Why foreign special forces take up so much media space
In West Africa and the Sahel, foreign special forces – French, American, European, Russian via private military companies, and a few units from other powers – are often presented as decisive actors against jihadist groups and armed rebellions. Their image is associated with high technology, precision strikes and the “neutralisation” of armed group leaders.
This visibility contrasts with a more complex reality. Special forces can produce significant, sometimes spectacular, tactical effects, but their strategic impact – that is, their lasting impact on the trajectory of conflicts – is far more debated. Recent experiences in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and northern Nigeria illustrate these ambiguities.
What are special forces in the Sahelian context?
Special forces are highly trained military units specialising in discreet and targeted operations: capturing or eliminating armed group leaders, freeing hostages, special reconnaissance, support to local forces, guiding air strikes, etc. They often operate in small detachments, with strong intelligence support (drones, interceptions, satellites) and logistics.
In the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea, several configurations exist:
- Western special forces: for example, the French units engaged in Operations Serval and then Barkhane, US special forces in Niger or Burkina Faso, and European detachments as part of training missions or bilateral partnerships.
- Foreign units linked to private military companies: the most publicised case is Wagner, followed by related structures, present notably in Mali and to a lesser extent in other countries in the region.
- National special forces: several West African states have created or strengthened their own elite units, often with external support (training, equipment, intelligence).
The central issue is to understand what these actors can really change in conflicts marked by the fragmentation of armed groups, weak state institutions and deep local tensions.
Undeniable but short-lived tactical successes
The available studies (reports by specialist think tanks, academic research, analyses by international organisations) converge on one point: foreign special forces have achieved significant tactical successes, in particular:
- the neutralisation or capture of leaders of jihadist groups or criminal networks;
- the temporary disruption of chains of command or logistics circuits;
- the release of hostages or the protection of certain strategic sites;
- decisive support to national forces during complex attacks on military camps or towns.
These operations have sometimes temporarily reduced the intensity of attacks in a given area, or secured a logistics corridor. They have also provided partner states with intelligence capabilities that are hard to obtain otherwise, notably through surveillance drones, communications interception and satellite imagery.
However, these gains often remain limited in scope: once the pressure is relaxed, armed groups reorganise, move to other areas or blend further into local communities. The highly fluid structure of Sahelian jihadist organisations, and their ability to fragment and reform, limit the lasting impact of decapitating their leadership.
Why special forces are not enough to reverse conflict dynamics
The conflicts in the Sahel and the northern Gulf of Guinea are not solely military. They combine:
- local grievances (access to land and water, tensions between farmers and herders, rivalries between community groups);
- a weak state presence, or one perceived as abusive (corruption, violence by the security forces, marginalisation of certain regions);
- informal and illicit economies (trafficking, artisanal gold mining, trade routes) from which armed actors and segments of the state apparatus profit;
- regional dynamics (porous borders, the circulation of weapons, contagion effects from neighbouring crises).
In this context, special forces can treat some armed symptoms but not the structural causes. Several limits recur in the analyses:
- The capillarity of the terrain: armed groups operate across vast, often hard-to-reach areas, with local networks of informants. A few hundred foreign operators, however well equipped, cannot control these territories over time.
- Replacement of leaders who are killed: the death of jihadist leaders can temporarily weaken a group, but clandestine structures are designed to ensure succession. Sometimes these killings even favour the emergence of more radical figures or ones less inclined to negotiate.
- A deficit of local legitimacy: the presence of foreign forces, especially when visible or associated with blunders, can be exploited by jihadist propaganda, which presents it as an “occupation” or interference.
- Asymmetry of objectives: the states deploying special forces also pursue their own strategic interests (global counter-terrorism, geopolitical influence, access to resources or regional positions), which do not always coincide with the priorities of local populations.
Political and symbolic effects: between support and contestation
Beyond the military field, foreign special forces produce major political effects in host countries.
