\nArmed conflict and violent extremism in West Africa do not develop in a vacuum. They take place in areas crossed by intense flows of licit and illicit goods. Drugs, gold, fuel, livestock, weapons, migrants: these flows follow long-established trafficking routes, often more stable than state borders. Understanding these routes and their logic is essential to grasp how armed groups finance their operations, consolidate their local influence and project themselves at regional level.\n<\/p>\n
\nRather than a \u201csingle route\u201d of crime, this is a mesh of corridors that intersect, shift and reconfigure according to opportunities, crackdowns and local alliances. Three broad dynamics stand out: trans-Saharan routes, coastal corridors and internal flows around natural resources.\n<\/p>\n
\nTrans-Saharan routes have historically linked the Maghreb with the Sahel and West Africa. Long structured by the caravan trade (salt, livestock, manufactured goods), they are now used to move contraband and higher-value trafficked goods.\n<\/p>\n
\nSeveral axes stand out, with local variations:\n<\/p>\n
\nThese routes rely on areas weakly controlled by states, where surveillance is complicated by the vastness of the territory, the logistical weakness of the security forces and the historical roots of informal trading circuits. Networks of smugglers, traders, transporters and community intermediaries have long operated there, often combining licit and illicit activities.\n<\/p>\n
\nNon-state armed groups, including jihadist organisations, do not always directly control trafficking. Their role is often that of an \u201carmed tax collector\u201d: they tax the flows, secure certain stretches and arbitrate disputes between networks. This pattern can be seen in central and northern Mali, in some areas of Niger, and in the Mali\u2013Burkina Faso\u2013Niger border areas.\n<\/p>\n
\nThe revenue from this \u201cinformal taxation\u201d feeds the groups\u2019 logistics (motorcycles, fuel, small arms, supplies) and strengthens their ability to negotiate with local communities, for example by guaranteeing the security of certain convoys or markets. In some cases, sections of these routes become genuine \u201clawless corridors\u201d where smugglers, contrabandists, armed groups and corrupt state actors coexist.\n<\/p>\n
\nSince the mid-2000s, West Africa has established itself as a transit zone for cocaine from South America to Europe. Added to this are cannabis (local and imported) and, more recently, diverted pharmaceutical substances.\n<\/p>\n
\nCocaine shipments arrive mainly by sea or air on the Atlantic coast (notably Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, sometimes C\u00f4te d\u2019Ivoire) or via Gulf of Guinea countries further south, before moving north towards the Sahel and Europe. Overland routes then link the ports to the Sahelian areas, combining:\n<\/p>\n
\nInvestigations and reports show that these flows involve a wide range of actors: transnational criminal networks, local political and economic elites, corrupt segments of the security forces, and also, in some places, armed groups. The direct involvement of jihadist organisations in cocaine trafficking remains debated, but their role in taxing routes and securing certain stretches is better documented.\n<\/p>\n
\nAlongside the major international routes, local drug economies are developing: cannabis production, small-scale trafficking in psychotropic drugs, circulation of diverted medicines. These markets fuel:\n<\/p>\n
\nIn some cities in the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea, these dynamics overlap with political tensions and socio-economic frustrations, creating an environment conducive to violent mobilisation, even though the direct link with jihadist groups varies by context.\n<\/p>\n
\nBeyond transnational flows, many trafficking routes centre on natural resources: gold, livestock, timber, charcoal and various minerals. These routes often receive less media attention than drug routes, but their impact on conflict is considerable.\n<\/p>\n
\nArtisanal gold mining has expanded sharply in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Guinea and other West African countries. Supply routes have formed around the extraction sites for:\n<\/p>\n
\nArmed and jihadist groups intervene at several levels:\n<\/p>\n
\nThis revenue can be more stable and predictable than that from riskier trafficking such as drugs. It strengthens the groups\u2019 local roots; they sometimes present themselves as regulators or protectors against perceived abuses by the administration, security forces or mining companies.\n<\/p>\n
\nThe livestock trade, essential to the pastoral economy, follows cross-border corridors between the Sahel and the coastal states (for example from Mali and Niger to Nigeria, Benin, C\u00f4te d\u2019Ivoire or Ghana). These routes are sometimes targeted by:\n<\/p>\n
\nSimilarly, fuel smuggling (often subsidised in one country and resold in another) follows well-established routes, notably in the areas bordering Nigeria. These flows are important for the informal economy and attract both criminal networks and some armed groups, which find in them a source of revenue and a means of securing energy supplies.\n<\/p>\n
