The question of maritime border surveillance keeps returning as sea-related issues multiply: piracy, drug trafficking, irregular migration, illegal fishing, fuel or mineral smuggling, as well as geopolitical competition and the exploitation of offshore hydrocarbons. Compared with the 1990s and 2000s, the seas are on the whole better monitored, but very unevenly depending on the region, the state and the type of threat.
In West Africa, often seen as a maritime “weak link”, progress is real, driven by technological investment, regional cooperation frameworks and increased attention from international partners. These advances nonetheless remain limited by incomplete operational capabilities, fragile governance systems and highly adaptive criminal dynamics.
What “better monitoring” a maritime border means
Maritime surveillance is not limited to the presence of warships. It combines several dimensions:
- sensors: coastal radars, AIS (Automatic Identification System) systems that track vessels, satellites, drones, air patrols;
- response assets: coastguards, national navies, police and customs units at sea;
- coordination centres: data fusion, risk analysis, inter-agency coordination;
- legal framework: national laws, international conventions (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, conventions against transnational crime, etc.);
- regional and international cooperation: information sharing, joint operations, multinational exercises.
Saying that maritime borders are “better monitored” therefore means both a technical improvement (more sensors, more patrols) and an organisational one (better flow of information, faster decision chains, stronger cooperation).
An overall improvement… but a very uneven one
At global level, maritime surveillance capabilities have strengthened markedly over the past twenty years or so. Several major trends stand out:
- widespread use of vessel tracking systems: AIS, mandatory for large commercial vessels, makes it possible to track most cargo ships and tankers in near real time. Commercial services and state agencies now combine AIS and satellite imagery to detect vessels that deliberately “switch off” their signal;
- growth of space-based surveillance: observation satellites (optical and radar) provide more frequent coverage, with constellations dedicated to maritime surveillance. They make it possible to spot illegal fishing activity or cargo transfers at sea;
- professionalisation of coastguards in many regions, with modernised fleets, enhanced training and maritime coordination centres;
- rise of regional cooperation: for example, the Yaoundé Architecture in the Gulf of Guinea, Frontex in Europe for integrated border management, or anti-piracy arrangements in the Indian Ocean.
This progress does not mean total control of the seas. Poorly monitored areas remain, notably in the maritime spaces of low-resource countries, in conflict zones and in certain regions where political priorities are focused on land security rather than maritime security.
Focus on West Africa: greater capabilities, control still incomplete
West Africa clearly illustrates this ambivalent dynamic: visible progress, but capabilities still out of step with the scale of the challenges. The region concentrates shipping routes vital to world trade, areas of piracy and armed robbery at sea, drug trafficking from Latin America, migrant flows, as well as intensifying offshore oil and gas exploitation.
Strengthening of surveillance arrangements
Several major developments have improved the surveillance of West African maritime borders:
- Yaoundé Architecture (2013): this regional cooperation framework covers the whole Gulf of Guinea, from Côte d’Ivoire to Angola. It relies on national and regional coordination centres responsible for exchanging information and coordinating responses to incidents at sea;
- national maritime surveillance centres: many coastal states (such as Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire) have set up maritime operations centres integrating AIS data, coastal radars and information from international partners;
- modernisation of navies and coastguards: acquisition of patrol vessels, refurbishment of existing ships, crew training, often with support from external partners (European Union, United States, France, etc.);
- regular multinational exercises: exercises such as Obangame Express in the Gulf of Guinea make it possible to test regional coordination, interception procedures and information sharing.
These efforts have contributed to a fall in reported piracy attacks in certain areas of the Gulf of Guinea in recent years, although the data must be interpreted with caution owing to under-reporting and shifts in modus operandi.
Structural limits and blind spots
Despite this progress, several constraints reduce the real effectiveness of surveillance:
- incomplete coverage: coastal radars cover only part of exclusive economic zones. Beyond certain distances, detection depends mainly on satellites and international cooperation;
- limited response assets: having information is not enough if patrol vessels are too few, poorly maintained, with limited endurance and high operating costs;
- sometimes fragile inter-agency coordination: navies, coastguards, customs, police, port authorities and ministries do not always share their information effectively, for institutional or budgetary reasons or because of bureaucratic rivalries;
- incomplete or poorly enforced legal frameworks: the arrest of a suspect vessel does not always lead to solid prosecutions, for lack of appropriate laws, usable evidence or sufficient judicial capacity;
- vulnerabilities at port level: ports are often nerve centres for trafficking (drugs, fuel, illicit goods). Surveillance at sea may be more advanced than controls on the quayside or in land-based supply chains.
Criminal actors and smuggling networks adapt to these arrangements, using smaller vessels, less monitored routes, cargo transfers on the high seas or accomplices within port and maritime administrations.
Wider security challenges: from terrorism to trafficking
Maritime border surveillance is not only about piracy. In West Africa, it is part of a regional security environment marked by:
- the expansion of jihadist groups from the Sahel towards certain coastal countries, which fuels concerns about the potential use of maritime routes for trafficking, financing or movements of people;
- cocaine and methamphetamine trafficking, for which West African ports and shipping routes serve as transit points towards Europe;
- illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, which represents a major economic loss for coastal states and fuels social tensions in fishing communities;
- smuggling of fuel and refined products, notably around Nigeria and its neighbours, with economic and environmental impacts;
- migration flows, particularly from certain West African countries to Europe, via the Canary Islands or the Mediterranean, which draw increased surveillance resources from European states and their partners.
In this context, maritime borders become spaces where security issues, economic interests and humanitarian constraints intersect. Stronger surveillance can reduce certain risks (piracy, trafficking) while shifting routes or making migration journeys more dangerous.
Tighter control, but far from watertight
Compared with the situation twenty or thirty years ago, maritime borders are on the whole better monitored: more data, sensors, patrol assets, and regional and international cooperation. States and regional organisations have more sophisticated analytical tools to spot anomalies, track vessels and coordinate interventions.
However, several factors put this improvement into perspective:
- the size of the areas to be controlled: exclusive economic zones are immense and resources remain limited, especially for states with small defence and security budgets;
- the adaptability of criminal actors: transnational networks exploit gaps in the arrangements, the boundaries between jurisdictions, poorly monitored areas and local complicity;
- political and institutional constraints: the priority given to maritime security varies with governments, political cycles and domestic pressures (land conflicts, economic crises, political transitions);
- unequal access to technology: the most advanced solutions (satellites, long-endurance drones, automated data analysis systems) often remain concentrated in the hands of a limited number of actors.
Surveillance has therefore been strengthened, but this does not automatically translate into total control of maritime borders, nor into a uniform reduction in risks. Results vary according to the area, the type of crime and each state’s capacity to turn information into action and effective prosecutions.
Outlook: towards more integrated and more selective surveillance
Current trajectories point to several likely developments:
- greater data integration: fusion of multiple sources (AIS, radars, satellites, human intelligence, port data) to produce complete and dynamic “maritime pictures”;
- growing use of artificial intelligence to detect abnormal vessel behaviour, anticipate certain risks and optimise the deployment of patrol assets;
- stronger regional cooperation in West Africa, with a gradual build-up of coordination centres and joint operations, subject to sustainable funding and political will;
- more selective surveillance: focus on certain areas (strategic ports, offshore production zones, identified trafficking corridors), with a risk of leaving other spaces on the margins.
For economic actors, NGOs and institutions operating in West Africa, the sea is no longer a weakly regulated “empty space”. It is increasingly regulated, monitored and politicised. Maritime borders are better observed than before, but they remain spaces of permanent negotiation between security, economic interests, local practices and transnational criminal dynamics.