Cross-border disinformation has become an additional source of fragility in many West African contexts. It circulates both through digital channels (encrypted messaging apps, social networks, short videos) and through more traditional vectors (rumours, sermons, community radio stations, cross-border markets). It affects sensitive issues: military operations, coups, the presence of foreign forces, communal conflicts and elections, but also public health and food security.
Here, ‘disinformation’ means the intentional dissemination of false or misleading content, often mixed with true elements, in order to influence perceptions, delegitimise actors or polarise societies. The term ‘cross-border’ refers to the circulation of such content across several countries, through shared languages and social networks, or through actors who operate in several national spaces at once.
Why disinformation crosses borders so easily
In West Africa, several structural factors facilitate the cross-border circulation of disinformation:
- Shared linguistic spaces: the use of French and English, but also of regional languages (Hausa, Fula, Bambara, Dioula, Wolof, etc.), allows the same message to reach several countries quickly.
- Social networks and messaging apps: WhatsApp, Facebook, TikTok, Telegram and YouTube enable the rapid spread of content that is hard to trace, often re-edited or taken out of context.
- Regional mobility: traders, transporters, migrants, preachers, artists, diasporas… also carry narratives, rumours and interpretations of events.
- Crisis contexts: armed conflicts in the Sahel, coups, electoral tensions and soaring food or energy prices create strong demand for quick explanations and scapegoats.
- Low institutional trust: in some countries, mistrust of the state, public media or international partners makes audiences more receptive to alternative narratives, even those with little credibility.
Several research studies and reports by specialist organisations stress that disinformation does not come only ‘from outside’ or ‘from social networks’. It is also produced or relayed by local actors: politicians, influence entrepreneurs, partisan media, armed groups, but also individuals acting for economic motives (monetising viral content) or symbolic ones (recognition, belonging to an online community).
Actors and objectives of cross-border disinformation
The actors involved are many and their objectives are often intertwined:
- National political actors: they may exploit narratives circulating in the sub-region to bolster their legitimacy, delegitimise the opposition or justify security and diplomatic choices.
- Armed groups and extremist organisations: they use disinformation to exaggerate their successes, minimise their losses, discredit national armies or international forces, and stoke communal divides.
- Foreign actors: states, strategic communication firms, private military companies or influence networks may seek to sway regional public opinion, particularly around military presence, defence agreements or economic partnerships.
- Media entrepreneurs and ‘influencers’: some accounts or pages, structured as genuine small businesses, produce polarising content to maximise engagement and advertising revenue, without necessarily subscribing ideologically to the narratives they spread.
The objectives range from geopolitical influence struggles to the simple pursuit of visibility. In conflict zones, disinformation can have direct effects on security: rumours of imminent massacres, false alerts, manipulated videos attributing to a given group or army abuses committed elsewhere or in another context.
West African specificities: between historical legacies and new media
Disinformation dynamics are rooted in older histories of political, religious or commercial rumours circulating at the regional level. What is changing today is the speed, scale and limited traceability of content.
Three elements are particularly structuring:
- The interplay between orality and digital media: a viral TikTok video can be summed up in a few sentences in a cross-border market, then relayed in a mosque or church, before returning online as a voice message. The same narrative thus circulates across several media, which makes it harder to debunk.
- Issues of sovereignty and foreign presence: competition between external powers, the reshaping of military partnerships and debates on sovereignty fuel highly polarised narratives that spread from one country to another.
- Armed conflicts and communal tensions: in Sahelian and border areas, some content explicitly aims to stoke mistrust between communities (herders/farmers, ‘natives’/‘newcomers’, urban/rural dwellers), with possible repercussions on both sides of borders.
Response levers: beyond censorship and internet shutdowns
Faced with these dynamics, several governments have adopted laws on cybercrime, ‘false information’ or ‘glorification of terrorism’, sometimes accompanied by platform blocking or internet shutdowns during sensitive periods. These responses can curb certain disinformation campaigns, but they raise important debates about civil liberties and can also reduce access to reliable information.
