{"id":77085,"date":"2026-01-13T10:50:45","date_gmt":"2026-01-13T10:50:45","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/foreign-military-withdrawals-sahel-security-impact\/"},"modified":"2026-01-13T10:50:45","modified_gmt":"2026-01-13T10:50:45","slug":"foreign-military-withdrawals-sahel-security-impact","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/foreign-military-withdrawals-sahel-security-impact\/","title":{"rendered":"Have foreign military withdrawals worsened the situation?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>\nForeign military withdrawals from the Sahel and parts of West Africa \u2013 French, European, UN or American forces \u2013 are fuelling an intense debate: did they worsen the security situation, or did they expose weaknesses that were already there? The question extends beyond the central Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger) to the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea, which fear a \u201cdomino effect\u201d.\n<\/p>\n<h2>What \u201cforeign military withdrawals\u201d covers<\/h2>\n<p>\nSince 2020, several major moves have followed one another:\n<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>the gradual end of France\u2019s Operation Barkhane and of the European Takuba task force in Mali, then in Burkina Faso and Niger;<\/li>\n<li>the accelerated withdrawal of MINUSMA (the UN mission in Mali) in 2023, at the request of the Malian authorities;<\/li>\n<li>the questioning of military cooperation with France in Burkina Faso (2023), then in Niger (2023\u20132024);<\/li>\n<li>the reduction or redeployment of some American deployments (notably in Niger in 2024).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>\nAt the same time, other actors have taken on a larger role: Russian or Russian-linked private military companies, foreign instructors, new defence agreements. This is therefore not a \u201ctotal vacuum\u201d, but a shift in partnerships and modes of intervention.\n<\/p>\n<h2>Insecurity was already deteriorating sharply before the withdrawals<\/h2>\n<p>\nAvailable data (ACLED, reports by the International Crisis Group, ISS Africa, Small Arms Survey) show a steady rise in violence well before the large-scale withdrawals:\n<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>in Mali, the rise of jihadist groups (JNIM, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara) predates 2020, with an expansion towards the centre of the country and the borders with Burkina Faso and Niger;<\/li>\n<li>in Burkina Faso, attacks multiplied from 2016\u20132017, with rapid destabilisation of rural and border areas;<\/li>\n<li>in Niger, the Tillab\u00e9ri and Diffa regions have for several years been affected by violence linked both to the Lake Chad basin and to Liptako-Gourma.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>\nThese dynamics stem from a combination of factors: fragile local governance, a sense of abandonment among populations, land and pastoral conflicts, the informal economy and trafficking, rivalries between armed groups, and the settlement strategies of jihadist organisations. Foreign operations sometimes made it possible to neutralise leaders or disrupt networks, but did not halt these underlying trends.\n<\/p>\n<p>\nTo speak of a situation worsened \u201csolely\u201d by the withdrawals therefore obscures the depth of the structural causes and the already deteriorating security trajectory in the region.\n<\/p>\n<h2>What direct effects have the withdrawals had on armed violence?<\/h2>\n<p>\nSeveral points emerge from recent analyses, even though the data remain partial and sometimes disputed.\n<\/p>\n<h3>Loss of air, intelligence and logistics capabilities<\/h3>\n<p>\nWith the Western and UN withdrawals, national forces lost significant support in:\n<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>intelligence (imagery, interceptions, aerial surveillance);<\/li>\n<li>mobility (helicopters, transport aircraft, protected road assets);<\/li>\n<li>medical and logistical support.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>\nThis reduction in capabilities makes it harder to hold vast rural and border territories that were already difficult to access. In some areas, armed groups have seized windows of opportunity to regain the initiative, particularly where international forces played a \u201cbuffer\u201d or deterrent role.\n<\/p>\n<h3>Reconfiguration of areas of control and mobility routes<\/h3>\n<p>\nThe departure of foreign or UN contingents led to a rapid reconfiguration of territory:\n<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>some bases or sites were taken over by national forces or their allies, but without always having the means needed to secure the immediate surroundings;<\/li>\n<li>in other cases, the withdrawal created temporary \u201csecurity gaps\u201d, exploited by jihadist groups or local militias;<\/li>\n<li>trade and transhumance routes adapted, sometimes shifting to riskier corridors, increasing the risks of extortion and violence against civilians.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>\nThe effects vary greatly from region to region: some localities have seen state presence strengthen, while others have slipped into a de facto lawless zone.\n<\/p>\n<h3>Uneven impact on violence against civilians<\/h3>\n<p>\nStatistics on violence against civilians show contrasting variations. In some areas, the end of certain foreign operations, often criticised for blunders or collateral damage, may have temporarily reduced direct violence linked to strikes. But in many cases, the reduced military pressure on armed groups has resulted in:\n<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>an intensification of abuses against populations accused of collusion with the enemy;<\/li>\n<li>more forced recruitment, looting and illegal taxation;<\/li>\n<li>an increase in forced displacement of populations.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>\nReports by NGOs and international organisations also highlight a rise in some forms of violence attributed to national forces or auxiliaries (militias, self-defence groups), in a context of asymmetric warfare and mistrust towards certain communities.\n<\/p>\n<h2>Political and symbolic effects: sovereignty, legitimacy, expectations<\/h2>\n<p>\nThe foreign withdrawals are not only military; they are also highly political.\n<\/p>\n<h3>A stronger sovereignty narrative<\/h3>\n<p>\nIn Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, the transitional authorities have made the withdrawals a marker of regained sovereignty. This narrative resonates with part of public opinion, weary of a foreign presence seen as ineffective and at times intrusive.\n<\/p>\n<p>\nThis repositioning can strengthen domestic political legitimacy in the short term. But it also creates strong expectations: if the departure of Western partners was presented as a precondition for improved security, populations expect rapid results, which are difficult to achieve in a protracted conflict.