{"id":77136,"date":"2025-12-15T11:00:09","date_gmt":"2025-12-15T11:00:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/great-powers-influence-sahel-geopolitics\/"},"modified":"2025-12-15T11:00:09","modified_gmt":"2025-12-15T11:00:09","slug":"great-powers-influence-sahel-geopolitics","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/great-powers-influence-sahel-geopolitics\/","title":{"rendered":"How do the great powers influence the Sahel?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>\n<strong>The Sahel<\/strong> has become one of the most contested areas on the African continent. An area of high insecurity, state fragility and strategic resources, it now attracts the attention of many external powers. This presence is no longer limited to counter-terrorism: it extends to diplomacy, the economy, information, military alliances and political regimes.\n<\/p>\n<p>\nUnderstanding how the great powers influence the Sahel means going beyond the idea of a simple \u201cFrance\u2013Russia confrontation\u201d or \u201cthe West versus the rest of the world\u201d. The dynamics are more complex, interweaving security interests, geopolitical rivalries, economic stakes and strategies of influence aimed at Sahelian public opinion.\n<\/p>\n<h2>Why is the Sahel so strategic for the great powers?<\/h2>\n<p>\nThe <strong>Sahel<\/strong> refers to a vast semi-arid belt stretching from Mauritania to Chad, including Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Several factors explain the great powers\u2019 interest in the region:\n<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Geographical centrality<\/strong>: an interface between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, between the Atlantic and the Red Sea, and a migration corridor towards the Mediterranean.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Global security stakes<\/strong>: the presence of jihadist groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda (JNIM) and the Islamic State (ISGS and affiliates), and risks of projection or regional destabilisation.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Natural resources<\/strong>: uranium in Niger, gold in Mali and Burkina Faso, oil and gas in neighbouring areas (Libya, Nigeria, Gulf of Guinea), and solar and wind potential.<\/li>\n<li><strong>State fragility<\/strong>: repeated coups, institutional weakness and economies dependent on external aid, opening space for strategies of influence.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Migration dimension<\/strong>: the Sahel is a major corridor for African mobility, at the heart of European border control policies.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>\nThese factors create an environment in which external powers combine <strong>security cooperation<\/strong>, <strong>development aid<\/strong>, <strong>investment<\/strong> and <strong>information warfare<\/strong> to defend their interests and shape the regional political order.\n<\/p>\n<h2>France: from central security ally to contested partner<\/h2>\n<p>\nFrance was long the dominant external actor in the Sahel. As heir to the former colonial presence, it had military bases, defence cooperation agreements and significant political influence.\n<\/p>\n<p>\nAfter 2013, with Operation <strong>Serval<\/strong> in Mali and then <strong>Barkhane<\/strong> across the Sahel, Paris positioned itself as a pillar of the fight against jihadist groups. This presence relied on:\n<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>a <strong>regional military deployment<\/strong> (bases in Chad, Niger, and Mali until the withdrawal);<\/li>\n<li>a <strong>key role in supporting national armies<\/strong> (training, intelligence, air support);<\/li>\n<li><strong>close cooperation with European partners<\/strong> (EU missions, special forces of Task Force Takuba, etc.).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>\nHowever, this French centrality was increasingly contested. Several factors combined:\n<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Security results deemed insufficient<\/strong>: despite the operations, insecurity spread, fuelling a sense of failure.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Sovereigntist and anti-French rhetoric<\/strong>: relayed by some local political actors, influencers and disinformation campaigns.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Internal political crises<\/strong>: coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, with new regimes seeking to redefine their alliances and mark a symbolic break.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>\nThe successive expulsions of French forces from Mali, Burkina Faso and then Niger have profoundly reshaped the French presence. Paris remains active in the region (notably in Chad and C\u00f4te d\u2019Ivoire), but its role is no longer hegemonic. This reshaping has opened space for other powers, in particular Russia.\n<\/p>\n<h2>Russia: rising influence, between security, symbols and information<\/h2>\n<p>\nRussia quickly established itself as a major actor in the Sahel, especially from 2020 onwards. Its influence rests on several levers:\n<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Security cooperation<\/strong>: deployment of military instructors and private military companies (such as the network linked to Wagner, now reintegrated into more formalised structures), and supply of weapons and equipment.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Political discourse<\/strong>: anti-colonial rhetoric, emphasis on \u201csovereignty\u201d and the rejection of Western interference, which resonates with some elites and part of the population.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Information influence strategies<\/strong>: social media campaigns, local media relays, and showcasing of security cooperation and the break with the West.