\nSmall arms and light weapons are the material foundation of most West African conflicts. Arms trafficking routes partly overlap with those for other goods, but follow their own logic.\n<\/p>\n
\nWeapons come from several sources:\n<\/p>\n
\nThe routes often follow axes already used for other trafficking, but with more discreet methods (splitting shipments, concealment in mixed convoys, passage through hard-to-reach areas). Local intermediaries \u2013 traders, network leaders, corrupt members of the security forces \u2013 play a key role in distribution to armed groups, community militias or organised bandits.\n<\/p>\n
\nMigration routes, notably through Niger, Libya and Algeria, have long been axes of economic mobility. In some contexts, these routes become hybrid: flows of migrants coexist with movements of fighters, weapons or contraband. However, the systematic conflation of migration and terrorism is not supported by the available research.\n<\/p>\n
\nOverlaps nonetheless exist: some smuggling networks diversify into other illicit activities, and armed groups may tax or control migration flows, notably in departure or transit areas. Migration control policies may then shift the routes without necessarily reducing volumes, which sometimes increases migrants\u2019 dependence on criminal or armed networks.\n<\/p>\n
\nTrafficking routes do not on their own explain the emergence of conflicts, which also stem from political, social, historical and environmental factors. They do, however, transform the nature and duration of violence.\n<\/p>\n
\nAccess to resources from trafficking allows armed groups to move from sporadic actions to sustained campaigns. Funding drawn from taxing routes, artisanal gold mining or fuel smuggling supports:\n<\/p>\n
\nThis \u201cwar economy\u201d complicates disengagement and demobilisation processes, as it creates powerful material interests in continuing the conflict, including for actors initially motivated by political or community grievances.\n<\/p>\n
\nTrafficking routes also reshape power relations at local level:\n<\/p>\n
\nIn several Sahelian and border areas, populations find themselves caught between multiple actors \u2013 state forces, armed groups, criminal networks \u2013 all seeking to capture a share of the flows. This competition can generate targeted violence, population displacement and chronic insecurity along trade routes.\n<\/p>\n
\nCounter-trafficking policies, whether national or backed by international partners, have mixed effects. They can disrupt some circuits, but can also push routes towards even more fragile or less controlled areas.\n<\/p>\n
\nWhen enforcement focuses on a particular stretch, networks adapt by opening new passages, sometimes more dangerous for local populations. Moreover, if counter-trafficking efforts are not accompanied by credible efforts to reform governance, reduce corruption and create economic alternatives, they may be perceived as selective or politically exploited, fuelling distrust.\n<\/p>\n
\nA detailed understanding of trafficking routes \u2013 their economic logic, their social roots and how they connect with conflicts \u2013 is therefore essential to design responses that go beyond the security dimension and take local and regional realities into account.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Armed conflict and violent extremism in West Africa do not develop in a vacuum. They take place in areas crossed by intense flows of licit and illicit goods. Drugs, gold, fuel, livestock, weapons, migrants: these flows follow long-established trafficking routes, often more stable than state borders. Understanding these routes and their logic is essential to […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"acteur":[155,153,158],"niveau":[173],"risque":[170,171],"thematique":[159,160],"zone":[144,146,147,149,151],"class_list":["post-77107","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","acteur-communities-and-civil-society","acteur-formal-and-informal-economic-actors","acteur-non-state-armed-groups","niveau-analytical-level","risque-political-risks","risque-security-risks","thematique-armed-conflict-and-terrorism","thematique-economy-resources-and-trafficking","zone-burkina-faso","zone-guinea","zone-mali","zone-niger","zone-senegal"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/77107","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=77107"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/77107\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=77107"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"acteur","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/acteur?post=77107"},{"taxonomy":"niveau","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/niveau?post=77107"},{"taxonomy":"risque","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/risque?post=77107"},{"taxonomy":"thematique","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/thematique?post=77107"},{"taxonomy":"zone","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/zone?post=77107"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}