How is Niamey managing insecurity in Tillabéri?

The Tillabéri region, in south-western Niger, is one of the epicentres of armed violence in the Sahel. Located in the so-called “three borders” area between Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, it concentrates the presence of jihadist groups affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, community militias and cross-border trafficking. The way Niamey manages this insecurity combines military responses, administrative measures, regional cooperation initiatives and attempts to re-anchor the state among the population.

Local dynamics are changing rapidly, particularly since the break with Western partners and the rapprochement with new security allies. The following analysis highlights the main lines of the Nigerien authorities’ security management of Tillabéri, as well as its limits and uncertainties.

A strategic space at the heart of regional realignments

Tillabéri is at once a landlocked rural area, a trade corridor and a sensitive border space. It is crossed by:

• roads linking Niamey to Mali and Burkina Faso;
• transhumance and trade circuits between Peul, Songhai, Tuareg, Arab and Gourmantché communities;
• illicit flows (weapons, fuel, livestock, smuggled goods) exploited by criminal networks and armed groups.

Since 2016–2017, the region has gradually been drawn into a spiral of violence: attacks on the defence and security forces, massacres of civilians, population displacement, school closures and disruption of agricultural and pastoral activities. Two main threat poles shape the landscape:

• Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), a coalition affiliated with al-Qaeda, active in the border areas with Burkina Faso and Mali;
• the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), now integrated into the Sahelian branch of the Islamic State, historically very present in northern Tillabéri.

The region is also affected by the fallout from the political crises in Mali and Burkina Faso, by the weakening of some international forces and by the realignment of Niger’s security alliances since 2023.

A primarily security and military response

Niamey’s management of insecurity relies first and foremost on a reinforced military posture. Several lines structure this approach:

Deployment of the armed forces and counter-insurgency operations

The Niger Armed Forces (FAN) and the National Guard are deployed in forward posts, operational bases and mobile detachments. The main objectives are:

• to protect urban centres and strategic roads;
• to conduct offensive operations against armed groups in rural areas;
• to secure certain markets, transhumance points and administrative sites.

The dominant logic remains that of counter-insurgency: tracking down armed groups, disrupting their logistics networks, and limiting their capacity to tax populations and control territory. This approach has at times reduced the number of attacks in some areas, but it carries risks of displacing violence to other localities and of tensions with certain communities, particularly when operations rely on partial or biased local intelligence.

Support from foreign allies and realignment of partnerships

For several years, the management of insecurity in Tillabéri took place within a framework of close cooperation with Western partners (France, the United States, the European Union), through:

• the presence of special forces and air assets on Nigerien territory;
• the training and equipping of local forces;
• intelligence sharing and aerial surveillance.

Since the change of regime in 2023, the Nigerien authorities have profoundly reoriented these partnerships, announcing the end of several military cooperation agreements and moving closer to new actors, notably Russia and associated security structures. This realignment has direct effects on Tillabéri:

• reduction or transformation of certain air support and intelligence capabilities;
• gradual arrival of new advisers and equipment;
• framing of the fight against insecurity within a more assertive discourse of sovereignty and of a break with past practices.

The concrete effects of this transition are still only partly documented, but the changeover period creates a phase of operational and political uncertainty, which armed groups are seeking to exploit.

Security governance: state of emergency, military zones and control of movement

In an attempt to regain control over Tillabéri, Niamey has also used legal and administrative instruments, with a strong emphasis on controlling populations and spaces.

State of emergency and restrictions

Several departments of Tillabéri have been placed under a state of emergency, allowing:

• tighter controls on movement (motorcycles, vehicles, markets);
• expanded powers for the defence and security forces;
• restrictions on certain economic activities deemed sensitive (movement of fuel, cross-border trade, etc.).

These measures aim to reduce the mobility of armed groups and disrupt their logistics circuits. They nevertheless have ambivalent effects on local populations: longer journeys, difficult access to markets, widespread suspicion, risks of corruption at checkpoints. In some cases, these restrictions can fuel resentment and the perception of “collective punishment” for already vulnerable communities.

Operational zones and territorial reorganisation

The region has been divided into military operational zones, with specific commands and strengthened coordination between the armed forces, gendarmerie, National Guard and intelligence services. The aim is to:

• better adapt the security response to local specificities;
• facilitate information sharing between services;
• speed up decision-making and reaction in the event of an attack.

At the same time, the state seeks to maintain a minimal administrative presence (prefects, sub-prefects, technical services) in the district towns that remain accessible, while de facto accepting areas of weak or very weak state control in the bush. This “variable geography” of state presence shapes how Niamey manages insecurity: protecting cores deemed strategic, at the cost of a partial withdrawal from some rural areas.