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Access to resources<\/strong>: negotiations for mining concessions (gold, manganese, etc.) or economic agreements in exchange for security support.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>\nIn the countries led by military juntas (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger), Russia is perceived by some leaders as a partner offering <strong>rapid security support with few political conditions<\/strong> (human rights, governance), and useful for counterbalancing Western pressure.\n<\/p>\n<p>\nResearchers nevertheless point to <strong>grey areas<\/strong>: lack of transparency in the agreements, a real impact on security that is still difficult to assess, risks of security and economic dependence, and possible effects on local dynamics of violence (relations between armies, militias and communities).\n<\/p>\n<h2>The United States: counter-terrorism, strategic rivalry and partial withdrawal<\/h2>\n<p>\nThe United States is present in the Sahel mainly through:\n<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>intelligence and surveillance capabilities<\/strong> (notably drone bases in Niger until the recent adjustments);<\/li>\n<li><strong>training and assistance programmes<\/strong> for the security forces;<\/li>\n<li><strong>diplomatic engagement<\/strong> focused on stability, governance and the prevention of violent extremism.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>\nUS policy combines several objectives:\n<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Limiting the expansion of jihadist groups<\/strong>, as part of a global counter-terrorism approach.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Countering the influence of Russia<\/strong> (and, to a lesser extent, China) in a context of global strategic competition.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Promoting democratic governance<\/strong>, with stronger conditionality than that of some other partners.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>\nThe successive coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and then Niger complicated this posture. US legislation strictly governs security assistance to regimes resulting from coups, which has led to reductions or suspensions of assistance and a partial repositioning of forces. This constraint opens space for actors less concerned with governance issues.\n<\/p>\n<h2>The European Union and its member states: between security, development and migration<\/h2>\n<p>\nThe European Union and several of its member states (Germany, Italy, Spain, etc.) have developed a so-called \u201c<strong>integrated<\/strong>\u201d approach in the Sahel, combining:\n<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>civilian and military missions<\/strong> (EUTM Mali, EUCAP Sahel, etc.) aimed at training armies, police forces and gendarmeries;<\/li>\n<li><strong>development aid and budget support<\/strong> in the fields of governance, education, health and agriculture;<\/li>\n<li><strong>migration policies<\/strong> seeking to strengthen border control, combat trafficking and encourage returns.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>\nThis approach has, however, been weakened by:\n<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>the <strong>deterioration of political relations<\/strong> with some military regimes;<\/li>\n<li>the <strong>rise of anti-Western sentiment<\/strong> and criticism of aid conditionality;<\/li>\n<li><strong>doubts about the effectiveness<\/strong> of training and security support arrangements in a context of political instability.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>\nThe EU nevertheless remains a major economic and financial actor, notably through development aid and support for the coastal countries of the Gulf of Guinea, now considered a priority area for \u201ccontaining\u201d the effects of the Sahelian crisis.\n<\/p>\n<h2>China: a discreet but indispensable actor<\/h2>\n<p>\nChina is less visible militarily than France or Russia, but its influence in the Sahel is significant, especially through:\n<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>economic investment<\/strong> in infrastructure (roads, dams, telecommunications), often under the \u201cBelt and Road Initiative\u201d;<\/li>\n<li><strong>state-to-state loans and financing<\/strong>, which increase the financial dependence of some countries;<\/li>\n<li><strong>a limited but real security presence<\/strong> through contributions to UN peacekeeping operations (MINUSMA in Mali until its withdrawal, for example), and the protection of its nationals.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>\nBeijing generally adopts a posture of <strong>declared political non-interference<\/strong>, favouring the stability of incumbent regimes and the continuity of its economic projects. This approach can be perceived as an alternative to Western conditionality, but it raises questions about debt, contract transparency and the local effects of major projects.\n<\/p>\n<h2>Other actors: Turkey, the Gulf states and African regional powers<\/h2>\n<p>\nOther actors are gaining in importance, even if they are sometimes less visible in public debate:\n<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Turkey<\/strong>: strengthening its presence through military cooperation, drone exports, religious and educational ties, and active diplomacy in West Africa.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The Gulf states<\/strong> (Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates): involved in investment, diplomatic mediation or occasional security cooperation, with sometimes distinct agendas.<\/li>\n<li><strong>African regional powers<\/strong> (Nigeria, Algeria, Morocco): each seeks to influence the regional security architecture, crisis mediation and economic dynamics (energy, trans-Saharan trade).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>\nThese actors contribute to a <strong>multipolarisation<\/strong> of the Sahel, in which Sahelian states theoretically have greater room for manoeuvre to diversify their partnerships, but must also manage sometimes contradictory agendas.