{"id":77065,"date":"2025-09-21T08:12:49","date_gmt":"2025-09-21T08:12:49","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/cross-border-mines-armed-groups-funding\/"},"modified":"2025-09-21T08:12:49","modified_gmt":"2025-09-21T08:12:49","slug":"cross-border-mines-armed-groups-funding","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/cross-border-mines-armed-groups-funding\/","title":{"rendered":"Do cross-border mines fund armed groups?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>In the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea, mining sites located near borders \u2013 particularly gold sites \u2013 are often presented as a \u201cwar chest\u201d for armed groups. The reality is more complex. Mines are not always directly controlled by jihadist organisations or militias, but they are part of cross-border economies where artisanal gold mining, trafficking, informal taxation and corruption intersect.<\/p>\n<h2>What are cross-border mines in West Africa?<\/h2>\n<p>Cross-border mines are extraction sites located in the immediate vicinity of a border or within mining basins that extend across several countries. In West Africa, they are mainly:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>artisanal or semi-mechanised gold mining sites, often informal or loosely regulated;<\/li>\n<li>industrial concessions adjoining areas of weak state presence;<\/li>\n<li>mining corridors linking several countries (for example Mali\u2013Burkina Faso\u2013Niger, or Burkina Faso\u2013Togo\u2013Ghana\u2013C\u00f4te d\u2019Ivoire).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>These areas combine several characteristics that favour armed economies:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>limited or fragmented state presence (few security forces, absent or contested administrations);<\/li>\n<li>high mobility of people, goods and capital;<\/li>\n<li>the importance of the informal sector and smuggling;<\/li>\n<li>a social fabric crossed by transnational community and trade networks.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>In this context, mines and borders become economic, political and security resources at the same time.<\/p>\n<h2>How do armed groups profit from mines?<\/h2>\n<p>Armed groups \u2013 jihadists, community militias, organised bandits \u2013 do not simply \u201cexploit mines\u201d. They insert themselves into existing value chains, adjusting their degree of control to the local context.<\/p>\n<h3>Taxation and \u201cprotection\u201d<\/h3>\n<p>The most common mechanism is informal taxation. Work by the International Crisis Group, Clingendael and the International Peace Information Service shows that in several areas of Liptako-Gourma (Mali\u2013Burkina Faso\u2013Niger) and northern Burkina Faso:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>armed groups levy taxes at the entrance to sites, on shafts or on crushers;<\/li>\n<li>fees are demanded on every gram of gold produced or sold;<\/li>\n<li>transit fees are imposed on the roads used to carry ore or refined gold to border markets.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>In return, these groups offer a form of \u201cprotection\u201d against theft, competing rackets or rival militias. In some cases, they also arbitrate disputes between gold miners, landowners and local chiefs, thereby strengthening their legitimacy with certain communities.<\/p>\n<h3>Partial or total control of sites<\/h3>\n<p>In a few specific areas, armed groups impose more direct control:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>regulating access times to sites;<\/li>\n<li>barring entry to the security forces or to certain local authorities;<\/li>\n<li>imposing social rules (dress, alcohol consumption, music, etc.) as part of armed governance.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Reports by the UN and by organisations specialising in illicit flows document cases in which katibas affiliated with al-Qaeda or the Islamic State in the Sahel temporarily closed sites, expelled gold miners deemed undesirable or redistributed part of the revenue to allied communities. This type of control, however, varies over time and depends on the local balance of forces.<\/p>\n<h3>Involvement in marketing chains<\/h3>\n<p>Armed groups also intervene downstream of production:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>securing convoys of gold or cash;<\/li>\n<li>tacit partnerships with local buyers or commercial intermediaries;<\/li>\n<li>involvement in smuggling networks to coastal countries from which gold is exported, sometimes via formal channels.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>In several Gulf of Guinea countries, studies by the OECD and UNODC show that gold of Sahelian origin is mixed with local gold before being exported to international refining centres. Armed groups do not control the whole chain, but capture part of the value at different links, often thanks to alliances with formal and informal economic actors.<\/p>\n<h2>Do mines mainly fund armed groups?<\/h2>\n<p>Cross-border mines are a significant source of income for some groups, but they are neither the only one nor always the main one. Academic research and databases such as ACLED or the Small Arms Survey highlight a plurality of funding sources:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>taxation of trade routes (livestock, fuel, consumer goods);<\/li>\n<li>racketeering on local markets and transporters;<\/li>\n<li>various forms of trafficking (arms, drugs, stolen vehicles, migrants, etc.);<\/li>\n<li>forced or voluntary contributions from certain communities;<\/li>\n<li>rents from agricultural, pastoral or forestry activities (timber, charcoal, wildlife).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The place of mines in this portfolio varies according to:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>the wealth of the local subsoil and the presence of gold sites;<\/li>\n<li>population density and the number of gold miners frequenting the sites;<\/li>\n<li>competition between armed groups, militias, security forces and local authorities;<\/li>\n<li>public policies (site closures, militarisation, partial legalisation of artisanal gold mining).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>In some areas of Burkina Faso or Niger, mining rent can account for a significant share of a group\u2019s resources. In others, taxes on trade routes or kidnapping for ransom remain more lucrative. Mines therefore do fund armed groups, but they are part of a broader economic system rather than its sole driver.<\/p>\n<h2>Why are cross-border mining areas so sensitive?<\/h2>\n<p>Beyond the question of funding, cross-border mines play a structuring role in conflict dynamics.