Other levers, less visible but often more durable, are gradually being explored by states, regional organisations, media and civil society actors.
Strengthening the information ecosystem rather than control alone
- Capacity of local media: fact-checking training, production of content in national languages, partnerships between community radio stations, television channels and online media to collectively verify widely shared information.
- Institutional transparency and responsiveness: more regular communication by the authorities on security operations, border incidents or sensitive rumours, in order to reduce the information vacuums that feed speculation.
- Regional cooperation: sharing of alerts between authorities in several countries when the same misleading content circulates simultaneously in different spaces, particularly around security or electoral events.
Building audiences’ skills
Countering cross-border disinformation is not just about ‘correcting’ content. It involves strengthening audiences’ ability to assess information:
- Media and information literacy: gradual integration, within formal and non-formal education systems, of modules on basic verification (origin of an image, date, source, minimal cross-checking).
- Community approaches: radio workshops, public debates and awareness programmes involving religious leaders, customary chiefs, and youth and women’s associations, in order to discuss recurring rumours and their effects.
- Taking local languages into account: much misleading content circulates as voice messages or videos in regional languages. Verification and awareness initiatives must address these audiences in their own languages.
Understanding the emotions and needs that disinformation responds to
Studies on disinformation show that it thrives where the narratives on offer respond to emotional or identity needs: the need to designate someone responsible, to restore wounded pride, to simplify an environment perceived as threatening. In West Africa, these dimensions intersect with colonial histories, persistent inequalities, and political and economic frustrations.
The most robust responses therefore seek to offer credible alternative narratives that acknowledge these frustrations without exploiting them, and that rely on actors trusted by the target audiences (respected journalists, religious figures, cultural personalities, community organisations).
Specific issues for organisations and businesses
For international organisations, NGOs and businesses operating in fragile contexts, cross-border disinformation can generate several types of strategic risk:
- Security risks: rumours of alleged collusion with one side (government, opposition, armed group, foreign power) that can increase local hostility or expose staff to threats.
- Political risks: perceptions of interference or partiality, amplified by regional disinformation campaigns, that can damage relations with authorities or partners.
- Social and reputational risks: online campaigns accusing an organisation of corruption, embezzlement, religious proselytism or political destabilisation, liable to affect the trust of beneficiaries, donors or clients.
- Supply chain risks: rumours targeting transporters, suppliers or operating sites (mines, infrastructure, logistics hubs) that can lead to community blockades or delays.
From this perspective, several strategic-level approaches emerge:
- Context analysis and monitoring: regular tracking of narratives circulating in areas of operation, including in local languages and on less visible platforms, in order to identify weak signals early.
- Actor mapping: identification of credible information relays (media, community leaders, associations) with whom to maintain regular dialogue.
- Transparency and consistency: clear communication on objectives, the limits of action and partnerships, in order to reduce the space left for malicious interpretations.
Limits and debates around counter-disinformation policies
Recent research and lessons learned highlight several points of caution:
- Risk of over-regulation: very broad laws on ‘fake news’ can be used to restrict legitimate criticism, investigative journalism or the voices of human rights defenders.
- Difficulty distinguishing error, rumour and organised manipulation: not all inaccurate information is necessarily disinformation. The response differs depending on whether it is an honest mistake, an old rumour or a coordinated campaign.
- Counter-productive effect of some censorship: removing content or blocking platforms can feed the idea that ‘the truth is being hidden’, sometimes reinforcing the credibility of conspiracy narratives.
- Lack of data and research: in several countries, systematic studies on the trajectories of disinformation content, its real impact and the effectiveness of responses remain limited, which makes public policies difficult to evaluate.
Countering cross-border disinformation thus involves a delicate balance between protecting societies, preserving freedom of expression and the need to maintain pluralistic spaces for debate, including on sensitive subjects such as security policies, political transitions or international partnerships.