{"id":77069,"date":"2026-09-04T08:22:18","date_gmt":"2026-09-04T08:22:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/alliance-of-sahel-states-aes-institutions-review-2026\/"},"modified":"2026-09-04T08:22:18","modified_gmt":"2026-09-04T08:22:18","slug":"alliance-of-sahel-states-aes-institutions-review-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/alliance-of-sahel-states-aes-institutions-review-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"Alliance of Sahel States (AES): institutions and record three years on"},"content":{"rendered":"

On 16 September 2026, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)<\/strong> will be three years old. Born of a mutual defence pact signed by three military regimes, it has become a confederation with a joint army, a bank and, since 24 August 2026, a Parliament. Few African regional organisations have built an institutional architecture so quickly.<\/p>\n

For companies, NGOs and analysts working in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, the AES is no longer a diplomatic abstraction: it is redefining points of contact, travel documents, financial channels and the security framework. This article reviews, institution by institution, what the AES has actually become in 2026 \u2014 and what it has not yet resolved.<\/p>\n

What is the Alliance of Sahel States?<\/h2>\n

The AES was created on 16 September 2023 in Bamako<\/strong> with the signing of the Liptako-Gourma Charter<\/strong> between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. This 17-article text establishes a collective defence and mutual assistance architecture: aggression against one of the three states is considered aggression against all, and the signatories undertake to fight terrorism and organised crime together in their common space.<\/p>\n

The name is no accident. Liptako-Gourma<\/a> refers to the tri-border area where Malian, Burkinab\u00e9 and Nigerien territory meet \u2014 the epicentre of regional jihadist violence and the geographical point of convergence of the three countries.<\/p>\n

Together, the three states cover around 2.8 million km\u00b2<\/strong> and are home to more than 70 million people<\/strong>. All three are led by authorities that came to power in coups between 2020 and 2023, and all three are landlocked \u2014 a parameter that weighs heavily on what follows.<\/p>\n

From defensive alliance to confederation<\/h3>\n

On 6 July 2024, in Niamey<\/strong>, the first summit of heads of state turned the alliance into the Confederation of Sahel States<\/strong>. The founding treaty sets out a simple principle: each state retains its independence and sovereignty, except for the powers expressly delegated to the Confederation. These powers cover three pillars \u2014 defence and security, diplomacy, development<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

It is this treaty that served as the template for everything that followed: the Unified Force, the confederal bank, the common passport and, most recently, the Parliament.<\/p>\n

The four institutions of the AES in 2026<\/h2>\n

1. The College of Heads of State and the rotating presidency<\/h3>\n

The Confederation’s supreme body brings together the three heads of state: Assimi Go\u00efta (Mali), Ibrahim Traor\u00e9 (Burkina Faso) and Abdourahamane Tiani (Niger). The presidency rotates, with a one-year term<\/strong>. Assimi Go\u00efta held the first presidency from July 2024; he handed over at the second summit, held in Bamako on 22 and 23 December 2025<\/strong>, with Ibrahim Traor\u00e9 designated to succeed him.<\/p>\n

2. The Unified Force<\/h3>\n

This is the most visible institution. After a series of staff meetings that began in Niamey on 7 March 2024, the AES Unified Force<\/strong> entered operational service on 20 December 2025 in Bamako<\/strong>, at the flag presentation ceremony chaired by the incumbent president of the Confederation.<\/p>\n

Its characteristics in 2026: around 5,000 Malian, Burkinab\u00e9 and Nigerien soldiers<\/strong>, a command post at Air Base 101 in Niamey<\/strong>, and a command entrusted to Burkinab\u00e9 General Daouda Traor\u00e9<\/strong>. On 16 and 17 April 2026, the chiefs of staff meeting in Ouagadougou approved a build-up of troop numbers, with a stated target of 15,000 personnel<\/strong>. On 10 July 2026, again in Ouagadougou, the defence ministers examined the status of forces agreement \u2014 the text that defines the rights, obligations and protections of deployed military personnel.<\/p>\n