\n<\/p>\n<h2>What concrete effects on local conflict dynamics?<\/h2>\n<p>\nThe influence of the great powers is not played out solely in foreign ministries. It has direct repercussions on <strong>local conflicts<\/strong>, <strong>community balances<\/strong> and <strong>informal economies<\/strong>.\n<\/p>\n<p>\nSeveral effects can be observed or are feared:\n<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Reshaping of internal alliances<\/strong>: a change of external partner can alter power relations within armies, between units, or between the army and self-defence groups.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Tightening or loosening of constraints<\/strong> on military operations, depending on the type of partner and its priorities (protection of civilians, human rights, speed of results).<\/li>\n<li><strong>War economy and security rents<\/strong>: flows of aid and military or mining contracts can feed predatory networks, strengthen some local actors at the expense of others and fuel frustration.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Public perception<\/strong>: the way inhabitants assess the action of foreign partners (protection, abuses, broken promises) influences the legitimacy of states and the capacity of armed groups to recruit.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>\nResearchers stress that <strong>local dynamics remain central<\/strong>: the great powers influence the context, but trajectories of violence are largely determined by land tensions, inequalities, local political rivalries, conflicts between farmers and herders, and the marginalisation of certain regions.\n<\/p>\n<h2>What geopolitical landscape for the Sahel? Trends and uncertainties<\/h2>\n<p>\nSeveral major trends are emerging, but with significant uncertainties:\n<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Increased multipolarity<\/strong>: the dominance of a single external actor is giving way to competition between several powers, with more fluid and sometimes opportunistic alliances.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Strengthening of military regimes<\/strong> backed by partners that are undemanding on governance, which may stabilise some governments in the short term while leaving questions of domestic legitimacy open.<\/li>\n<li><strong>A shift in security priorities<\/strong> towards the coastal countries of the Gulf of Guinea, where the great powers are seeking to prevent the spread of Sahelian violence.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Intensified competition over information<\/strong>: battles of narratives, disinformation campaigns, and exploitation of colonial memory and social frustrations.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>\nMany <strong>areas of uncertainty<\/strong> remain: the real capacity of the new partnerships to improve security, the long-term effects of mining and security agreements, the reactions of civil society and urban youth, and the impact of climate and economic shocks on political stability.\n<\/p>\n<p>\nThe influence of the great powers in the Sahel is therefore neither a zero-sum game nor a simple \u201creplacement\u201d of one actor by another. It is part of an <strong>entanglement of local, national and regional crises<\/strong>, in which the partnership choices of Sahelian states interact with deep social dynamics. How these interactions evolve in the coming years will weigh heavily on the security and political trajectory of West Africa as a whole.\n<\/p>\n<p>\nFor organisations, NGOs and businesses exposed to these shifts, anticipating the concrete impact of these rivalries on the ground requires continuous monitoring of incidents and actor dynamics: discover Sahel Watch\u2019s <a href=\"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/solution\/\">Sahel security monitoring platform<\/a>. To take the analysis further, see also our <a href=\"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/west-africa-security-scenarios-2030\/\">security scenarios for West Africa up to 2030<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The Sahel has become one of the most contested areas on the African continent. An area of high insecurity, state fragility and strategic resources, it now attracts the attention of many external powers. This presence is no longer limited to counter-terrorism: it extends to diplomacy, the economy, information, military alliances and political regimes. Understanding how [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"acteur":[157,154,158,156],"niveau":[173],"risque":[170,171],"thematique":[159,162],"zone":[144,147,149],"class_list":["post-77136","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","acteur-armed-and-security-forces","acteur-international-actors-and-regional-organisations","acteur-non-state-armed-groups","acteur-states-and-public-institutions","niveau-analytical-level","risque-political-risks","risque-security-risks","thematique-armed-conflict-and-terrorism","thematique-geopolitics-and-international-actors","zone-burkina-faso","zone-mali","zone-niger"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/77136","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=77136"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/77136\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=77136"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"acteur","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/acteur?post=77136"},{"taxonomy":"niveau","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/niveau?post=77136"},{"taxonomy":"risque","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/risque?post=77136"},{"taxonomy":"thematique","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/thematique?post=77136"},{"taxonomy":"zone","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/zone?post=77136"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}