How do smuggling networks work in the Sahel?

Smuggling networks in the Sahel form a parallel economy deeply rooted in the region’s history. They cannot be reduced to a few “barons” or to jihadist armed groups: they rely on a multitude of actors, from small local transporters to transnational intermediaries, organised around old routes and new economic opportunities.

A transit economy at the heart of the Sahel

The Sahel links North Africa, coastal West Africa and, further east, the Horn of Africa. This position makes it a strategic transit zone for licit and illicit flows. Historically, trans-Saharan routes were used for the trade in salt, gold and livestock. Today, they are being reused for trafficking in fuel, cigarettes, medicines, drugs and consumer goods, but also for flows of migrants.

Smuggling develops in a context of:

• weak state presence in vast rural and desert areas;
• long, porous borders that are difficult to control;
• fragile national economies and high unemployment, particularly among young people;
• price and tax differences between neighbouring countries, which create profit opportunities;
• armed conflicts and political crises that disrupt controls and divert security resources.

Smuggling networks are therefore not a marginal phenomenon: they structure a significant share of the local economy in some border regions.

Who are the actors in Sahelian smuggling?

Field research (Small Arms Survey, Clingendael, ISS Africa, ICG) shows that smuggling in the Sahel relies on a mosaic of actors with varied profiles and motivations.

Small transporters and local intermediaries

At the base, there is a multitude of small actors:

• drivers of off-road vehicles or lorries;
• motorcycle taxis and tricycle drivers in rural areas;
• porters on foot or with donkeys in the most isolated areas;
• small market traders, retailers of fuel in jerrycans, cigarette sellers, etc.

For these actors, smuggling is often an economic survival strategy rather than an ideological criminal activity. They operate on a small scale, sometimes seasonally, and are embedded in family, community or tribal networks.

Wholesalers, logisticians and “facilitators”

Above these small actors are more structured intermediaries:

• wholesalers who buy in bulk to redistribute to several markets;
• logisticians who organise convoys, routes and storage;
• “facilitators” who maintain relations with security forces, customs or local elected officials.

These intermediaries manage the most sensitive aspect of trafficking: negotiating informal “taxes”, corruption, managing the risk of interception, diversifying routes. They provide the link between local circuits and more discreet transnational networks.

Economic and political elites involved

Several studies highlight the direct or indirect involvement of segments of economic and political elites in some forms of smuggling:

• importers holding official licences who under-declare volumes or divert part of the goods into illicit channels;
• business people close to circles of power who invest in lorry fleets or wholesale trade;
• local elected officials or administrators who profit from informal “taxes” on the passage of goods.

This interweaving of the formal and informal economy complicates efforts against smuggling: the line between licit and illicit activities is sometimes blurred.

Armed groups, militias and jihadist groups

Non-state armed groups – community militias, rebel groups, jihadist factions – occupy specific segments of smuggling chains:

• imposing “transit fees” on convoys;
• providing armed protection for routes and depots;
• controlling certain border crossings or stretches of road.

Jihadist groups, particularly in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, draw revenue from these levies, but they do not necessarily control the circuits as a whole. They insert themselves into pre-existing networks, often by negotiating with local notables, traders or tribal leaders.

What types of trafficking and which routes?

Smuggling in the Sahel covers a wide range of goods, each with its own economic logic.

Fuel, cigarettes and consumer goods

The most widespread trafficking concerns everyday consumer products:

• fuel: imported legally into one country, then re-exported informally to a neighbour where the price is higher; resold in jerrycans or at small outlets;
• cigarettes: brought in from North Africa or coastal ports, often through customs under-declaration schemes;
• food and manufactured products: sugar, flour, oil, spare parts, textiles, medicines, sometimes counterfeit or of uncertain quality.

This trafficking relies on differences in prices, subsidies and taxation. It is sometimes tolerated locally because it helps supply populations, particularly in isolated areas.

Drugs and higher-value flows

The Sahel region is also a transit zone for high-value drugs:

• cocaine: shipped from South America to the West African coast, then transported north (Maghreb, Europe) via Sahelian routes;
• cannabis resin: produced notably in the Maghreb and transiting towards West Africa or Europe;
• diverted medicines or psychotropic drugs: circulating between coastal states and inland areas.

This trafficking often involves smaller, discreet networks with a higher degree of logistical and financial sophistication (laundering, shell companies, banking and informal channels).

Migration, artisanal gold mining and other flows

Other forms of smuggling or informal economy shape Sahelian routes:

• migration: paid transport of migrants through Niger, Mali or Burkina Faso towards North Africa;
• artisanal gold mining: gold extracted and exported largely outside official channels, through informal buyers and cross-border networks;
• small arms: regional circulation of weapons from past conflicts or diverted stockpiles.

These flows intersect: the same route may be used to transport migrants, fuel and cigarettes, depending on the opportunities and risks of the moment.

How are these networks organised in practice?

