The announced withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) marks a turning point for the region’s political and security architecture. The decision comes amid growing tensions between the juntas in power in the three countries and the regional organisation, against a backdrop of coups, the fight against jihadist armed groups and geopolitical realignments.
A withdrawal at the crossroads of political and security crises
Mali (2020–2021), Burkina Faso (2022) and Niger (2023) experienced successive military coups, which their authors justified by the failure of civilian governments to curb insecurity and corruption. ECOWAS responded with sanctions, suspensions and demands for a “transition” to constitutional order, with electoral timetables that the military authorities considered restrictive.
In this standoff, the three states gradually converged: political and security rapprochement, the creation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), denunciation of economic sanctions and a rhetoric of sovereignty in the face of an ECOWAS perceived as aligned with certain member states and Western partners. Leaving ECOWAS is therefore both a political act of rupture and a symbolic gesture of reconfiguring regional alliances.
In security terms, these states continue to face an escalation of violence linked to groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, but also to local militias and self-defence forces. The decision to leave ECOWAS does not stem solely from this insecurity, but it is connected to it: it reflects a desire to regain control over cooperation frameworks, military partnerships and priorities in the fight against violent extremism.
Political and institutional consequences for the region
The withdrawal of three Sahelian states redraws the internal balance of ECOWAS. The organisation loses a strategic geographical bloc at the heart of the Sahel, as well as significant demographic and territorial weight. Symbolically, it weakens the image of an ECOWAS able to maintain regional cohesion in the face of political crises.
Several implications can be identified:
- Weakened regional mediation capacity: ECOWAS sees its role as mediator challenged by regimes that consider it biased. Other actors – the African Union, Algeria, bilateral partners, or even Russia or Turkey – may seek to fill this vacuum.
- Risk of normative fragmentation: since the 1990s, ECOWAS has built a body of norms on democracy, elections and coups. The departure of three states that reject these norms paves the way for an institutional “grey zone” in the Sahel, where military transitions could become entrenched without a binding regional framework.
- Strengthening of the AES as an alternative bloc: the Mali–Burkina Faso–Niger alliance presents itself as an autonomous political and security framework, with a discourse centred on sovereignty, collective security and the reorientation of partnerships. The durability of this alliance nevertheless remains uncertain, depending on the convergence of interests between military regimes and their limited economic capacities.
For the other member states, the withdrawal poses a dilemma: maintain a firm line on principles (condemnation of coups, pressure for transitions) or adapt their stance to avoid encouraging further ruptures and the rise of competing blocs within the West African space.
Security impact: cooperation, borders and the fight against violent extremism
The fight against terrorism and violent extremism in West Africa rests on a patchwork of frameworks: ECOWAS, the G5 Sahel (already weakened by the withdrawal of Mali, then Burkina Faso and Niger), bilateral initiatives, international operations and informal cooperation between security forces. Leaving ECOWAS does not end all cooperation, but it changes the channels and the interlocutors.
Several effects should be anticipated:
- More complex coordination: regional mechanisms for intelligence sharing, early warning and coordination of border operations, often supported by ECOWAS, risk losing fluidity. Ad hoc arrangements between the AES and certain neighbours may emerge, but with higher transaction costs and greater dependence on the political will of the moment.
- Redefinition of external partnerships: the withdrawal is part of a broader shift by some Sahelian regimes towards new security partners (notably Russia, at the expense of France and several European actors). ECOWAS, often the interface for regional security programmes, could be bypassed in favour of bilateral agreements or narrower formats.
- Border management and cross-border flows: the closure or restriction of certain borders, decided as part of the sanctions, has already affected local populations and economies. In the medium term, leaving ECOWAS could lead to more nationalised border management, with consequences for the movement of people, but also for trafficking and the routes used by armed groups.
For violent non-state actors, these institutional realignments create both opportunities (areas of reduced coordination between states, exploitable political tensions) and constraints (strengthening of certain military coalitions, arrival of new security partners). The concrete effects will depend on the ability of states to maintain, despite political tensions, technical channels of cooperation on security matters.