Relations with communities: between distrust, local initiatives and attempts at dialogue

The management of insecurity in Tillabéri is not played out solely on the military front. It also depends on relations between the state, local communities and armed actors.

Vigilance committees and local security actors

In several localities, forms of vigilance committees, self-defence groups or community surveillance arrangements have emerged or been tolerated. Their role is to:

• pass information to the security forces;
• protect villages against incursions;
• organise informal early warning systems.

These structures can contribute to local security, but they carry risks of abuse: targeting of certain groups perceived as close to the jihadists, settling of local scores, instrumentalisation by political or economic elites. Niamey thus finds itself in a delicate position, between the need for local support and a stated desire to avoid the uncontrolled proliferation of militias.

Attempts at dialogue and local arrangements

In some areas of the Sahel, local arrangements between communities, authorities and armed actors have been tried, whether formal or informal. In Tillabéri, attempts at community mediation or ad hoc negotiation over movement, transhumance or the protection of markets have been reported, often led by:

• customary and religious leaders;
• local associations;
• community intermediaries with access to armed groups.

Niamey’s attitude towards these initiatives is cautious and at times ambivalent. The central authorities officially favour armed struggle against groups described as terrorist, but sometimes tolerate local arrangements that temporarily reduce violence or maintain essential economic activities. These practices remain poorly institutionalised and highly dependent on the balance of power at any given moment.

Regional cooperation and the limits of coordination

Insecurity in Tillabéri is closely linked to the dynamics of neighbouring countries. Niamey’s management therefore also relies on regional cooperation frameworks.

Multinational frameworks and joint forces

Niger has taken part in several regional mechanisms:

• the G5 Sahel Joint Force, with coordinated operations in the three borders area;
• bilateral agreements with Mali, Burkina Faso and Nigeria for joint patrols or operations;
• cooperation within ECOWAS and other regional forums on security and counter-terrorism issues.

Successive political changes in the region, diplomatic tensions and the questioning of certain frameworks (such as the G5 Sahel) nevertheless limit the continuity and effectiveness of these arrangements. Armed groups take advantage of grey areas along the borders, differences in posture between states and coordination difficulties.

Redefinition of alliances and impacts for Tillabéri

The recent reconfiguration of Niger’s alliances, with closer ties to certain neighbours that have themselves broken with Western partners, opens up new prospects for security cooperation, but also new challenges:

• a risk of limited synchronisation of national strategies, as each state has its own domestic priorities;
• uncertainties over the funding and sustainability of the new arrangements;
• possible tensions with regional or international partners more critical of these choices.

For Tillabéri, this means that the management of insecurity is increasingly embedded in a shifting regional framework, in which Niamey’s room for manoeuvre is both broadened politically and constrained by operational and economic realities.

Civilian programmes, development and the limits of non-military action

Niamey has also sought to link the security response with development and support actions for the population, often in partnership with international organisations and NGOs.

Recurring lines of action include:

• humanitarian assistance to internally displaced people and host communities;
• projects to revive agriculture, pastoralism and small businesses in areas that remain accessible;
• programmes to strengthen community resilience, prevent radicalisation and support young people.

These initiatives nevertheless face several obstacles:

• insecurity, which restricts humanitarian and development actors’ access to many areas;
• the difficulty of coordinating civilian interventions and military operations;
• the sometimes negative perception of certain programmes, seen as too short-term or insufficiently adapted to local realities (land, pastoralism, justice, local governance).

Niamey’s management of insecurity in Tillabéri thus remains marked by an asymmetry: a military presence more visible than public services, justice or economic opportunities, which limits the state’s ability to regain lasting legitimacy.

Recent trends and uncertainties

Several trends deserve particular attention in understanding how the management of insecurity in Tillabéri is evolving:

• Realignment of armed groups: shifting rivalries and alliances between jihadist factions, adaptation of their modus operandi, diversification of funding sources.
• Pressure on communities: taxation, forced or voluntary recruitment, control of movement, but also negotiation and survival strategies of populations caught between several armed actors.
• Evolution of Niger’s security partnerships: the gradual rise of new allies, the withdrawal or repositioning of former partners, with effects that are still only partly measurable at local level.
• Resilience and fatigue of populations: a remarkable capacity for adaptation among many communities, but also risks of discouragement, prolonged exodus and a breakdown of trust in the state if prospects for improvement remain limited.

Niamey’s management of insecurity in Tillabéri thus appears as a fragile balance between military imperatives, political constraints, regional pressures and the expectations of the population. The responses implemented have so far prevented a total collapse of state control, but they have not yet produced lasting stabilisation. The evolution of alliances, the state’s capacity to re-anchor itself locally and the consideration given to rural socio-economic dynamics will be decisive for what comes next.