{"id":77074,"date":"2026-06-10T08:36:08","date_gmt":"2026-06-10T08:36:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/drone-war-sahel\/"},"modified":"2026-06-10T08:36:08","modified_gmt":"2026-06-10T08:36:08","slug":"drone-war-sahel","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/drone-war-sahel\/","title":{"rendered":"Is the drone war reshuffling the cards in the Sahel?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

In just a few seasons, an object sold to film weddings or monitor fields has become a weapon of war in the Sahel<\/strong>. The drone war<\/strong> is no longer a hypothesis: armed groups and national armies now also clash in the air, using makeshift civilian devices and latest-generation military drones. This shift is changing the nature of the threat, its cost, its geography \u2014 and the exposure of everyone operating in the region. This article provides a dated and sourced review of what is really changing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A tactical break: the civilian drone turned weapon<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

From intelligence to kamikaze strikes<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Until 2022, drones were mainly used as tools for intelligence or propaganda<\/a>: observing military positions, filming an ambush to broadcast it. The leap came when armed groups began attaching improvised explosive devices to commercial quadcopters, either to drop charges on posts or to turn the device itself into a projectile \u2014 the \u201csuicide\u201d or kamikaze drone. According to the Institute for Security Studies<\/a>, this weaponisation of civilian drones draws directly on the Libyan and Middle Eastern conflicts, and constitutes an asymmetric adaptation intended to counter the air superiority acquired by Sahelian armies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A low-cost weapon that is hard to counter<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The strength of this weapon lies in its economics. A civilian drone costs from a few hundred to a few thousand euros, can be found in local trade \u2014 agriculture, events, communications \u2014 and is easy to conceal, which makes it ideal for trafficking in a region with porous borders. Conversely, detection and neutralisation systems (jamming, interception) are expensive, rare and poorly suited to small, fast devices flying at low altitude. The cost-to-damage ratio therefore weighs heavily in the attacker’s favour. More serious still: some groups use offline artificial intelligence software and open-source tools to plan flight paths and bypass jamming, as highlighted in an analysis by Al Jazeera<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Who uses drones in the Sahel?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Armed groups: JNIM, Islamic State, the Azawad rebellion<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Three families of non-state actors have taken up the tool. The Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM)<\/strong>, affiliated with Al-Qaeda, is the most active: the ACLED<\/a> database recorded the group’s use of drones on at least 89 occasions between 2023 and 2025, including nearly 70 confirmed attacks. The Islamic State in the Sahel (ISGS)<\/strong> took the step later but strikes hard, while the separatist Azawad rebellion (FLA)<\/strong> has been using home-made FPV drones against the Malian army and its partners since summer 2024. This build-up is grafted onto a threat already shaped by the rivalry between JNIM and ISGS<\/a>, which defines the geography of the conflict in Mali and beyond.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Armies and their partners<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Drones are not the preserve of insurgents. The armies of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have equipped themselves with military drones \u2014 notably the Turkish Bayraktar TB2<\/em> and Akinci<\/em> \u2014 whose effectiveness has enabled targeted strikes, but has also given rise to recurring controversies over civilian casualties. In May 2026, the unified force of the Alliance of Sahel States claimed intense joint air campaigns<\/a> in Mali in response to the April attacks. External partners add to this equation: Russian influence through the Africa Corps<\/a> weighs on Malian capabilities, and Bamako publicly accused Ukraine of having supported the Azawad rebels after the battle of Tinzaouaten in 2024 \u2014 an accusation denied by Kyiv. The question of external support remains sensitive and poorly documented: we stick to established facts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A dated escalation (2023-2026)<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The timeline shows a clear acceleration from spring 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n