Joint operations have become a central instrument of the security response in West Africa and the Sahel: cross-border operations between neighbouring states, multinational arrangements (G5 Sahel, MNJTF around Lake Chad), bilateral cooperation with external partners. They are often presented as “coordinated”, “integrated” or even “pooled”. In practice, the reality is more nuanced.
The issue is not only whether forces operate at the same time in the same area, but whether they genuinely share information, plan together, complement each other on the ground and pursue converging strategic objectives. In other words: is coordination structural and lasting, or essentially declaratory and occasional?
What “coordination” really covers
In security language, coordination refers to several distinct levels:
- Political coordination: agreements between states, joint mandates, joint declarations, legal frameworks (memoranda of understanding, defence agreements, cross-border protocols).
- Strategic coordination: shared definition of priorities (areas to be secured, types of threats, timetable), linkage between military operations, police, justice and civilian action.
- Operational coordination: joint planning of operations, intelligence sharing, clear chains of command, harmonised rules of engagement.
- Logistical coordination: resupply, medical evacuation, maintenance, communications, air capabilities.
Many so-called “joint” operations are limited to a political or symbolic level: announcements of cooperation, simultaneous patrols on either side of a border, exchanges of delegations. Operational coordination, which is more demanding, often remains partial and fragile.
Examples of joint operation frameworks in West Africa
Several arrangements illustrate these dynamics:
- The G5 Sahel Joint Force (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Chad) was designed for coordinated cross-border operations against armed groups and trafficking. Despite a strong political framework, actual deployment, the frequency of operations and projection capacity remained limited, in a context of coups, diplomatic tensions and the withdrawal of key partners.
- The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) around Lake Chad (Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, Benin) has conducted joint operations against Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa. Coordination there is older, but remains heavily dependent on national capacities and priorities, notably those of Nigeria.
- Bilateral or regional cross-border operations (for example Burkina Faso–Togo–Benin, or Niger–Nigeria) are multiplying in border areas affected by jihadist groups or trafficking. They often rely on more flexible police and military cooperation mechanisms, but with variable strategic depth.
These frameworks show a genuine will to pool efforts, but also the structural limits of coordination in a context of jealously guarded sovereignty, political transitions and mutual distrust.
The main obstacles to genuine coordination
Diverging political and security agendas
The states involved in joint operations do not all perceive threats in the same way. For some, the priority is the fight against jihadist groups; for others, border control, the fight against trafficking, regime stability or the management of internal rivalries. These differences translate into:
- different geographical priorities (some states concentrate their resources on areas considered more sensitive for their own internal security);
- political timelines (elections, transitions, regional sanctions) that influence actual commitment on the ground;
- reluctance to share sensitive information, perceived as liable to be used for political or influence purposes.
When national agendas diverge, operational coordination becomes harder to stabilise over time.
Highly unequal military and logistical capabilities
The armed and security forces of the countries in the region have very heterogeneous levels of training, equipment and morale. This asymmetry affects the ability to conduct genuine joint operations:
- some contingents lack sufficient mobility resources (vehicles, fuel, air support), which limits their effective participation;
- joint-service and inter-state communications often remain fragmented, despite intelligence fusion centres supported by international partners;
- joint command capabilities (C2) are still being built, with difficulties in managing complex operations across several theatres.
Under these conditions, the “joint” label can mask a highly asymmetrical operational commitment between partners.
Fragmentation of international partners
Joint operations often take place in an environment where several external actors are involved simultaneously: UN missions, bilateral forces, private military companies, training and equipment programmes. This plurality can generate:
- duplication or overlapping initiatives (several parallel coordination structures);
- rivalries for influence between international partners, which have repercussions on operational choices;
- an overload of consultation mechanisms, sometimes more cumbersome than genuinely operational.
Coordination then becomes as much a matter of diplomacy and management of security assistance as a functional military process.
Weak integration of civilian and local dimensions
Most joint operations remain focused on the military dimension, with limited integration of civilian actors: local administrations, customary authorities, civil society organisations. This poses several problems:
- operations may ignore essential local dynamics (land conflicts, pastoral tensions, community rivalries) that fuel violence;
- feedback from communities is insufficient, limiting the relevance of human intelligence;
- operations may be perceived as external or intrusive, which complicates cooperation with populations.
Coordination is not limited to the armed forces: it also requires linkage with public policies, justice, local governance and legitimate non-state actors.
Real progress, but often sectoral and fragile
Despite these limitations, several developments indicate a gradual improvement in certain aspects of coordination:
- Intelligence fusion centres and regional platforms (supported by the African Union, ECOWAS or bilateral partners) that facilitate the sharing of information on armed groups, trafficking routes or security incidents.
- Mixed patrols and joint border posts that allow better mutual knowledge, even though the size of the territories to be covered remains considerable.
- Regular joint exercises (manoeuvres, crisis simulations) that strengthen technical interoperability and common procedures.
- More integrated approaches in some areas, where military, police and civilian actors try to coordinate their action around the protection of civilians and the reopening of public services.
This progress nevertheless remains highly dependent on political stability, continuity of funding and the maintenance of channels of dialogue between states, which is far from guaranteed in a context of rapid regional realignments.
For organisations and companies: what this implies
For economic actors, NGOs and international organisations, the question of the “genuine coordination” of joint operations has direct implications in terms of risk:
- Limited predictability: operations can be announced, postponed or reconfigured quickly, with variable effects on the security of logistics corridors, operating sites or rural areas.
- Blurred areas of responsibility: in some cross-border areas, it is not always clear which forces are actually present, who commands what, or what the priorities are in terms of protecting civilians.
- Threat displacement effects: one-off joint operations can push armed groups to redeploy to other areas, including regions previously relatively spared.
- Local perceptions: the way populations perceive these operations (protection, neutrality, abuses, alleged collusion with certain actors) influences overall trust in institutions and, by extension, in the organisations present on the ground.
Analysis of joint operations must therefore include, beyond official announcements, close observation of their actual implementation, their continuity over time and their effects on local security and governance dynamics.
Towards more substantial coordination?
Several trends could, in the medium term, encourage more genuine and less declaratory coordination:
- Gradual strengthening of national capacities (command, logistics, intelligence) that reduces asymmetries between partners.
- Regional and international pressure for better harmonisation of responses, notably via ECOWAS, the African Union and certain funding mechanisms conditional on cooperation.
- Institutional learning: security forces are accumulating experience of cross-border operations, which gradually improves procedures and cooperation reflexes.
- Growing recognition of the role of local actors in stabilisation, with attempts to link military operations, local mediation and development programmes.
However, uncertainties remain high: realignments of alliances, breaks with certain partners, the rise of non-Western actors, tensions between sovereignty and cooperation. The question is therefore not only whether joint operations are coordinated today, but in which direction regional security architectures are evolving, and with what degree of trust between actors.
Ultimately, many joint operations remain only partially coordinated: they reflect a will to cooperate, but come up against political, institutional and technical constraints that limit their depth. Genuine coordination is built over time, through the accumulation of practices, trust and shared capabilities, more than through announcements of “joint” operations alone.