Images of crowds gathered in Bamako, Ouagadougou or Niamey are often presented as proof of \u201cmass support\u201d for the military juntas. Yet this support is more complex, more fluctuating and more conditional than it appears. It combines genuine allegiance, resignation, pragmatic calculation, fear and the absence of a credible alternative.<\/p>\n
Rather than asking whether \u201cthe population\u201d supports the juntas or not, it is more useful to analyse who<\/strong> supports them, why<\/strong>, for how long<\/strong> and under what conditions<\/strong>.<\/p>\n Pro-junta mobilisations in West Africa, particularly in Mali<\/strong>, Burkina Faso<\/strong> and Niger<\/strong>, share several recurring characteristics:<\/p>\n These elements are not enough to conclude that there is mass, uniform support from \u201cthe population\u201d:<\/p>\n Crowd images therefore indicate the juntas\u2019 ability to mobilise part of the urban population, but they do not on their own make it possible to measure the depth or durability of support.<\/p>\n The recent coups have taken place in a context of deep disillusionment<\/strong> with civilian regimes and international partners. Several factors fuel an initially positive, or at least understanding, reception:<\/p>\n In many countries, part of the population associates civilian governments with:<\/p>\n The coup is then perceived as a symbolic sanction<\/strong> imposed on leaders considered ineffective or out of touch.<\/p>\n In the central Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger), the advance of jihadist groups and armed militias has deeply affected populations, particularly in rural areas. Many feel that:<\/p>\n In this context, a military government promising to \u201cregain control of the territory<\/strong>\u201d and to \u201cwage total war on terrorism<\/strong>\u201d can appear as an option of last resort<\/strong>, even if its real capabilities are limited.<\/p>\n Resentment towards certain partners, particularly France<\/strong>, draws on:<\/p>\n The juntas capitalise on these frustrations by presenting themselves as defenders of sovereignty<\/strong> and proposing a geopolitical repositioning (diversification of alliances, rapprochement with new partners). This rhetoric resonates strongly with part of urban youth.<\/p>\n \u201cSupport\u201d for the juntas is neither monolithic nor stable. It varies according to social categories, regions and how the situation develops.<\/p>\n The capitals concentrate:<\/p>\n Rural areas, for their part, are more exposed to:<\/p>\n Expectations of the juntas there are therefore more directly linked to everyday security<\/strong> and access to basic resources. Support there is often more pragmatic<\/strong>: loyalty goes to the actor (state, armed group, militia, local chief) that offers the most protection or room for manoeuvre.<\/p>\n Part of urban youth<\/strong> sees the juntas as:<\/p>\n However, this political capital can erode quickly if:<\/p>\n In military regimes, the repression of critical voices<\/strong>, surveillance of the media and the criminalisation of certain forms of protest limit the public expression of opposition. Apparent \u201csupport\u201d may then partly be:<\/p>\n The real degree of allegiance therefore remains difficult to measure, especially as conventional tools (polls, opinion surveys) are rare and sometimes impossible to carry out in a context of security and political crisis.<\/p>\n Initial support for the juntas often rests on a promise of rupture<\/strong>: a break with previous political elites, with certain external partners, and with policies considered ineffective. This promise has several limits.<\/p>\n Populations simultaneously expect:<\/p>\n Yet the juntas inherit systems marked by:<\/p>\n The capacity of military regimes to meet these expectations quickly is therefore structurally limited, which exposes them to disillusionment.<\/p>\n To stay in power, the juntas tend to:<\/p>\n In the medium term, this dynamic can weaken the trust<\/strong> of part of the population, particularly when economic and security difficulties persist.<\/p>\n Assessing real support for the juntas requires taking several methodological constraints into account:<\/p>\n Rather than a clear-cut \u201cyes\u201d or \u201cno\u201d, it is more rigorous to consider that:<\/p>\n The relationship between populations and the juntas is therefore better understood as a shifting balance<\/strong> between allegiance, constraint, calculation and waiting. This balance can change quickly depending on three key variables: the security trajectory, the economic situation and the degree of political closure.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Images of crowds gathered in Bamako, Ouagadougou or Niamey are often presented as proof of \u201cmass support\u201d for the military juntas. Yet this support is more complex, more fluctuating and more conditional than it appears. It combines genuine allegiance, resignation, pragmatic calculation, fear and the absence of a credible alternative. Rather than asking whether \u201cthe […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"acteur":[],"niveau":[173],"risque":[],"thematique":[163],"zone":[144,149],"class_list":["post-77127","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","niveau-analytical-level","thematique-governance-and-political-transitions","zone-burkina-faso","zone-niger"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/77127","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=77127"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/77127\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=77127"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"acteur","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/acteur?post=77127"},{"taxonomy":"niveau","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/niveau?post=77127"},{"taxonomy":"risque","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/risque?post=77127"},{"taxonomy":"thematique","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/thematique?post=77127"},{"taxonomy":"zone","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/zone?post=77127"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}What images of popular support show \u2013 and do not show<\/h2>\n
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The underlying reasons for an often favourable initial reception<\/h2>\n
Fatigue with civilian political elites<\/h3>\n
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Persistent insecurity and a sense of abandonment<\/h3>\n
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Frustration with external partners<\/h3>\n
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Support that is often conditional, evolving and fragmented<\/h2>\n
Divides between towns and countryside<\/h3>\n
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Urban youth and the juntas\u2019 political capital<\/h3>\n
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Fear, control of public space and the absence of alternatives<\/h3>\n
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The limits and risks of support based on rupture<\/h2>\n
Very high expectations, limited room for manoeuvre<\/h3>\n
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Authoritarian consolidation and the weakening of spaces for debate<\/h3>\n
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Why the question of \u201cpopular support\u201d remains hard to settle<\/h2>\n
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