\nWest Africa\u2019s national armies are on the front line against non-state armed groups: jihadist organisations, community militias and structured criminal gangs. The question of their ability to \u2018hold out alone\u2019 comes up regularly, especially in a context of partial withdrawal of foreign forces (Barkhane, MINUSMA) and the reshaping of security partnerships.\n<\/p>\n
\nRather than answering with a simple yes or no, it is more relevant to distinguish several levels: militarily holding key areas, durably controlling a territory, reducing the influence of armed groups and, in the longer term, restoring the legitimacy of the state. Each of these levels requires different resources and alliances.\n<\/p>\n
\n\u2018Holding out\u2019 is not only about winning battles. In the Sahelian and Gulf of Guinea contexts, three dimensions combine:\n<\/p>\n
\nAn army can win tactical victories while losing the battle for local influence, which leaves armed groups free to regroup, relocate or blend into communities.\n<\/p>\n
\nWest African armies have several strengths that are often underestimated in public debate.\n<\/p>\n
\nNational forces know local dynamics better than any external actor: community divides, transhumance seasons, trade and smuggling routes. This knowledge varies between units, but it is a structural advantage over armed groups that rely precisely on these local realities.\n<\/p>\n
\nIn many countries, the army remains one of the few national institutions perceived as a symbol of unity, despite recurring criticism of abuses and politicisation. This symbolic dimension plays a role in mobilisation, recruitment and resilience.\n<\/p>\n
\nRecent years have seen increased defence budgets<\/strong> in several Sahelian and coastal states, a partial modernisation of equipment (armoured vehicles, drones, surveillance assets), and the creation of special forces and units dedicated to counter-terrorism.\n<\/p>\n \nAlthough these changes remain incomplete, they show that national armies are not static. In some contexts, they can contain the expansion of armed groups or retake strategic localities, especially when they receive logistical, intelligence or air support from foreign or regional partners.\n<\/p>\n \nAcademic work and reports by specialist think tanks converge on one finding: a primarily military response, even a reinforced one, is not enough to durably stabilise the areas affected by armed groups.\n<\/p>\n \nNational armies are generally undersized<\/strong> relative to the size of the territories to be covered, particularly in Sahelian and border areas. Even when well trained, they cannot maintain a robust presence in every vulnerable locality, all the more so as some units remain concentrated around capitals and major urban centres.\n<\/p>\n \nThis forced dispersion creates grey zones<\/strong> where armed groups can settle, levy taxes, control roads or impose their social order, while avoiding direct confrontation with state forces.\n<\/p>\n \nSeveral limits frequently recur in specialist analyses:\n<\/p>\n \nIn these conditions, even a technically capable army may find itself struggling to win the lasting support of local communities<\/strong>, which is nonetheless central to isolating armed groups and gaining access to human intelligence.\n<\/p>\n \nA large share of West African armies relies on external support<\/strong> for training, intelligence, air support, equipment or funding. These partnerships have changed recently: the withdrawal of certain Western actors, the rise of new forms of bilateral cooperation, and the presence of private military companies in some countries.\n<\/p>\n \nThis dependence does not mean that armies are incapable on their own, but that they do not operate in an international vacuum<\/strong>. Armed groups themselves are part of transnational networks (trafficking, movement of fighters, financial flows, ideological references), which makes a strictly national response difficult.\n<\/p>\n \nThe question is therefore not only whether armies can \u2018hold out alone\u2019, but in what kind of partnership configuration<\/strong> they can best defend national interests while preserving their autonomy of decision.\n<\/p>\n \nArmed groups rarely thrive in spaces where the state provides basic services, settles local conflicts credibly and offers minimal economic prospects. The army often intervenes where these functions have been weakened or abandoned.\n<\/p>\n \nYet no army can durably replace<\/strong> the justice system, territorial administration, social services or customary and religious mediation mechanisms. Even when the armed forces retake a locality, the absence of a rapid return of other state services leaves a vacuum that armed groups can exploit again.\n<\/p>\n \nAn army\u2019s ability to \u2018hold out\u2019 therefore depends closely on the overall capacity of the state<\/strong>: public finances, local governance, land management, regulation of pastoralism, anti-corruption efforts, oversight of the security forces, etc.