We have detailed its origins and operational limits in our dedicated analysis: AES Unified Force: where does the Sahel’s joint army stand?<\/a><\/p>\n

3. The Confederal Bank for Investment and Development (BCID-AES)<\/h3>\n

Inaugurated on 23 December 2025 in Bamako<\/strong>, the BCID-AES has start-up capital of 500 billion CFA francs<\/strong> (around $895 million). Its purpose: to finance structural projects in infrastructure, agriculture, energy and private sector support, outside traditional Western financial channels.<\/p>\n

The financial and customs dimension of Sahelian sovereignty \u2014 bank, external tariff, currency project \u2014 is the subject of a separate analysis: AES financial sovereignty: where does the project stand?<\/a><\/p>\n

4. The Confederal Parliament<\/h3>\n

This is the most recent piece. On 24 August 2026, in Niamey<\/strong>, the Parliament of the Confederation held its inaugural session<\/strong>. It has 45 confederal members<\/strong> from the three countries. The opening ceremony was chaired by Nigerien Prime Minister Ali Mahamane Lamine Zeine, representing President Abdourahamane Tiani.<\/p>\n

Officially, the institution is meant to \u201cbring the common institutions closer to the people\u201d. Its practical working arrangements \u2014 session calendar, actual legislative power, relationship with national parliaments \u2014 have not yet been specified by the confederal authorities. This is the main point to watch in the coming months.<\/p>\n

What the AES has already changed in practice<\/h2>\n

The break with ECOWAS.<\/strong> Announced on 28 January 2024, the withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger from the Economic Community of West African States has been effective since 29 January 2025<\/strong>. To soften the blow, ECOWAS maintained several transitional measures: recognition \u201cuntil further notice\u201d of passports and identity cards bearing its logo, and continued visa-free rights of movement, residence and establishment for nationals of the three countries. We analysed the implications of this divorce in What are the implications of the Mali\u2013Burkina\u2013Niger withdrawal from ECOWAS?<\/a> and the root causes of the dispute in Why is ECOWAS contested?<\/a><\/p>\n

The attributes of shared sovereignty.<\/strong> The AES unveiled its flag in February 2025 and launched a common biometric passport<\/strong> \u2014 a project initiated in August 2025, provided for by article 5 of the confederal treaty, and rolled out successively by Burkina Faso, Mali and then Niger (President Tiani enrolled on 16 July 2026). A confederal television channel, based in Bamako, has also been launched.<\/p>\n

Diplomatic realignment.<\/strong> The three capitals have broken off or sharply reduced their ties with Paris \u2014 first in Niger (what impact has the break with France had in Niger?<\/a>), then in Burkina Faso with the severance of diplomatic relations on 26 June 2026<\/a> \u2014 while moving closer to Moscow and Ankara. See also Is Russian influence really changing the balance?<\/a> and How do the great powers influence the Sahel?<\/a><\/p>\n

The AES does not, however, have a currency.<\/strong> This is the most widespread confusion: despite the many searches for an \u201cAES currency\u201d or a \u201csahel\u201d that would replace the CFA franc, no confederal currency exists to date, and no date for its entry into circulation has been officially set<\/strong>. The three countries still use the CFA franc and remain members of WAEMU. The subject is a political project, not a monetary reality.<\/p>\n

What the AES has not yet resolved<\/h2>\n

Three years after the Liptako-Gourma Charter, the security record remains grim. The central Sahel remains the global epicentre of terrorism, and 2026 has been marked by major shocks: the large coordinated FLA\u2013JNIM offensive in Mali<\/a>, the fuel blockade on Bamako<\/a>, and the rise of ISGS<\/a> in the tri-border area, in open rivalry with JNIM<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa) analysts Leylatou Saidou Daoura<\/strong> and Rahinatou Le\u00efla Salia<\/strong> stress that the effectiveness of the Unified Force will depend less on its political announcement than on its actual ability to function: a clear chain of command, rapid intelligence sharing, availability of air assets, unit mobility and the ability to hold recaptured areas over time. The precedent of the G5 Sahel Joint Force is a reminder that a multinational force only produces lasting results with stable funding, robust logistics and effective intelligence \u2014 three conditions rarely met together. Our analyses of the real capacity of Sahelian armies<\/a> and of the effect of foreign military withdrawals<\/a> point in the same direction.<\/p>\n

