The question of the threat in northern and south-eastern Senegal concerns two peripheral but strategic areas: the Fouta (the Senegal River valley, a border area with Mauritania and Mali) and the south-east (the regions of Kédougou and Tambacounda, at the Mali–Guinea–Senegal junction). These areas lie close to spaces marked by the activity of jihadist groups in Mali and Burkina Faso, and by well-established cross-border trafficking.
The Senegalese authorities have been aware for several years that the country’s main vulnerability lies not in its large cities but in its border margins. Managing this threat combines military reinforcement, regional cooperation, monitoring of movements and prevention work, with mixed results and significant limits linked to local realities.
A mainly regional threat, but with local friction points
In the Fouta, the main concern is the proximity of Malian areas where groups affiliated with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and JNIM operate, as well as the circulation of trafficking (arms, fuel, livestock, soft drugs). The regions of Matam and Podor are less exposed to direct attacks than to transit phenomena: the movement of people, resources and ideas, in a space historically integrated by cross-border trade.
In the south-east, the Kédougou region is close to the Malian and Guinean borders, in an environment marked by artisanal gold mining, the presence of industrial mining companies and high mobility of young workers. Recent research by specialist think tanks stresses that jihadist groups active in Mali and Burkina Faso regard this area as potential strategic depth, but that they do not, at this stage, have a social foothold there comparable to the one they have built in Liptako-Gourma.
In both cases, the threat is less that of a large-scale offensive than a risk of gradual spread: small cores of sympathisers, logistics, opportunistic recruitment in precarious communities, then possible exploitation of local tensions (land, pastoralism, gold mining, relations with the security forces).
Security reinforcement on the northern and south-eastern borders
Dakar’s response rests first on a reinforced security apparatus. The Senegalese army, often presented as one of the most structured in the region, has developed a posture of “forward defence”: the aim is to contain the threat as far upstream as possible, beyond or as close as possible to the borders, to prevent it from consolidating inside the country.
In practice, this translates into:
- the deployment of military posts, gendarmerie brigades and mobile companies in the border areas of the Fouta and the south-east;
- joint patrols and occasional joint operations with Mauritanian, Malian and Guinean forces, under bilateral agreements and regional mechanisms (G5 Sahel, ECOWAS);
- investment in intelligence, particularly human intelligence, to detect suspicious movements, radical preaching or logistical support networks.
The Senegalese forces have also drawn on their experience in peacekeeping operations and counter-terrorism cooperation with international partners (France, the United States, the European Union) to adapt doctrine, training and equipment to the regional threat. This cooperation nevertheless remains calibrated to avoid too visible a foreign presence in sensitive border areas.
Monitoring of movements, social control and prevention of radicalisation
Beyond the military tool, Dakar relies on tighter control of movements and of spaces of socialisation. The security services pay particular attention to:
- cross-border movements of young men of fighting age, especially those leaving to work at gold-mining sites or as seasonal farm workers;
- preaching in certain mosques or daara (Koranic schools), as well as religious or charitable associations that could serve as vehicles of influence;
- informal money transfer channels, which may be used to finance clandestine activities.
This monitoring goes hand in hand with prevention initiatives, often discreet, linking the state and religious actors. Sufi brotherhood leaders, influential imams and Islamic associations are mobilised to counter jihadist narratives, reaffirm the population’s attachment to brotherhood-based Islam and to the country’s stability, and defuse recruitment attempts.
In the Fouta as in the south-east, development and youth employment programmes are also highlighted, sometimes with the support of international partners. The aim is to reduce the socio-economic vulnerability that could make narratives of rupture attractive. Available evaluations nevertheless point to a frequent gap between stated ambitions and the real impact on local living conditions.
Regional cooperation and geopolitical constraints
Managing the threat in the Fouta and the south-east does not depend on Dakar alone. It is heavily conditioned by the evolution of the crises in Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea, and by recent regional realignments.
In the north, the gradual withdrawal of some international forces from Mali, the growing power of the Malian military authorities and their alternative security partnerships are changing regional balances. For Senegal, this means dealing with a neighbour whose security and diplomatic priorities are shifting, while maintaining minimal cooperation to avoid “security vacuums” along the border.
In the south-east, political instability in Guinea and the fragility of the state in some mining areas limit Conakry’s capacity to fully control its territory. This favours trafficking and informal circuits that cross the border with Kédougou. Dakar therefore seeks to strengthen bilateral cooperation while developing its own control capacity on its side of the border.
Regional frameworks (ECOWAS, the African Union) offer spaces for coordination, but their decisions often run up against political differences between member states and limited resources. Managing the threat therefore remains largely bilateral and pragmatic, adjusted case by case.
Persistent limits and vulnerabilities
Despite the absence of a lasting jihadist foothold in these areas, several vulnerabilities remain:
- a weak state presence in some rural municipalities, where public services (health, education, justice) are scarce and the security forces are perceived as distant or hard to reach;
- land and pastoral tensions linked to demographic pressure, climate change and competition for access to water and pasture, particularly along the river and in transhumance areas;
- the informal economy and trafficking (gold mining, smuggling, movement of livestock and fuel), which structure local life and make any policy of head-on repression delicate, at the risk of undermining livelihoods;
- a sense of marginalisation in some communities, which may perceive security policies as imposed from Dakar, without real consideration of local priorities.
These factors do not automatically lead to radicalisation or the establishment of armed groups, but they create ground where external actors may, in time, try to insert themselves by presenting themselves as protectors or arbiters of local conflicts. Academic work on the Sahel shows that this type of dynamic often precedes the entrenchment of jihadist groups in other contexts.
A strategy of prevention rather than reaction
Overall, Dakar manages the threat in the Fouta and the south-east through a reinforced prevention strategy, rather than by responding to insecurity that is already established. The authorities seek to maintain a “safety distance” between regional conflict hotspots and Senegalese territory, by combining:
- a stronger military and security presence in border areas;
- pragmatic regional cooperation with neighbouring countries;
- monitoring and prevention of radicalisation, drawing on religious and community networks;
- targeted development programmes, whose effectiveness remains uneven.
This approach has so far helped limit the direct spread of armed violence into Senegal, unlike several neighbouring countries. It does not, however, eliminate medium-term risks, particularly if the crises in Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea drag on and if socio-economic frustrations in peripheral areas do not find lasting responses.