tensions over land are frequent, but only some of them turn into open violence. Understanding why some land conflicts escalate, while others remain contained or are resolved peacefully, means looking beyond the disagreement over ownership or use of land alone.

Research and field analyses show that the tipping point into violence generally results from a combination of factors: weak institutions, the interplay of local actors, socio-economic inequalities, environmental shocks, political instrumentalisation or the presence of armed groups. The land conflict then becomes a vehicle for other, deeper tensions.

Land conflict: what are we talking about?

A land conflict is a situation of disagreement, dispute or rivalry over rights to land and associated resources (water, pasture, forests, artisanal mines, etc.). It may concern:

• ownership (who is the legitimate “owner” or “indigenous” holder);
• use (farming, grazing, extracting timber or sand, etc.);
• boundaries (limits of plots, villages, community lands);
• compensation (indemnities for expropriations, mining projects, infrastructure).

Most of these conflicts remain low in intensity: discussions, verbal tensions, recourse to customary or administrative authorities. The central question is therefore: what turns an “ordinary” land dispute into a violent, sometimes armed, conflict?

Structural factors that weaken land management

Several underlying factors create fertile ground for the escalation of land tensions, without being enough on their own to trigger violence.

Demographic pressure and relative scarcity of land

In many rural and peri-urban areas of West Africa, population growth, the expansion of cash crops, urbanisation and the multiplication of agro-industrial or mining projects are reducing access to land considered “available”. Pressure is concentrated on:

• lowlands and irrigated areas, crucial for intensive agriculture;
• transhumance corridors and dry-season pastures;
• peri-urban areas subject to heavy speculation.

This pressure does not automatically lead to violence, but it makes every dispute more sensitive and increases the strategic value of land for families, customary chiefs and local elected officials.

Overlapping and uncertain land rules

In many West African contexts, several systems coexist: customary law, Islamic law, modern state law and uncodified local practices. This overlap creates:

• legal grey areas, where everyone can invoke a different norm to defend their interests;
• conflicts of authority between customary chiefs, elected officials, technical services and courts;
• contradictory decisions, which fuel a sense of injustice.

When actors perceive the rules of the game as vague or open to manipulation, they may consider violence a more effective means than institutional channels of asserting their rights.

Unequal access to land and marginalisation

Socially or politically dominant groups (lineage families, local elites, investors, political leaders) often have better access to formal procedures (land titles, administrative support, lawyers). Conversely, some groups are more vulnerable:

• young people without land or dependent on family land;
• women, whose rights frequently remain derived from those of men;
• transhumant herders or internal migrants;
• communities perceived as “non-indigenous” or “foreign”.

When these groups feel systematically disadvantaged or excluded from decision-making mechanisms, the land conflict comes to reflect a wider balance of power. Land is then no longer only an economic resource, but also a marker of dignity, social recognition and power.

Triggers and escalation mechanisms

Structural factors create fertile ground, but the tipping point into violence often occurs through specific triggers and escalation mechanisms.

Past episodes of violence and the memory of conflicts

Areas marked by past violence (land riots, clashes between farmers and herders, intercommunal conflicts) carry a memory of injustices, sometimes passed down over several generations. This memory can:

• reactivate old grievances with each new land dispute;
• fuel hostile representations (“they want to drive us out”, “they have always been protected by the state”);
• justify pre-emptive violent responses, in the name of “defending” the community.

In these contexts, a local incident – destruction of crops, blocking of a transhumance corridor, a settlement deemed illegal – can quickly be interpreted as a collective threat, leading to violent mobilisation.

Failure or bias of resolution mechanisms

How institutions handle land disputes plays a decisive role. Violence becomes more likely when:

• procedures are perceived as slow, costly or corrupt;
• customary or administrative authorities are accused of favouritism;
• decisions are neither explained nor applied transparently;
• local mediation mechanisms have been weakened by political or security crises.

Faced with a system deemed unfair or ineffective, the parties may seek to “rebalance” the balance of power through shows of force, threats or targeted violence.

Political and electoral instrumentalisation

Land is often at the heart of local political strategies: distribution of plots, regularisation of occupations, granting of permits to investors, creation of municipalities or new constituencies. Some actors may:

• mobilise “indigenous” identities against groups perceived as “non-indigenous”;
• promise the return of land or the eviction of certain occupants in exchange for political support;
• protect their supporters involved in contested occupations.

In these configurations, a local land conflict becomes a vehicle for wider political rivalries. The political protection of certain actors can reduce the risk of sanctions and make the violent option more attractive.