<\/p>\n<h3>Competition for access to resources<\/h3>\n<p>Gold sites attract thousands of people: gold miners, traders, transporters, equipment owners, financial intermediaries. This concentration of people and capital creates:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>land tensions between local communities, migrants, herders and farmers;<\/li>\n<li>rivalries between customary authorities and state representatives over rights of control and taxation;<\/li>\n<li>conflicts between artisanal miners and industrial mining companies.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Armed groups exploit these tensions by presenting themselves as protectors of a community, as arbiters of disputes or as defenders of access to the resource. This instrumentalisation strengthens their social roots.<\/p>\n<h3>Areas of refuge and retreat<\/h3>\n<p>Cross-border mines are often located in wooded or hard-to-reach areas, with many uncontrolled tracks. They offer:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>spaces for fighters to retreat or transit;<\/li>\n<li>opportunities to blend in among gold-mining populations;<\/li>\n<li>logistical footholds (supplies, medical care, information).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The proximity of a border makes it easier to evade a state\u2019s military operations by crossing the line, especially when cross-border cooperation is limited or politicised.<\/p>\n<h3>Governance and legitimacy issues<\/h3>\n<p>The way states manage artisanal gold mining and mining taxation has a direct impact on the dynamics of violence. Policies perceived as predatory, discriminatory or brutal (forced closures, destruction of equipment, violence during inspections) can:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>fuel resentment against the state;<\/li>\n<li>increase the appeal of armed groups promising an alternative \u201cjustice\u201d;<\/li>\n<li>push some economic actors to seek the protection of militias or jihadist groups.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Conversely, initiatives for concerted regulation, gradual formalisation and fairer revenue sharing can reduce armed groups\u2019 room for manoeuvre, even if the results often remain mixed and slow.<\/p>\n<h2>Dynamics that differ from country to country<\/h2>\n<p>The relationship between cross-border mines and armed groups varies considerably from one country to another.<\/p>\n<h3>Central Sahel: a strong link between mines and conflict<\/h3>\n<p>In Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, several studies (ISS Africa, ICG, Small Arms Survey) highlight:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>a significant presence of jihadist groups or militias on or around many artisanal gold mining sites;<\/li>\n<li>an entanglement of community conflicts, rivalries over mining sites and the weakening of the state;<\/li>\n<li>gold flows that feed regional smuggling circuits, with very limited traceability.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>In these contexts, cross-border mines contribute tangibly to the financial resilience of armed groups, while structuring spaces where state authority is challenged.<\/p>\n<h3>Gulf of Guinea: growing risks, diverse configurations<\/h3>\n<p>In Benin, Togo, C\u00f4te d\u2019Ivoire or Nigeria, the situation is more mixed:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>in some areas bordering Burkina Faso or Niger, armed groups are moving closer to gold sites or trying to impose levies on them;<\/li>\n<li>in others, mining issues are linked more to organised crime, banditry and corruption than to structured jihadist groups;<\/li>\n<li>states sometimes seek to strengthen regulation or militarise certain sites, with ambivalent effects on local tensions.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The spread of insecurity from the Sahel to the coastal countries makes cross-border mines an issue to watch, even though they are not everywhere a central driver of armed financing.<\/p>\n<h2>What lessons for public and private actors?<\/h2>\n<p>Cross-border mines do not on their own \u201ccreate\u201d armed groups, but they feed political economies of violence. Several lessons emerge:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>mining rent strengthens the survival capacity of groups already established locally, rather than triggering their emergence ex nihilo;<\/li>\n<li>the interactions between artisanal gold mining, local governance, corruption and security presence are decisive for understanding the scale of armed levies;<\/li>\n<li>responses focused solely on closing or militarising sites can displace problems without solving them, and may even deepen mistrust of the state;<\/li>\n<li>gold value chains, from the shaft to international markets, involve formal and informal actors, some of whom benefit indirectly from armed levies.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The question is therefore not only whether cross-border mines \u201cfund\u201d armed groups, but how their integration into fragile local and regional economies helps structure spaces where violence becomes an ordinary means of regulation and redistribution.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea, mining sites located near borders \u2013 particularly gold sites \u2013 are often presented as a \u201cwar chest\u201d for armed groups. The reality is more complex. Mines are not always directly controlled by jihadist organisations or militias, but they are part of cross-border economies where artisanal gold mining, [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"acteur":[153,158,156],"niveau":[173],"risque":[170,171],"thematique":[159,160],"zone":[143,144,145,147,149,152],"class_list":["post-77065","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","acteur-formal-and-informal-economic-actors","acteur-non-state-armed-groups","acteur-states-and-public-institutions","niveau-analytical-level","risque-political-risks","risque-security-risks","thematique-armed-conflict-and-terrorism","thematique-economy-resources-and-trafficking","zone-benin","zone-burkina-faso","zone-cote-divoire","zone-mali","zone-niger","zone-togo"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/77065","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=77065"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/77065\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=77065"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"acteur","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/acteur?post=77065"},{"taxonomy":"niveau","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/niveau?post=77065"},{"taxonomy":"risque","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/risque?post=77065"},{"taxonomy":"thematique","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/thematique?post=77065"},{"taxonomy":"zone","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/zone?post=77065"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}