Sahelian armies – mainly those of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, but also Chad and Mauritania – are at the heart of debates on regional security. They are presented both as the “front line” against jihadist groups and criticised for their structural weaknesses, their human rights violations and their dependence on external support. Assessing their real capacity means looking beyond political discourse to examine in detail their human, material, organisational and political resources.
Understanding military “capacity”: much more than the number of soldiers
An army’s real capacity cannot be reduced either to the size of its force or to the inventory of its weapons. Research on African armed forces highlights four essential dimensions:
- Operational capacity: the ability to plan, conduct and sustain operations over time (logistics, intelligence, combined-arms coordination).
- Institutional capacity: organisation, chain of command, human resources management, discipline, training.
- Political capacity: relationship with civilian authority, internal cohesion, degree of politicisation or factionalism.
- Societal capacity: relationship with the population, perceived legitimacy, respect for human rights, ability to cooperate with local actors.
In the Sahel, these four dimensions are deeply shaped by the legacy of post-colonial states, recurrent armed rebellions, coups d’état and dependence on international partners (France, the European Union, Russia, the Gulf states, etc.).
Personnel, recruitment and training: armies expanding rapidly but fragile
Since the early 2010s, Sahelian armies have significantly increased their personnel, under pressure from the rise of jihadist insurgencies and intercommunal violence. This rapid expansion has several characteristics:
- Massive, accelerated recruitment: in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, the increase in personnel has often preceded the upgrading of training, command and support capacities, which limits the operational quality of the new units.
- Uneven training: a minority of soldiers receive structured training (European programmes, bilateral cooperation, regional schools), while a large proportion receive shortened training, sometimes focused on combat techniques at the expense of discipline, the law of armed conflict and logistical skills.
- High turnover and attrition: operational pressure, combat losses and harsh living conditions lead to a rapid rotation of personnel and institutional fatigue, which affect cohesion and accumulated experience.
This dynamic creates a paradox: Sahelian armies are larger on paper, but the proportion of soldiers genuinely able to conduct complex, coordinated operations remains limited.
Equipment, logistics and external dependence
Sahelian armies have gradually acquired more modern equipment: armoured vehicles, surveillance drones, recent small arms, improved communications. However, several structural limitations persist:
- Fragile logistics: the ability to keep units deployed in remote areas supplied over time remains a major weakness. Degraded roads, insecurity and a lack of transport reduce the forces’ actual mobility.
- Dependence on external support: intelligence, air support, maintenance of complex equipment and specialised training rely heavily on foreign partners. This dependence limits strategic autonomy and makes the armies vulnerable to changes in these partners’ posture.
- Incomplete standardisation: the coexistence of equipment of diverse origins (Western, Russian, Asian) complicates maintenance, the supply of spare parts and technical training.
On the ground, these constraints translate into a real capacity often concentrated in a few better-equipped units, while many garrisons remain largely immobile, with a limited radius of action and little capacity for rapid reaction.
Chain of command, discipline and internal cohesion
The quality of the chain of command and of the armed forces’ internal governance is a central determinant of their effectiveness. In Sahelian armies, several recurring features appear in specialist analyses:
- Centralisation and personalisation: decision-making is often highly centralised, with strong influence from general staffs and political power, which sometimes slows reaction on the ground and can encourage logics of personal loyalty.
- Internal inequalities: certain elite units or units close to power enjoy markedly better resources, bonuses and equipment, which can give rise to internal tensions and a perception of favouritism.
- Problems of discipline and control: reports by NGOs and international organisations document abuses against civilians during counter-terrorism operations. Beyond their human and legal implications, these practices reflect difficulties in exercising effective control over troops and undermine the armies’ legitimacy.
The recent coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger also illustrate the central political role of the armed forces, but do not necessarily mean greater operational capacity. An army capable of overthrowing a government is not automatically an army capable of durably stabilising a territory in the face of diffuse insurgencies.
Relations with the population and local legitimacy
In the asymmetric conflicts of the Sahel, the relationship between the armed forces and the population is a decisive factor. The armies’ ability to obtain information, to cooperate with local communities and to present themselves as protectors rather than as a threat largely determines their effectiveness.
Field studies show contrasting situations:
- Areas of relative trust: in some regions, the armed forces are seen as a bulwark against armed groups, particularly when officers maintain regular dialogue with local authorities and community leaders.
- Areas of acute mistrust: in others, the population denounces abuses, arbitrary arrests or violence, which reduces cooperation, encourages the concealment of fighters and may even push some young people towards armed groups.
- Proliferation of armed actors: the support, or even integration, of self-defence groups or community militias further complicates this relationship, blurring the line between regular forces and non-state armed actors.
The real capacity of Sahelian armies must therefore also be assessed in the light of this socio-political dimension: an army that loses the trust of part of the population sees its operational room for manoeuvre sharply reduced.
Reforms, new alliances and the reshaping of capacities
Recent years have been marked by a rapid reshaping of security partnerships: the gradual withdrawal of certain international forces, the strengthening of alternative forms of cooperation, the rise of new actors. These developments have several consequences for the capacity of Sahelian armies:
- National refocusing: the end or scaling-down of certain international operations has led Sahelian states to claim greater autonomy, with efforts to strengthen their combat units, develop their own air capabilities and diversify their arms suppliers.
- Partial institutional reforms: some countries have launched reorganisations of command, revisions of doctrine or enhanced training programmes, but implementation remains uneven and is often constrained by security emergencies.
- Risks of fragmentation: the coexistence of regular forces, allied militias, private military companies and parallel security structures can increase confusion and complicate strategic coordination.
These dynamics open up room for progress, but they do not erase the structural constraints linked to weak public finances, fragile institutions and the size of the territories to be secured.
Real capacity: a force for “holding” rather than transformation
In summary, the real capacity of Sahelian armies is characterised by several features:
- A limited but real capacity to resist: they are able to hold urban centres, major roads and certain strategic areas, and to conduct offensive operations from time to time.
- Difficulty in controlling rural areas over time: low troop density, logistical constraints and the mobility of armed groups limit their ability to stabilise remote rural areas.
- Strong internal asymmetries: a few better-trained and better-equipped units account for a large share of operational capacity, while others remain under-officered and difficult to deploy.
- Limited capacity for transformation: the armies can contain certain threats, but struggle to change conflict dynamics durably without broader political, economic and social reforms.
For public, private and international actors, the challenge is to see these armies not as the sole levers of stabilisation, but as actors among others in complex configurations, where strictly military responses are not enough on their own to reverse the trends of violence and fragmentation in the Sahel.