\n<\/p>\n \nFaced with insufficient state presence, some states have encouraged or tolerated the rise of self-defence groups<\/strong> or community militias. In the short term, these actors may help defend certain areas, but they introduce significant risks:\n<\/p>\n \nIn this context, the question \u2018can armies hold out alone?\u2019 is linked to another: what kind of relationship should be established between the armed forces, internal security forces and local security actors<\/strong>, without encouraging the privatisation or ethnicisation of violence?\n<\/p>\n \nRather than absolute self-sufficiency, the challenge is to achieve a lasting capacity for resilience<\/strong> of states and their armies in the face of armed groups. Several conditions recur regularly in specialist analyses.\n<\/p>\n \nThe most frequently cited reforms concern:\n<\/p>\n \nThese reforms are not merely technical: they touch on the relationship between the army, political power and society, and determine the trust of populations and international partners alike.\n<\/p>\n \nExperience accumulated in the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea shows that military gains are only lasting if they are accompanied by:\n<\/p>\n \nWithout these elements, armed groups can once again present themselves as providers of security, justice or income, even after military setbacks.\n<\/p>\n \nArmed groups exploit the porous borders<\/strong> between Sahelian and coastal countries, moving according to military pressure, economic opportunities and local alliances. A national army\u2019s ability to \u2018hold out\u2019 is therefore linked to the quality of regional cooperation<\/strong>: intelligence sharing, joint operations and harmonised approaches towards border communities.\n<\/p>\n \nAn isolated army, even a reinforced one, struggles to contain actors whose networks and flows extend well beyond the national framework.\n<\/p>\n \nThe phrase \u2018hold out alone\u2019 suggests a clear separation between national armies and all other actors. In West African reality, however, security rests on a combination of elements<\/strong>:\n<\/p>\n \nIn some contexts, national armies can contain<\/strong> or push back<\/strong> armed groups, protect strategic routes and maintain security in large cities. However, the lasting stabilisation of territories<\/strong> and the reduction of armed groups\u2019 appeal require a broader transformation of modes of governance, local economies and relations between the state and citizens.\n<\/p>\n \nThe central question then becomes not whether armies can hold out alone, but how to integrate them into a broader strategy<\/strong> in which security is no longer solely a matter for the armed forces, but one of social contract, justice and economic prospects.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" West Africa\u2019s national armies are on the front line against non-state armed groups: jihadist organisations, community militias and structured criminal gangs. The question of their ability to \u2018hold out alone\u2019 comes up regularly, especially in a context of partial withdrawal of foreign forces (Barkhane, MINUSMA) and the reshaping of security partnerships. Rather than answering with […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"acteur":[155,156],"niveau":[173],"risque":[],"thematique":[163],"zone":[],"class_list":["post-77134","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","acteur-communities-and-civil-society","acteur-states-and-public-institutions","niveau-analytical-level","thematique-governance-and-political-transitions"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/77134","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=77134"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/77134\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=77134"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"acteur","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/acteur?post=77134"},{"taxonomy":"niveau","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/niveau?post=77134"},{"taxonomy":"risque","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/risque?post=77134"},{"taxonomy":"thematique","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/thematique?post=77134"},{"taxonomy":"zone","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/zone?post=77134"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}Structural limits: why armies are not enough<\/h2>\n
A problem of coverage rather than \u2018victory\u2019<\/h3>\n
Internal challenges: governance, discipline and trust<\/h3>\n
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Dependence on external partnerships<\/h2>\n
The role of other state institutions<\/h2>\n
Local communities, militias and risks of fragmentation<\/h2>\n
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Conditions for lasting resilience<\/h2>\n
Internal reforms of the armed forces<\/h3>\n
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Linking the security response with local governance<\/h3>\n
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Regional cooperation and border control<\/h3>\n
Towards a plural response rather than military self-sufficiency<\/h2>\n
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