For Fiacre Vidjenagninou<\/strong>, a researcher at the Behanzin Institute in Cotonou and the Egmont Institute in Brussels, the Unified Force is also a political and symbolic instrument: it reflects a desire for sovereign self-assertion after the break with regional frameworks and external partnerships. But this dimension will not be enough to stabilise territories if military action is not accompanied by a return of public services, accessible local justice and dialogue with the population. A strictly military victory, he points out, would remain fragile.<\/p>\n

Finally, the institutional break with ECOWAS has not changed geography: the three countries remain landlocked and dependent on the trade corridors<\/a> linking them to the ports of Abidjan, Lom\u00e9, Cotonou and Dakar \u2014 routes that are themselves exposed, as shown by developments in road convoy security<\/a>.<\/p>\n

What this changes for organisations operating in the Sahel<\/h2>\n

Beyond the geopolitical reading, four practical implications deserve to be built into security and compliance arrangements.<\/p>\n

1. A regulatory framework with two layers.<\/strong> Confederal decisions (travel documents, customs regime, financing) now overlay national law. Legal monitoring that only followed national official gazettes would miss part of the applicable framework.<\/p>\n

2. A shift in institutional points of contact.<\/strong> ECOWAS channels no longer operate in the three countries. Sector procedures, authorisations and appeals go through national and, increasingly, confederal bodies \u2014 including the Parliament inaugurated in August 2026.<\/p>\n

3. Unchanged logistical dependence.<\/strong> The political divorce from ECOWAS has not moved the ports. Supply planning and corridor analysis remain at the heart of business continuity.<\/p>\n

4. Reduced consular protection.<\/strong> Diplomatic ruptures reduce the channels available in the event of an incident involving expatriate staff. This is a direct parameter of duty of care<\/a> and the protection of expatriate workers<\/a>.<\/p>\n

To place these dynamics on the map, our map of security risks in West Africa<\/a> and our monthly regional overview<\/a> offer an up-to-date reading, zone by zone. On medium-term scenarios, see Can West Africa avoid lasting fragmentation?<\/a><\/p>\n

Book a demo<\/a><\/p>\n

Frequently asked questions about the AES<\/h2>\n

Which countries are members of the Alliance of Sahel States?<\/h3>\n

The AES has three member states: Mali<\/strong>, Burkina Faso<\/strong> and Niger<\/strong>. No other country has joined since the Liptako-Gourma Charter was signed on 16 September 2023, although several regional rapprochements have been mentioned.<\/p>\n

Does the AES have its own currency?<\/h3>\n

No. To date, the AES has no currency of its own<\/strong> and no date for its entry into circulation has been officially announced. The three countries still use the CFA franc and remain members of WAEMU. The Confederation has, however, set up an investment bank, the BCID-AES, inaugurated on 23 December 2025 in Bamako.<\/p>\n

Has the AES really left ECOWAS?<\/h3>\n

Yes. The withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger has been effective since 29 January 2025<\/strong>. ECOWAS has nonetheless maintained transitional measures, notably the free movement of people and the recognition of identity documents bearing its logo, in order to limit disruption for populations and trade.<\/p>\n

How many soldiers does the AES Unified Force have?<\/h3>\n

The Unified Force entered operational service on 20 December 2025 with around 5,000 personnel<\/strong>. In April 2026, the chiefs of staff of the three countries approved a build-up targeting a strength of 15,000 soldiers<\/strong>. Its command post is located in Niamey.<\/p>\n

Sources<\/h2>\n