Presence of armed groups and the economy of violence

In areas where armed groups operate (criminal gangs, community militias, jihadist groups, private military companies or local auxiliaries), land conflicts can be captured or aggravated by these actors. Several dynamics are observed:

• armed groups present themselves as “protectors” of certain communities or categories (herders, farmers, traders) and intervene in disputes;
• land-related violence becomes a source of income (extortion, “taxes” on land, control of mining sites or agricultural areas);
• weapons circulate more easily, increasing the lethality of clashes.

The presence of armed actors thus turns land disputes into strategic stakes of territorial control, with lasting effects on the geography of populations (displacement, regrouping, no-go areas).

When land conflicts become identity conflicts

A central element in the dynamics of escalation is the reframing of the conflict: it is no longer merely a disagreement over a plot, but a confrontation between collective identities.

Ethnicisation and communalisation of disputes

In many situations, ethnic, religious or status categories (indigenous/non-indigenous, farmer/herder, sedentary/mobile) serve as shortcuts for interpreting land conflicts. Violence becomes more likely when:

• actors mobilise a discourse of collective threat (“our community is in danger”);
• individual incidents are generalised to an entire group;
• intercommunal mediation mechanisms are weakened.

This ethnicisation is neither automatic nor mechanical. It is often produced by mobilisation entrepreneurs (local leaders, elected officials, religious or traditional chiefs, sometimes armed groups) who find political or economic advantage in it.

The role of rumours and information

Rumours, partial accounts and biased interpretations play an important role in escalation. In contexts of low trust in institutions, populations rely on informal information networks, which can:

• exaggerate the scale of an incident;
• attribute malicious intent to the other party;
• reactivate historical narratives of domination or betrayal.

A lack of transparent communication by local authorities, or their silence in the face of sensitive incidents, can leave the field open to these narratives, facilitating violent mobilisation.

Resilience factors: why some conflicts do not escalate

Conversely, many land conflicts, including in fragile areas, do not end in violence. Several factors contribute to this resilience.

Local mediation and compromise mechanisms

In several regions, hybrid arrangements bring together customary authorities, local elected officials, technical services, civil society organisations and sometimes development projects. Their effectiveness rests on:

• the ability to hear all parties, including marginalised groups;
• the social recognition of mediators;
• the search for pragmatic solutions (shared use, compensation, redesign of transhumance corridors);
• the gradual documentation of rights (participatory mapping, local agreements, village land registers).

When these mechanisms are legitimate and accessible, they offer a credible alternative to violence.

Relative clarity of rules and predictability of decisions

Even without comprehensive land reform, some contexts manage to stabilise the rules of the game: known procedures, minimal documentation of transactions, registration of local agreements, involvement of the authorities in prevention (and not only in crisis management). This predictability reduces uncertainty and makes recourse to violence more costly, socially and politically.

Capacity of the state and local authorities to contain escalation

Prevention capacity is not limited to a police presence. It includes:

• a rapid response to sensitive incidents (destruction of crops, clashes between herders and farmers, occupation of land);
• public communication on the decisions taken and the reasons for them;
• the regulation of transhumance and seasonal activities;
• the sanctioning, however limited, of the most serious violence.

When local actors perceive that violence will be sanctioned and that avenues of redress exist, the incentive to escalate diminishes.

A multi-level reading: local, national, regional

Land conflicts cannot be understood solely at the level of the village or municipality. Several levels interact:

• Local: power relations between families, lineages, customary chiefs, farmers, herders and migrants;
• National: agricultural policies, land reforms, decentralisation, development programmes, development choices (mines, infrastructure, agro-industrial zones);
• Regional: cross-border mobility of herders, circulation of weapons, presence of transnational armed groups, regional markets (livestock, cereals, artisanal gold).

The escalation of a land conflict often results from the interplay of these levels: a national decision on a protected area, for example, may reshape local uses, be interpreted as expropriation and be exploited by armed actors operating at regional level.

Why this issue is strategic for public and private actors

For states, local authorities, companies and international organisations, understanding land dynamics is a strategic issue:

• security: land-related violence can fuel cycles of reprisals, serve as an entry point for armed groups and durably weaken territories;
• economic: land uncertainty holds back investment, disrupts supply chains and increases transaction costs;
• social and political: the perception of land injustice fuels distrust of the state, local elites and development projects.

Identifying areas where land conflicts risk escalating requires combining several indicators: pressure on resources, history of violence, weak mediation mechanisms, presence of armed actors, local political stakes. This approach makes it possible to move from a reactive approach (responding to crises) to a preventive one, focused on reducing escalation factors.