Why regional police cooperation has become central
In West Africa, transnational crime (trafficking, cybercrime, money laundering) and violent armed groups exploit porous borders, state weaknesses and judicial delays. In the face of these threats, regional police cooperation – that is, information sharing, joint operations and coordination mechanisms between security services – has become a declared pillar of national and regional strategies.
Yet the question of its effectiveness is far from settled. Mechanisms have multiplied, but their real impact remains mixed, with occasional successes and persistent structural limits.
The main police cooperation frameworks in West Africa
Regional police cooperation rests on a layering of institutional frameworks, operational to varying degrees, which often overlap:
- ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States): the overall political framework for regional security (1999 Convention on cross-border crime, counter-terrorism action plan, integrated maritime strategy, etc.).
- WAPCCO (West African Police Chiefs Committee): the committee of the region’s police chiefs, supported by INTERPOL, aimed at harmonising practices, strengthening information sharing and organising joint operations.
- INTERPOL: national bureaux in each country, shared databases (notably on wanted persons, stolen documents, weapons and vehicles), targeted regional operations (drug trafficking, wildlife, counterfeit medicines, etc.).
- Cross-border police cooperation platforms: joint police posts or cooperation centres (for example in the Burkina Faso–Côte d’Ivoire, Niger–Nigeria and Mali–Mauritania border areas, etc.).
- Thematic initiatives: specialised networks (counter-narcotics, maritime policing in the Gulf of Guinea, combating human trafficking or arms trafficking), often supported by the UN, the EU or partner states.
In addition to these formal mechanisms, there is discreet bilateral cooperation between services (intelligence, criminal investigation police, customs), sometimes more responsive but not very visible.
Real progress: where does cooperation work?
Despite many limits, several areas show notable progress.
Better circulation of police information
In most West African countries, INTERPOL national bureaux are now operational and connected to investigative services. The following can be observed:
- an increase in queries and consultations of regional and international databases;
- more frequent use of INTERPOL notices for fugitives moving between countries in the region;
- faster exchanges of information in certain terrorism, kidnapping or trafficking cases.
Cross-border platforms allow, in some cases, regular meetings between neighbouring security forces, which reduces blockages linked to mistrust or mutual unfamiliarity.
Joint operations against certain types of trafficking
Coordinated regional operations (often with INTERPOL, UNODC or the EU) have led to:
- significant seizures of drugs, small arms, fuel or contraband;
- the dismantling of networks involved in human trafficking or migrant smuggling;
- coordinated checks at ports and airports (notably in the Gulf of Guinea), with the sharing of alerts and risk profiles.
These operations remain occasional, but they demonstrate the ability of several police services to work together on targeted objectives, with external technical and logistical support.
Gradual standardisation of certain tools
Regional cooperation has contributed to:
- the dissemination of common procedures in combating money laundering, cybercrime and human trafficking;
- the upgrading of certain national legal frameworks (criminalisation of terrorism, terrorist financing, judicial cooperation);
- the joint training of police officers, gendarmes and customs officers on common modules.
These processes remain uneven, but they create a minimum foundation of shared understanding of threats and response tools.
Structural limits that weigh on effectiveness
Despite these advances, regional police cooperation falls well short of the security challenges. Several major obstacles consistently recur in specialist analyses.
Uneven national capacities and overstretched services
The police and gendarmerie forces of many countries in the region face:
- a lack of human, material and technological resources;
- pressing internal priorities (urban insecurity, political tensions, public order, local conflicts) that reduce availability for regional cooperation;
- limited computerisation and incomplete national databases, restricting the quality of the information shared.
Regional cooperation can be no stronger than its weakest national links. Capacity gaps between states create ‘grey’ zones exploited by criminal and armed groups.
Challenges of trust and political will
Police cooperation requires the sharing of sensitive information, sometimes on politically delicate subjects (local complicity, corruption, rivalries between services). Several obstacles emerge:
- mistrust between states, heightened by diplomatic tensions, coups or strategic divergences (notably in the Sahel in recent years);
- reluctance to share certain information deemed too sensitive or liable to expose internal dysfunctions;
- possible political instrumentalisation of regional mechanisms, for example to pursue opponents or exiles under the guise of ‘counter-terrorism’.
These factors limit the real depth of exchanges, especially in the most sensitive cases (terrorism, politico-economic crime, high-level corruption).
Institutional fragmentation and overlapping initiatives
The proliferation of programmes, projects and platforms creates a risk of dispersion:
- several parallel structures deal with the same issues (terrorism, drug trafficking, piracy), with overlapping mandates;
- initiatives led by external partners may be poorly coordinated with one another, each donor favouring its own framework;
- national services are sometimes called upon by too many mechanisms, without sufficient resources to feed them all.