\n<\/p>\n<h3>Realignment of alliances and external dependencies<\/h3>\n<p>\nThe Western withdrawals have been partly offset by other partnerships, notably with Russia and some private security actors. This realignment does not remove external dependence; it shifts it.\n<\/p>\n<p>\nThe effects on security remain difficult to measure independently, given the lack of reliable data and of transparency on mandates, rules of engagement and chains of command. Several analyses nonetheless point to:\n<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>a refocusing of efforts on protecting regimes and strategic urban centres;<\/li>\n<li>priority given to the military fight, with a risk of sidelining the political, social and economic dimensions of the crisis;<\/li>\n<li>grey areas concerning the conduct of operations and the handling of human rights violations.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2>Regional consequences: the Sahel, coastal states and cross-border corridors<\/h2>\n<p>\nThe withdrawals are not confined to the borders of the countries concerned. They alter the regional balance.\n<\/p>\n<h3>Risk of spillover into coastal states<\/h3>\n<p>\nThe Gulf of Guinea countries (Benin, Togo, C\u00f4te d\u2019Ivoire, Ghana) are reinforcing their security arrangements in the areas bordering Burkina Faso and Niger. Armed group incursions into northern Benin and Togo, already documented, show that the pressure is moving south.\n<\/p>\n<p>\nThe reduction in foreign capabilities in the central Sahel, combined with porous borders, may facilitate:\n<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>the movement of fighters and weapons;<\/li>\n<li>the relocation of some criminal activities (trafficking in fuel, livestock, gold, drugs);<\/li>\n<li>the search by jihadist organisations for new fallback areas and resources.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>Cross-border areas and local governance<\/h3>\n<p>\nBorder areas \u2013 often lightly administered, with high pastoral and commercial mobility \u2013 are particularly sensitive. The withdrawal of international forces sometimes reduces joint arrangements there (coordinated patrols, intelligence sharing, logistical support), even though these areas require close cooperation between states.\n<\/p>\n<p>\nLocal actors (traditional chiefdoms, village committees, associations) remain essential pivots for managing tensions and circulating information. Without lasting support for these structures, the risk is a proliferation of local security arrangements, sometimes linked to armed groups or militias, which may eventually fuel new cycles of violence.\n<\/p>\n<h2>Did the withdrawals \u201cworsen\u201d the situation? A nuanced answer<\/h2>\n<p>\nSeveral elements can be distinguished.\n<\/p>\n<h3>Short-term deterioration in some areas<\/h3>\n<p>\nIn areas where the foreign presence played a direct role in deterrence or in supporting local forces, the withdrawal may have:\n<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>accelerated the loss of control over some rural localities;<\/li>\n<li>made it easier for armed groups to rebuild sanctuaries;<\/li>\n<li>increased the vulnerability of civilians in the short term.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>\nThese effects are particularly visible where national forces did not yet have the means, logistics or trust of the population needed to take over.\n<\/p>\n<h3>Exposure of structural weaknesses<\/h3>\n<p>\nBeyond these short-term effects, the withdrawals have above all highlighted deep-seated weaknesses:\n<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>long-standing dependence on external support for the security of large parts of the territory;<\/li>\n<li>weak local governance, justice and public services in rural areas;<\/li>\n<li>community tensions and competition for resources, which military action alone cannot resolve;<\/li>\n<li>a lack of robust and lasting regional mechanisms for security cooperation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>\nThe withdrawals do not create these weaknesses, but they make them more visible, forcing states and their partners to rethink models of security and territorial governance.\n<\/p>\n<h3>A tipping point rather than a single cause<\/h3>\n<p>\nForeign military withdrawals appear less a single cause of deterioration than a tipping point in an already deeply rooted conflict. They alter the balance of forces, redistribute alliances and accelerate certain processes (realignment of armed groups, shifting front lines, strengthening or weakening of regimes).\n<\/p>\n<p>\nDevelopments over the medium term will depend on several factors:\n<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>the ability of states to rebuild security forces that are better rooted locally and more accountable;<\/li>\n<li>the coordination of military, political and socio-economic responses;<\/li>\n<li>the quality of new international partnerships, in terms of transparency, respect for rights and effectiveness;<\/li>\n<li>the role of local communities and traditional authorities in conflict management and mediation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>\nThe central issue remains less the presence or absence of any particular foreign partner than the building of security and governance systems able to respond to local realities, in a highly interconnected regional environment.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Foreign military withdrawals from the Sahel and parts of West Africa \u2013 French, European, UN or American forces \u2013 are fuelling an intense debate: did they worsen the security situation, or did they expose weaknesses that were already there? The question extends beyond the central Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger) to the coastal states of [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"acteur":[157,158,156],"niveau":[173],"risque":[170,171],"thematique":[159,162],"zone":[144,147,149],"class_list":["post-77085","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","acteur-armed-and-security-forces","acteur-non-state-armed-groups","acteur-states-and-public-institutions","niveau-analytical-level","risque-political-risks","risque-security-risks","thematique-armed-conflict-and-terrorism","thematique-geopolitics-and-international-actors","zone-burkina-faso","zone-mali","zone-niger"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/77085","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=77085"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/77085\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=77085"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"acteur","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/acteur?post=77085"},{"taxonomy":"niveau","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/niveau?post=77085"},{"taxonomy":"risque","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/risque?post=77085"},{"taxonomy":"thematique","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/thematique?post=77085"},{"taxonomy":"zone","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/zone?post=77085"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}