Smuggling networks in the Sahel rarely function as rigid hierarchical organisations. They resemble flexible “chains” or “platforms” in which each actor handles a specific link.

Segmentation of tasks and risks

To reduce risk, tasks are segmented:

• one actor finances the purchase of goods;
• others handle transport over a given stretch;
• local relays manage storage and redistribution;
• intermediaries deal with the authorities or armed groups.

Each link rarely knows the whole chain. This fragmentation makes it harder to dismantle a network completely.

Use of social ties and identity affiliations

Networks rely on pre-existing ties of trust:

• kinship (extended family, clans);
• community or tribal affiliation;
• professional networks (transporters, traders, gold panners).

These ties make it possible to secure transactions, settle disputes and share information on risks (presence of patrols, local tensions, etc.). Ethnic or tribal affiliations are not enough to explain smuggling, but they often underpin long-standing cross-border economic networks.

Corruption, arrangements and grey areas

The movement of goods often relies on informal arrangements:

• payment of “taxes” or bribes at certain checkpoints;
• ad hoc negotiations with checkpoint commanders or elected officials;
• use of partly authentic documents (false certificates, under-declarations).

These practices create “grey areas” where law, customary tolerance and illegality mix. In some cases, the distinction between smuggling and “normal” trade is unclear to local actors.

What links with insecurity and jihadist groups?

The relationship between smuggling and insecurity in the Sahel is complex and cannot be reduced to the direct financing of terrorism. Several mechanisms are at work.

Financial resources for armed groups

Jihadist groups and some militias draw revenue from:

• taxes levied on convoys (in cash, fuel or goods);
• armed protection of routes or gold-panning sites;
• direct participation in some trafficking, depending on the context.

This revenue supplements other sources (racketeering, kidnapping for ransom, forced or voluntary contributions from some communities, etc.). Dependence on trafficking varies greatly from one group to another and from one area to another.

Strengthening local war economies

In conflict areas, smuggling feeds “war economies”:

• armed groups compete for control of lucrative routes or mining sites;
• local communities sometimes align with a group to secure their own activities;
• weapons and ammunition circulate more easily.

This dynamic can prolong conflicts, even when the initial political grievances weaken, because many actors derive an economic advantage from the situation.

Ambivalent local perceptions

For part of the population, some trafficking – fuel, foodstuffs, medicines – is seen above all as a means of accessing essential goods. Groups that secure these flows, even if armed, may be seen as ambivalent actors: both a source of threats and providers of protection or income.

This ambivalence complicates purely repressive policies: abruptly cutting smuggling circuits without economic alternatives can further weaken populations and increase resentment towards the state.

What recent trends and strategic issues?

Several recent developments are influencing how smuggling networks operate in the Sahel.

Routes reshaped by political crises

The coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, deteriorating relations with some international partners and the gradual withdrawal of several foreign military operations are changing the security and political environment:

• some stretches are becoming riskier, pushing networks to open new routes;
• regional cooperation on border control is weakened;
• new intermediaries are emerging, taking advantage of shifts in local power.

Smuggling networks adapt quickly to these changes, testing different routes and readjusting their alliances.

Expansion towards the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea

Security pressure in the heart of the Sahel and the growing strategic interest of the coastal states (Benin, Togo, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire) are leading to:

• a partial shift of some flows (gold, fuel, contraband) towards forest and coastal areas;
• the growing importance of corridors linking seaports and inland areas;
• closer interweaving of Sahelian smuggling and port economies.

This expansion raises the stakes for the coastal states, which must reconcile the development of trade, counter-trafficking and the prevention of security risks.

Partial digitalisation and logistical innovation

Without being fully “digitalised”, networks are gradually adopting digital tools:

• communication via encrypted messaging apps;
• use of mobile money transfers or informal financial services;
• finer coordination of convoys thanks to telecommunications.

These developments improve the responsiveness of actors and complicate the tracking of financial flows linked to smuggling.

Between enforcement, regulation and economic alternatives

State and international responses have long focused on enforcement (seizures, arrests, tighter controls). These actions have an effect, but they also tend to:

• shift routes rather than eliminate trafficking;
• increase the value of services offered by networks able to circumvent controls;
• weaken already precarious local economies if they are not accompanied by alternative solutions.

Current debates stress the need to distinguish between:

• segments with a strong organised crime dimension (drugs, weapons, laundering);
• forms of survival smuggling, linked to supply needs and to the weaknesses of regional economic integration.

For many analysts, a lasting reduction in smuggling in the Sahel requires:

• stronger governance of borders and local institutions;
• better regional coordination of tax and customs policies;
• credible economic alternatives for populations living from subsistence trafficking;
• targeted action on the financial and logistical circuits of the most structured networks.

Smuggling networks in the Sahel are neither a homogeneous bloc nor a mere “tool” of armed groups. They form a deeply rooted economic and social infrastructure that adapts to political and security crises. Understanding them requires combining the local, national and regional levels, and linking the economic, social and security dimensions without reducing them to a single cause.