Economic and social stakes: free movement, trade and vulnerabilities
ECOWAS is not only a political framework; it is also an economic and social space founded on the free movement of people, goods and services, as well as on integration projects (common external tariff, single currency project, regulatory harmonisation). The withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger may have significant effects on these dimensions.
The main stakes lie at several levels:
- Free movement of people: nationals of these countries could lose certain mobility benefits within the ECOWAS area, depending on how the withdrawal is applied and negotiated. For border populations, heavily dependent on daily movements for trade, employment or access to services, any further restriction would translate into higher costs and greater vulnerability.
- Regional trade and supply chains: Niger, a landlocked country, depends heavily on corridors via Benin and Togo; Mali and Burkina Faso rely on the ports of Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Ghana and Togo. Additional customs duties or barriers, even partial ones, would make imports more expensive (fuel, foodstuffs, agricultural inputs) and complicate exports (gold, livestock, agricultural products).
- Informal economy and trafficking: de facto regional integration relies largely on informal channels. Additional constraints on legal trade may increase the appeal of clandestine routes and smuggling networks, already active in the Sahel (fuel, cigarettes, weapons, drugs, livestock). This may increase the resources of certain criminal or armed groups, while further weakening public finances.
- Social risk and public perceptions: a fall in purchasing power, supply disruptions or mobility restrictions may fuel social discontent, in contexts where military regimes derive their legitimacy from the promise of security and sovereignty. Part of the population may support the break with ECOWAS, perceived as unfair or distant, but this support remains conditional on concrete results in terms of security and living conditions.
Geopolitical realignments: towards competing blocs in West Africa?
The withdrawal of these three states is part of a broader dynamic of shifting influence in West Africa. Traditional partners (France, the European Union, the United States) see their position challenged in the Sahel, while other actors (Russia, Turkey, the Gulf states and, to a lesser extent on security matters, China) are strengthening their presence, notably through military agreements, mining contracts or political support.
In this context, several trends can be observed or anticipated:
- Intra-regional polarisation: the coexistence of an AES bloc, driven by military regimes at odds with ECOWAS, and a core of politically more stable coastal states seeking to contain the contagion of coups, may generate lasting political tensions. This polarisation could translate into divergences on crisis management, security partnerships and economic orientations.
- Rise of alternative formats: as trust between certain states and ECOWAS erodes, frameworks such as the AES, ad hoc coalitions or bilateral agreements may take over to address security, migration or infrastructure issues. This undermines the idea of regional integration structured around a single dominant organisation.
- Balancing act between external powers: states in the region must deal with competing offers of security and economic partnerships. For some, ECOWAS remains a framework for collective negotiation with donors and partners; for others, leaving the organisation is seen as a way to diversify alliances and increase room for manoeuvre in the face of Western conditionalities.
The future trajectory will depend on several variables: the evolution of the security situation in the AES countries, the ability of ECOWAS to adapt its crisis management mechanisms, and the way populations perceive the costs and benefits of these geopolitical repositionings.
Areas of uncertainty and watch points for exposed actors
Several elements remain uncertain and should be closely monitored by organisations, companies and institutions active in West Africa:
- Legal and practical arrangements for the withdrawal: timelines, transitional agreements and possible sectoral exceptions (transport, energy, health, humanitarian) will determine the real extent of disruptions to the movement of goods and people.
- Evolution of sanctions and counter-sanctions: the tightening or easing of economic and financial measures, on both sides, will influence the business climate, the risk of logistical disruption and macroeconomic stability.
- Whether discreet technical cooperation is maintained: even amid political tensions, some states may seek to preserve channels of cooperation on critical issues (cross-border health, the fight against trafficking, river basin management, early warning). The robustness of these mechanisms will partly determine regional resilience.
- Local perceptions and regime legitimacy: the military authorities present the withdrawal as an act of sovereignty. If concrete benefits are slow to materialise, part of the population could reconsider this choice, with domestic and regional political implications.
For economic and institutional actors, the challenge is not only to measure the immediate risk, but to anticipate a possible lasting reconfiguration of the West African space around several integration poles, with distinct rules and partners. This potential fragmentation increases uncertainty, but also provides indicators to monitor in order to adjust strategies for establishment, cooperation and risk management.