The 2030 horizon in West Africa is taking shape amid considerable uncertainty: repeated coups d\u2019\u00e9tat in the Sahel, the withdrawal of several international missions, the reshaping of military alliances, the spread of violence from the Sahel towards the Gulf of Guinea, and economic and demographic pressures. Rather than a single prediction, it is more useful to consider several plausible security scenarios, combining local, national and regional dynamics.<\/p>\n
The West African security landscape is already highly contrasted. The countries of the central Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger) face entrenched jihadist insurgencies, community militias and weakened state institutions. The coastal countries (Benin, Togo, C\u00f4te d\u2019Ivoire, Ghana) face growing pressure on their northern borders, with incursions linked to groups active in the Sahel. Nigeria remains an epicentre of multiple forms of violence (jihadism, armed banditry, farmer-herder conflicts), with regional spillover effects.<\/p>\n
At the same time, the international presence is being reshaped: the end of MINUSMA in Mali, the scaling down of several Western deployments, the growing role of new partners (Russia, Turkey, Gulf actors) and increased use of private military companies. Regional organisations \u2013 ECOWAS, the African Union \u2013 are going through political tensions, notably over sanctions and the handling of military transitions.<\/p>\n
In this context, three broad security scenarios for 2030 can be outlined: a scenario of prolonged deterioration and fragmentation, a scenario of relative stabilisation and containment, and a scenario of differentiated security realignment, combining local progress and new risks.<\/p>\n
Before exploring these scenarios, several structural dynamics, already documented by the main reference sources, should be set out: they will shape both the next five years and the 2030 horizon.<\/p>\n
Data from ACLED, the International Crisis Group (ICG) and ISS Africa show persistent violence linked to jihadist groups in the central Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger), with local entrenchment dynamics combining coercion, opportunistic alliances and the exploitation of socio-economic grievances. Competition between the affiliates of al-Qaeda (JNIM) and the Islamic State (ISGS\/ISWAP) is resulting in territorial reconfigurations rather than a clear retreat.<\/p>\n
In the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea (Benin, Togo, C\u00f4te d\u2019Ivoire, Ghana), several reports (Clingendael, ISS, UN) highlight an increase in incursions from Burkina Faso, as well as a growing presence of support networks, even where attacks remain sporadic. Border areas, already marked by smuggling, land tensions and the marginalisation of public services, are spaces of lasting vulnerability.<\/p>\n
Since the withdrawal of French forces from Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger and the end of MINUSMA in Mali, the direct Western presence in counter-terrorism has been declining in the central Sahel. Work by think tanks such as the ICG and the Clingendael Institute highlights a trend towards the \u201crenationalisation\u201d and \u201calternative regionalisation\u201d of security, with the rise of new partnerships (Russia, Turkey, private military companies) and the creation of formats such as the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).<\/p>\n
At the same time, ECOWAS has been weakened by tensions with regimes that came to power through coups, while sub-regional and bilateral frameworks (the Accra Initiative, C\u00f4te d\u2019Ivoire\u2013Burkina Faso\u2013Ghana cooperation, etc.) are seeking to reposition themselves on preventing contagion towards the south.<\/p>\n
World Bank and OECD projections point to rapid population growth, accelerated urbanisation and continued pressure on farmland and water resources. These trends heighten tensions between farmers and herders, feed the informal economy and encourage competition for control of resources (artisanal gold mining, timber, livestock, trade routes).<\/p>\n
Armed groups \u2013 jihadists, community militias or criminal groups \u2013 take advantage of these fragilities to insert themselves into local value chains (taxing roads, protecting illicit activities, arbitrating local disputes), which complicates any strictly military response.<\/p>\n
This scenario rests on the continuation, or even acceleration, of current trends of state weakening and the spread of armed violence. It does not mean the general collapse of all states, but a multiplication of \u201cgrey zones\u201d: spaces where the state can no longer guarantee security or provide basic services, leaving room for non-state armed actors and informal or criminal economies.<\/p>\n
In the central Sahel, groups affiliated with al-Qaeda (JNIM) and the Islamic State (ISGS\/ISWAP) could consolidate their hold on strategic rural corridors, drawing on local conflicts (land, pastoralism, community rivalries). Pressure towards the south would continue, with more intense attacks in northern Benin and Togo, or even a more marked advance towards more densely populated areas, including northern C\u00f4te d\u2019Ivoire and potentially Ghana.<\/p>\n
In Nigeria, worsening violence in the centre and north-west \u2013 banditry, kidnappings, farmer-herder conflicts \u2013 would strengthen cross-border trafficking dynamics (arms, fuel, livestock, drugs), affecting Niger, Benin and Cameroon. Coastlines could see a resurgence of piracy and maritime crime, linked to networks rooted on land.<\/p>\n
In this scenario, the military transitions in the Sahel would become bogged down, with electoral timetables postponed and recurring tensions between transitional authorities, political opposition and regional partners. Distrust of regional organisations would grow, fuelling a sovereigntist withdrawal.<\/p>\n
