A state under pressure on several fronts
Nigeria is simultaneously facing three major types of internal threat: the jihadist insurgency of Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in the North-East, armed criminal gangs (“bandits”) in the North-West and the Centre, and separatist movements in the South-East, centred on the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). This combination places exceptional pressure on the political, military and economic capabilities of the federal state.
The question is not only whether Nigeria can “win” on all these fronts, but whether it can contain them simultaneously, that is, limit their expansion, reduce their impact on populations and preserve national cohesion. The analysis rests on placing in perspective the specific dynamics of each threat, their interactions and the structural constraints weighing on the Nigerian state.
Boko Haram and ISWAP: an insurgency transformed rather than defeated
In the North-East, Boko Haram, which emerged in the early 2000s, evolved into a large-scale armed insurgency from 2009 onwards. Since the 2016 split, two poles have dominated: the original Boko Haram faction and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), affiliated with the Islamic State organisation. The death of Abubakar Shekau in 2021 weakened the original faction but strengthened ISWAP, which has established itself as the main jihadist actor in the Lake Chad region.
The Nigerian army, supported by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) with Chad, Niger and Cameroon, has retaken several localities and reduced the groups’ capacity to hold urban territory. However, ISWAP retains sanctuaries in hard-to-reach areas (Lake Chad islands, forests, cross-border corridors) and continues to put pressure on civilians, notably through taxation, extortion and targeted attacks on security forces and certain villages.
Work by the International Crisis Group, ISS Africa and several academic studies converges on one finding: the conflict has entered a phase of “violent stabilisation” rather than resolution. Nigeria is partially succeeding in containing the insurgency within a relatively well-defined geographical area, but at the cost of a sustained military effort, mass population displacement and prolonged dependence on humanitarian aid. The room for manoeuvre to reallocate resources to other internal crises remains limited.
Armed banditry in the North-West: a criminal threat with quasi-insurgent effects
In the North-West and part of the Centre, groups of “bandits” carry out kidnappings for ransom, looting, cattle rustling and the destruction of villages. These groups are often structured around gang leaders, with shifting alliances, internal rivalries and varying connections to smuggling and arms trafficking networks, and sometimes to jihadist actors.
Analyses by ACLED, Small Arms Survey and ISS Africa show that this armed banditry has taken on a quasi-insurgent dimension in certain rural areas: control of roads, taxation of communities, denial of access to fields, forced displacement. The line between organised crime, conflict over resources (land, pastoralism) and political violence is becoming blurred.
The state’s capabilities are being severely tested: difficult terrain, lack of local intelligence, mistrust of the security forces among the population, corruption, and the proliferation of sometimes uncontrolled self-defence militias. One-off military operations achieve temporary results, but the geographical dispersal of the groups and the porous border with Niger make lasting stabilisation complex.
This threat, although primarily criminal, undermines the legitimacy of the state, disrupts agricultural supply chains and fuels a perception among rural populations that they have been abandoned. It absorbs security resources that are then lacking for other fronts, creating an effect of institutional saturation.
Separatist movements in the South-East: political protest and violent drift
In the South-East, the Biafran separatist movement, driven notably by IPOB and its paramilitary wing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN), is rooted in a long memory: the Biafran War (1967–1970) and a lasting sense of political and economic marginalisation among part of the Igbo population. IPOB combines political rhetoric, mobilisation of the diaspora and action on the ground, including “sit-at-home” days (instructions to stay at home) and, in some cases, violent acts attributed to factions or to groups claiming to act in this cause.
The Nigerian authorities have proscribed IPOB as a terrorist organisation and favoured a security response: arrests, police and army operations, increased surveillance. This approach has at times fuelled a cycle of mistrust and radicalisation, with mutual accusations of abuses and difficulties in distinguishing between political activists, criminal groups and opportunistic actors exploiting the context.
Compared with Boko Haram/ISWAP or the bandits of the North-West, the separatist movements of the South-East do not, at this stage, threaten the territorial integrity of the state to the same degree. Their impact is nonetheless significant on perceptions of national cohesion, confidence in federal institutions and regional economic stability, particularly in strategic urban and commercial areas.
A state facing structural constraints
Nigeria’s capacity to contain these three threats simultaneously depends largely on structural factors. Several elements emerge from academic work and think-tank reports:
- Institutional fragmentation: coexistence of federal, police and paramilitary forces with sometimes overlapping mandates, imperfect coordination between agencies, tensions between the centre and the federated states.
- Lack of trust between the state and the population: perceptions of injustice, corruption and impunity, reinforced by documented abuses by some security personnel.
- Inequality and youth unemployment: high population growth and a lack of economic opportunities, which favour recruitment by armed groups or criminal networks.
- Circulation of small arms: cross-border flows, resale of diverted weapons, a black market supplying jihadists, bandits and militias alike.
- Budgetary pressures: dependence on oil revenues, vulnerability to economic shocks, difficult trade-offs between security, social and infrastructure spending.
These constraints reduce the state’s capacity to pursue, in parallel, differentiated long-term strategies adapted to each type of threat. They partly explain why responses often remain reactive, focused on one-off operations rather than on integrated approaches combining local governance, development, justice and security.
Interactions between threats: contagion effects and overlaps
The three dynamics are not sealed off from one another. Several forms of interaction are emerging:
- Opportunistic convergence: bandit groups have in some cases forged links with jihadist factions, whether for access to weapons, ransoms or protection. This convergence varies from area to area, but it complicates the distinction between ideological insurgency and crime.
- Symbolic contagion effect: the existence of several hotspots of armed protest reinforces, for some segments of the population, the idea that violence is a possible means of being heard, whether for religious, economic or identity-based demands.
- Competition for security resources: the need to deploy troops and assets across several theatres reduces the capacity to concentrate forces. A relative improvement in one area may coincide with a deterioration in another, simply as a result of redeployment.
- International perception: the multiplication of crises affects Nigeria’s image as a pole of regional stability, with implications for investment, security partnerships and diplomacy.
These interactions reinforce the idea that the question is not merely tactical or military, but systemic: managing these threats simultaneously comes down to the nature of Nigeria’s social contract and the state’s capacity to respond to local grievances without allowing autonomous spaces of violence to develop.
Can Nigeria contain these three threats simultaneously?
Recent trends suggest an intermediate scenario. On the one hand, the Nigerian state has significant resources: a large population, an economy that is diversified on a regional scale, armed forces that are relatively robust compared with many of its neighbours, and accumulated experience in managing internal crises. These assets have so far made it possible to avoid a generalised collapse or major territorial fragmentation.
On the other hand, the persistence of hotspots of violence in several regions, for more than a decade in the North-East, indicates that the state’s capacity is geared more towards partial control than towards resolution. Containing Boko Haram/ISWAP, the bandits and the separatist movements simultaneously appears possible in the short and medium term, but at the cost of:
- chronic levels of violence in certain rural and peri-urban areas;
- an erosion of trust in institutions and a diffuse sense of insecurity;
- a high economic and human cost, particularly for the most vulnerable populations.
Analyses by think tanks and researchers stress that the sustainability of this “management at the upper threshold of crisis” will depend on several factors: the government’s capacity to improve local governance, reform the security sector, create economic prospects for young people and engage in targeted political dialogue (notably in the South-East and certain rural areas of the North).
In summary, Nigeria can, up to a point, simultaneously contain Boko Haram, the bandits and the separatists, but this capacity remains fragile, uneven across regions and heavily dependent on internal reforms. Without structural change, the risk is less one of sudden disintegration than of a prolonged state of “low- to medium-intensity conflict” on several fronts, with lasting consequences for national cohesion and regional stability in West Africa.