Between 9 and 24 October 2026, the risk map shifted once again in the central Sahel. On 9 October, fighting between JNIM (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, linked to al-Qaeda) and the Islamic State in the Sahel was reported in Gonadaouri, in Oudalan, in northern Burkina Faso. On 24 October, the Malian general staff announced the discovery of 54 civilians killed in a camp at Tagadayat, around 35 km south-east of Menaka, an attack that initial accounts attribute to the Islamic State. A few weeks earlier, an attack claimed by the same group had targeted Birni-N’Konni, in Niger, outside its usual area of operation.<\/p>\n
For a company, an NGO or an institution preparing a new presence, a mission or a new programme, these facts raise a practical question: on what basis should it decide to go, under what conditions, and when should that decision be reviewed? This is the purpose of a security risk assessment. This guide sets out the method, step by step, as it can be applied in the Sahel in 2026.<\/p>\n
A security risk assessment is not a situation report. It serves a decision: whether or not to launch an activity in a given area, with what protective means, and at what threshold to suspend it. It produces three things: a prioritised list of risks, measures proportionate to each, and a level of residual risk that management accepts with full knowledge of the facts.<\/p>\n
Three concepts structure the exercise:<\/p>\n
This approach is also the concrete expression of the duty of care<\/a>: an organisation that has identified a risk without implementing the planned measures may be held to have failed in that obligation. The guides of the GISF (Global Interagency Security Forum, formerly EISF) state this explicitly.<\/p>\n Before collecting a single incident, specify what the assessment must decide. Four parameters are enough:<\/p>\n This framing avoids two frequent pitfalls: the generic “country” assessment that says nothing about your site, and the assessment written after the decision to justify it.<\/p>\n The second step is to understand who is active in the area and according to what logic. In the Sahel, this means distinguishing at least: jihadist groups (JNIM and the Islamic State in the Sahel<\/a>), whose rivalry<\/a> changes the geography of violence; non-jihadist armed movements; defence and security forces and their partners, whose operations, notably with drones, also create a risk for civilians; militias and self-defence groups; ordinary crime.<\/p>\n The analysis draws on the history of incidents, at several scales:<\/p>\n Sources are many and must be cross-checked: incident databases such as ACLED, reports by organisations such as Human Rights Watch, the national press, humanitarian networks and local correspondents. A figure claimed by a belligerent is not a fact: note its source and its status (confirmed, reported, claimed).<\/p>\n Note<\/p>\n Risk does not come only from armed groups. According to ACLED data cited by Human Rights Watch on 19 October 2026, air strikes by Malian forces and their partners killed 89 civilians between April and August 2026, more than double the same period in 2025. A market, a convoy or a gathering close to an area of operations is therefore exposed to a risk of collateral damage.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n Based on the context, draw up the list of threats that actually concern your activity. A simple grid helps keep it concrete:<\/p>\nStep 1: frame the decision<\/h2>\n
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Step 2: analyse the context and the actors<\/h2>\n
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Step 3: identify the threats<\/h2>\n