Civic space could shrink further in several countries: tighter control of the media, pressure on NGOs, and the use of counter-terrorism to neutralise certain opposition forces. This polarisation would limit the capacity for social and community mediation, which is nonetheless crucial for preventing violence.<\/p>\n
Prolonged deterioration would mean persistent insecurity on roads, greater risks to supply chains and more internal and cross-border forced displacement. Humanitarian operations would be further constrained by access restrictions, kidnapping risks and the need to negotiate with increasingly fragmented armed actors. Companies operating in the extractive, logistics or agro-industrial sectors would face rising security and reputational risks, particularly where controversial security arrangements are used.<\/p>\n
A second scenario envisages gradual stabilisation, without a rapid return to security \u201cnormality\u201d, but with some containment of the most serious crises and a decline in the intensity of violence in certain areas. This trajectory assumes internal political compromises, selective strengthening of state capacity and renewed regional cooperation.<\/p>\n
In this scenario, several states would manage to adjust their security strategies, better combining military action, local governance and socio-economic responses. Armies and security forces would remain at the heart of these arrangements, but with greater effort on discipline, reducing abuses and integrating accountability mechanisms. Local dialogue initiatives \u2013 with communities, self-defence groups or even some segments of armed groups \u2013 could help reduce violence in targeted areas.<\/p>\n
Political transitions in the Sahel would lead to clearer timetables and institutional arrangements allowing gradual reintegration into regional frameworks. ECOWAS, despite persistent tensions, could adapt its sanctions and mediation instruments to avoid the lasting isolation of certain member states.<\/p>\n
In the Gulf of Guinea countries, the jihadist threat would remain present but contained, thanks to a combination of measures: stronger surveillance on the northern borders, cross-border security cooperation, and targeted investment in basic services and infrastructure in border areas. Attacks would remain sporadic and concentrated in rural or forested areas, without a large-scale shift towards urban centres.<\/p>\n
This containment would not mean the absence of violence, but rather a greater capacity of states to prevent armed groups from becoming durably entrenched on their territory, by relying on local networks (traditional chiefs, religious leaders, community associations) and on better integration of young people into the local economy.<\/p>\n
Relative stabilisation would also require international partnerships to adapt: fewer heavy deployments, more targeted support (training, intelligence, air support, strengthening of judicial and police systems). International funding would focus on a few priorities: justice, local governance, the fight against corruption, the prevention of violent extremism and adaptation to climate change.<\/p>\n
Regional initiatives, whether led by ECOWAS, the African Union or ad hoc coalitions, would play a coordinating role, particularly on information sharing, border management and the fight against transnational trafficking. The effectiveness of these arrangements would remain uneven, but sufficient to prevent an uncontrolled spread of crises.<\/p>\n
A third scenario, probably the most plausible, combines elements of the previous two: some areas see relative improvement, while others sink into violence or tip into new forms of insecurity. The region is then characterised by a mosaic of situations, with highly contrasting national and local trajectories.<\/p>\n
In several countries, some regions could benefit from coordinated stabilisation efforts: targeted disarmament and reintegration programmes, strengthened local administration, investment in infrastructure and social services, and the integration of transitional justice or customary mediation mechanisms. These \u201cconsolidation\u201d zones would nevertheless remain vulnerable to shocks (political crises, falling commodity prices, climate disasters).<\/p>\n
At the same time, other spaces \u2013 often rural, peripheral and cross-border \u2013 could become zones of \u201cnon-governance\u201d, combining the presence of armed groups, the informal economy, trafficking and parallel governance systems. These spaces would serve as reservoirs of resources and sanctuaries for various armed actors, without necessarily seeking to overthrow states, but negotiating with them or coexisting in ambiguous arrangements.<\/p>\n
By 2030, threats could evolve into hybrid forms, mixing jihadist ideology, banditry, identity-based claims and economic interests. Groups claiming to be jihadist could turn into more opportunistic actors, focused on controlling trade routes, artisanal mining sites or transhumance areas. Conversely, groups that were initially criminal could adopt religious or community rhetoric to legitimise their actions.<\/p>\n
Urban violence, often underestimated, could grow in importance: organised crime, gangs, tensions over access to land and housing, and socio-economic protests in fast-growing cities. These urban dynamics would not necessarily take the form of armed insurgencies, but they could further weaken social cohesion and trust in institutions.<\/p>\n
