Do populations really support the juntas?

Images of crowds gathered in Bamako, Ouagadougou or Niamey are often presented as proof of “mass support” for the military juntas. Yet this support is more complex, more fluctuating and more conditional than it appears. It combines genuine allegiance, resignation, pragmatic calculation, fear and the absence of a credible alternative.

Rather than asking whether “the population” supports the juntas or not, it is more useful to analyse who supports them, why, for how long and under what conditions.

What images of popular support show – and do not show

Pro-junta mobilisations in West Africa, particularly in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, share several recurring characteristics:

• Strong urban concentration: the large demonstrations take place in the capitals (Bamako, Ouagadougou, Niamey), sometimes in a few large regional towns, and much more rarely in rural areas.
• Organised mobilisation: trade unions, associations, youth movements, religious leaders, local influencers, and political or economic intermediaries play a key role in staging these rallies.
• Highly politicised discourse: denunciation of “France”, criticism of civilian political elites, emphasis on national sovereignty, support for new alliances (Russia, Turkey, etc.).

These elements are not enough to conclude that there is mass, uniform support from “the population”:

• The demonstrations are not necessarily representative of rural areas, where the majority of inhabitants live, particularly in the Sahel.
• Participation may be driven by conviction, but also by social conformity, opportunism (getting closer to the new authorities), or even fear of appearing hostile to the regime.
• Potential opponents may self-censor out of caution, especially when public freedoms are restricted.

Crowd images therefore indicate the juntas’ ability to mobilise part of the urban population, but they do not on their own make it possible to measure the depth or durability of support.

The underlying reasons for an often favourable initial reception

The recent coups have taken place in a context of deep disillusionment with civilian regimes and international partners. Several factors fuel an initially positive, or at least understanding, reception:

Fatigue with civilian political elites

In many countries, part of the population associates civilian governments with:

• corruption and the capture of public resources;
• poor governance (failing public services, patronage);
• an inability to improve living conditions despite decades of reformist rhetoric.

The coup is then perceived as a symbolic sanction imposed on leaders considered ineffective or out of touch.

Persistent insecurity and a sense of abandonment

In the central Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger), the advance of jihadist groups and armed militias has deeply affected populations, particularly in rural areas. Many feel that:

• the state does not protect them;
• the security forces are poorly equipped, poorly commanded or sometimes predatory;
• international partners have not halted the deterioration in security.

In this context, a military government promising to “regain control of the territory” and to “wage total war on terrorism” can appear as an option of last resort, even if its real capabilities are limited.

Frustration with external partners

Resentment towards certain partners, particularly France, draws on:

• the perception of an ineffective foreign military presence;
• colonial and post-colonial memories that remain vivid;
• the feeling that partners’ priorities do not always coincide with those of local populations.

The juntas capitalise on these frustrations by presenting themselves as defenders of sovereignty and proposing a geopolitical repositioning (diversification of alliances, rapprochement with new partners). This rhetoric resonates strongly with part of urban youth.

Support that is often conditional, evolving and fragmented

“Support” for the juntas is neither monolithic nor stable. It varies according to social categories, regions and how the situation develops.

Divides between towns and countryside

The capitals concentrate:

• the administrative and economic elites;
• the media and social networks;
• the most visible activist groups.

Rural areas, for their part, are more exposed to:

• armed violence (jihadist groups, militias, regular forces);
• reprisals and forced displacement;
• the deterioration of services (schools, health, markets).

Expectations of the juntas there are therefore more directly linked to everyday security and access to basic resources. Support there is often more pragmatic: loyalty goes to the actor (state, armed group, militia, local chief) that offers the most protection or room for manoeuvre.

Urban youth and the juntas’ political capital

Part of urban youth sees the juntas as:

• actors capable of breaking with a political order considered locked;
• an opportunity to redistribute certain positions (posts, public contracts, political visibility);
• a vehicle for national assertion vis-à-vis the outside world.

However, this political capital can erode quickly if:

• promises of improved security do not materialise;
• restrictions on public freedoms intensify;
• the economic situation deteriorates (sanctions, inflation, unemployment).

Fear, control of public space and the absence of alternatives

In military regimes, the repression of critical voices, surveillance of the media and the criminalisation of certain forms of protest limit the public expression of opposition. Apparent “support” may then partly be:

• a constrained silence, linked to fear of reprisals;
• a wait-and-see attitude, for lack of an organised political alternative;
• a temporary accommodation with those in power.

The real degree of allegiance therefore remains difficult to measure, especially as conventional tools (polls, opinion surveys) are rare and sometimes impossible to carry out in a context of security and political crisis.

The limits and risks of support based on rupture

Initial support for the juntas often rests on a promise of rupture: a break with previous political elites, with certain external partners, and with policies considered ineffective. This promise has several limits.

Very high expectations, limited room for manoeuvre

Populations simultaneously expect:

• a rapid improvement in security;
• economic relief (lower prices, access to jobs, basic services);
• symbolic recognition (national dignity, sovereignty).

Yet the juntas inherit systems marked by:

• fragile institutions;
• strong economic dependence (foreign aid, imports);
• armed conflicts rooted in complex local dynamics (land, pastoralism, marginalisation of certain communities).

The capacity of military regimes to meet these expectations quickly is therefore structurally limited, which exposes them to disillusionment.

Authoritarian consolidation and the weakening of spaces for debate

To stay in power, the juntas tend to:

• reduce the space for political parties and independent media;
• criminalise certain forms of protest in the name of security or the fight against “subversion”;
• rely on highly politicised support movements, sometimes hostile to any criticism.

In the medium term, this dynamic can weaken the trust of part of the population, particularly when economic and security difficulties persist.

Why the question of “popular support” remains hard to settle

Assessing real support for the juntas requires taking several methodological constraints into account:

• Lack of reliable data: independent polls are rare and sometimes impossible to conduct in certain areas.
• Visibility bias: spectacular demonstrations are widely relayed, while discreet forms of disagreement (abstention, murmurs, departures, refusal to cooperate) are barely visible.
• Contexts of fear or surveillance: these limit the sincerity of responses and public expression.

Rather than a clear-cut “yes” or “no”, it is more rigorous to consider that:

• part of the population, particularly in urban areas, genuinely adheres to the discourse of rupture and sovereignty promoted by the juntas;
• another part is pragmatic or resigned, in the absence of a credible alternative or in a context of acute insecurity;
• significant segments of society remain critical or wary, even if they rarely express this publicly.

The relationship between populations and the juntas is therefore better understood as a shifting balance between allegiance, constraint, calculation and waiting. This balance can change quickly depending on three key variables: the security trajectory, the economic situation and the degree of political closure.