This institutional complexity undermines the clarity and continuity of efforts, especially when external funding is redirected or interrupted.
Weak judicial cooperation and criminal follow-up
Police cooperation only produces lasting effects if it is followed by effective prosecutions. Yet several limits recur:
- slow or politicised extradition procedures;
- legal frameworks that are sometimes not harmonised, complicating the classification of transnational offences;
- congested judicial systems, and a lack of resources for prosecutors’ offices and courts to handle complex cases.
The result: arrests may have no significant follow-up, or networks quickly re-form. From the point of view of criminal or armed groups, the real risk of sanction remains limited.
Police cooperation and counter-terrorism: a mixed record
The rise of jihadist groups in the Sahel and their connections towards the coastal countries have increased pressure for greater police cooperation. Several trends can be identified.
Improved monitoring and alert sharing
The following can be observed:
- faster circulation of alerts on suspect individuals, modus operandi or threats of attacks;
- regional working groups bringing together police, gendarmerie and intelligence services;
- capacity-building programmes targeting counter-terrorism criminal investigation police (financial investigations, digital forensics, etc.).
These efforts have helped to foil certain attack plans and to disrupt logistics channels (weapons, financing, movements).
But a response still out of step with local dynamics
Several limits persist:
- the rural and border areas most affected by violent extremism often remain poorly covered by specialised police mechanisms;
- cooperation remains focused on capitals and large cities, with a gap between the central and local levels;
- armed groups exploit the weakness of the local state, land or pastoral conflicts and community grievances, dimensions that police cooperation alone cannot address.
Police cooperation can disrupt certain flows (weapons, money, movements), but it does not address the root causes of armed groups’ entrenchment in local territories.
What criteria should be used to judge effectiveness?
The effectiveness of regional police cooperation is not measured solely by the number of arrests or seizures. Several more qualitative criteria are useful:
- ability to detect and document transnational networks (quality of intelligence, mapping of flows);
- responsiveness to emerging threats (adaptation to new modus operandi, cybercrime, crypto-assets, etc.);
- institutional resilience: continuity of cooperation mechanisms despite political crises, changes of government or broken alliances;
- integration with the justice system: ability to turn police operations into actual convictions and the lasting dismantling of networks;
- local perception: public trust in the security forces, cooperation of border communities with the police.
On each of these levels, the record is nuanced: real progress in structuring cooperation tools and networks, but a still limited impact on the overall trajectory of organised crime and violent extremism.
Recent trends and signals to watch
Several developments deserve particular attention in the coming years.
Digitalisation and biometric data
The rise of biometric systems (passports, border control), shared databases and digital surveillance tools opens up new possibilities:
- better traceability of cross-border movements;
- more precise detection of document forgery;
- cross-referencing of data between services (police, immigration, customs).
These technologies can strengthen effectiveness, but they also raise questions of data protection, governance and the risk of abuse for political ends.
Regional political and security realignments
Political transitions, coups and realigned alliances (notably in the Sahel) have a direct impact on police cooperation:
- reduction or suspension of certain cooperation programmes with international partners;
- a refocusing on alternative or narrower frameworks (ad hoc coalitions, bilateral agreements);
- a risk of regional fragmentation, with subsets of states cooperating more among themselves than with ECOWAS as a whole.
The robustness of police cooperation will be tested in part by its ability to survive this political turbulence.
Linkage with local security dynamics
An emerging trend is the attempt to better link:
- regional mechanisms (databases, legal frameworks, training);
- national arrangements;
- and local realities: community policing, vigilance committees, customary and religious authorities.
Without this linkage, police cooperation risks remaining a ‘top-down’ mechanism, barely visible to populations and disconnected from everyday security needs.
Concluding points: relative but indispensable effectiveness
Regional police cooperation in West Africa is indispensable in the face of threats that ignore borders. It has enabled concrete progress in information sharing, the standardisation of tools and joint operations, notably against certain types of trafficking and in counter-terrorism.
Its effectiveness nevertheless remains relative, held back by uneven national capacities, political tensions, insufficient judicial cooperation and a persistent gap between regional mechanisms and local realities. It appears to be a necessary but not sufficient condition: it must be part of a broader approach that includes governance, justice, development and the management of local conflicts.
For public, private and civil society actors exposed to security risks in the region, the challenge is less to know whether regional police cooperation is ‘effective’ in itself than to understand where it works, where it stalls, and how it is evolving. It is this detailed understanding that makes it possible to anticipate areas of vulnerability, but also the spaces where regional institutions can serve as relevant relays or partners.