Climate change and increased rainfall variability will continue to weigh on agriculture and pastoralism, particularly in the Sahelian and Sudano-Sahelian zones. Competition for access to water and pasture could fuel local conflicts, sometimes exploited by armed actors or political entrepreneurs. Seasonal population movements, already significant, could intensify, complicating the management of borders and resources.<\/p>\n
Economically, vulnerabilities linked to debt, commodity price shocks and dependence on food or energy imports could heighten social frustration, particularly among young people. This frustration does not automatically lead to violence, but it provides fertile ground for armed groups or political actors seeking to mobilise discontent.<\/p>\n
The scenarios described are not mutually exclusive and may coexist across countries and regions. Several structural factors will influence the direction West Africa takes by 2030.<\/p>\n
The way in which the military transitions in the Sahel, political changes of power in the coastal countries and institutional reforms are managed will have a major impact. Inclusive transitions, with a real place for opposition parties, civil society organisations and local authorities, can help reduce tensions and restore some trust in the state. Conversely, prolonged, opaque or exclusionary transitions risk fuelling new protests.<\/p>\n
The effectiveness of security responses will depend on how well they are linked to development policies targeting the most fragile areas: border regions, isolated rural areas and urban peripheries. Programmes supporting livelihoods, access to education and health, and inclusive management of land and natural resources will be decisive in limiting recruitment by armed groups.<\/p>\n
The reshaping of security partnerships \u2013 the partial withdrawal of some Western actors, the rise of other powers, the role of private military companies \u2013 will influence the operational capacity of states, but also their internal and external legitimacy. The ability of regional organisations to adapt, avoid lasting rifts between member states and offer flexible cooperation mechanisms will be another central element. The emergence of coalitions that are alternatives or complements to ECOWAS, such as the Alliance of Sahel States, and the multiplication of diversified bilateral partnerships (training, equipment, technical support) will redraw regional geopolitical balances.<\/p>\n
Beyond central states, the resilience of societies \u2013 community networks, customary and religious authorities, local associations, media \u2013 will play a decisive role. In several contexts, these actors have already shown their ability to negotiate local ceasefires, organise mediation between communities or maintain essential services despite insecurity. Recognising them and integrating them into national crisis prevention and management strategies will be a key factor in steering towards stabilisation rather than deterioration.<\/p>\n
West Africa in 2030 will probably remain a region under strong security pressure, marked by persistent crises in the Sahel and Nigeria and by risks of contagion towards the coastal countries. However, the trajectory is not set: there is room for manoeuvre, at the level of both states and societies, to contain, transform or reduce certain forms of violence.<\/p>\n
For economic, humanitarian and institutional actors, the challenge is to anticipate this diversity of trajectories, avoiding homogenising views (\u201cthe whole Sahel is lost\u201d, \u201cthe coastal countries are safe\u201d) and integrating local specificities into risk analysis. The period to 2030 will be marked by rapid realignments: the capacity to adapt, to read contexts in detail and to cooperate with local actors will be decisive in navigating this uncertain environment.<\/p>\n
To go further: understand why security has deteriorated in West Africa<\/a>, and assess whether the region can avoid lasting regional fragmentation<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The 2030 horizon in West Africa is taking shape amid considerable uncertainty: repeated coups d\u2019\u00e9tat in the Sahel, the withdrawal of several international missions, the reshaping of military alliances, the spread of violence from the Sahel towards the Gulf of Guinea, and economic and demographic pressures. Rather than a single prediction, it is more useful […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"acteur":[157,158,156],"niveau":[173],"risque":[170,171,172],"thematique":[159,162,163],"zone":[143,144,145,147,149,150,151,152],"class_list":["post-77101","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","acteur-armed-and-security-forces","acteur-non-state-armed-groups","acteur-states-and-public-institutions","niveau-analytical-level","risque-political-risks","risque-security-risks","risque-social-and-reputational-risks","thematique-armed-conflict-and-terrorism","thematique-geopolitics-and-international-actors","thematique-governance-and-political-transitions","zone-benin","zone-burkina-faso","zone-cote-divoire","zone-mali","zone-niger","zone-nigeria","zone-senegal","zone-togo"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/77101","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=77101"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/77101\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=77101"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"acteur","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/acteur?post=77101"},{"taxonomy":"niveau","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/niveau?post=77101"},{"taxonomy":"risque","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/risque?post=77101"},{"taxonomy":"thematique","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/thematique?post=77101"},{"taxonomy":"zone","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/zone?post=77101"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}