For some governments, their presence:
- strengthens the regime’s capacity to survive, by securing the capital, certain strategic routes or key economic sites;
- offers diplomatic leverage with other partners, by showing that they are at the heart of the international fight against terrorism;
- makes it possible to showcase security cooperation to domestic public opinion, at least initially.
But this presence can also generate internal tensions:
- part of the population, the army or the political elite may perceive this cooperation as an infringement of sovereignty;
- changes of regime (notably coups d’état) are sometimes accompanied by a reshaping of alliances, with the presence of certain foreign forces being called into question and new partners being sought;
- competition between external powers (Western, Russian, regional) results in a polarisation of political debate and in influence campaigns aimed at discrediting certain actors.
This political dimension explains why special forces that are tactically effective can, over time, become a subject of domestic contestation, or even grounds for a diplomatic rupture.
Impact on local communities and perceptions of security
For people living in conflict zones, the key question is not only the presence of special forces, but the overall quality of security and governance. Several elements emerge from field surveys and qualitative studies:
- Perceptions of security depend more on the reduction of everyday violence (raids, racketeering, abductions, abuses) than on the number of jihadist leaders announced as neutralised.
- Blunders, collateral damage or operations perceived as arbitrary – whether they involve foreign forces, national forces or allied militias – can fuel distrust and strengthen the appeal of armed groups presenting themselves as protectors or local arbiters.
- When special forces operate with considerable opacity, without clear communication or accountability, it becomes difficult for communities to distinguish their actions from those of other armed forces or armed groups, which fuels confusion and rumours.
In some cases, targeted operations can nonetheless help to restore a minimum of trust, for example when they prevent a large-scale attack or free captives. But these effects remain fragile if the state is unable to improve access to basic services, justice and local conflict resolution mechanisms in a lasting way.
Special forces and international struggles for influence
Foreign special forces are also a foreign policy tool. Their deployment, withdrawal or redeployment to other theatres signals strategic priorities.
In the Sahel and West Africa, several trends are emerging:
- A reconfiguration of Western presences, with the end or transformation of certain operations and a desire to reduce direct political exposure while retaining projection and intelligence capabilities.
- The rise of new foreign military actors, notably through more discreet security partnerships or through private military companies, which blur the line between state cooperation and commercial services.
- A diversification of partnerships by West African states, seeking not to depend on a single ally and to take advantage of international rivalries to increase their room for manoeuvre.
In this game, special forces become a key vector of presence, information gathering and influence, but also a potential source of diplomatic friction when security agendas diverge.
Special forces as one element of a wider set-up
The question is therefore not only whether foreign special forces are “decisive”, but in what configuration they can contribute to a lasting improvement in security.
The most cautious analyses highlight several conditions:
- Clear anchoring in an overall political strategy, defined by the host country, linking security, governance, development, justice and the inclusion of local communities.
- Complementarity with national forces, including building up the skills of local armies and security forces, but also control and accountability mechanisms to limit abuses.
- Coordination with civilian initiatives (local mediation, development programmes, mechanisms for managing land and pastoral conflicts) so that military operations do not contradict dialogue efforts.
- A minimum of transparency towards the population and national institutions, to reduce misunderstandings, rumours and exploitation by armed groups’ propaganda.
Without these elements, special forces risk remaining a powerful but essentially reactive tool, able to strike quickly and hard, but without transforming the deep dynamics that fuel insecurity.
Are foreign special forces decisive?
At a strictly military level, foreign special forces can be decisive at specific moments: preventing the fall of a town, countering a major offensive, dismantling a cell planning complex attacks, protecting vital infrastructure.
On the other hand, at the level of the lasting stabilisation of Sahelian and West African states, they appear rather as one lever among others, whose effectiveness depends largely on:
- the coherence of national strategies;
- the ability of states to restore a legitimate and non-predatory presence in rural and peripheral areas;
- taking into account the local grievances and informal economies that structure these territories.
Foreign special forces are therefore neither a miracle solution nor a negligible factor. They are a powerful but limited instrument, whose effect can be positive, neutral or counter-productive depending on how it is integrated into a wider set-up for conflict management and rebuilding trust between the state and the population.