{"id":77055,"date":"2026-06-22T08:24:14","date_gmt":"2026-06-22T08:24:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/aes-unified-force-sahel-joint-army\/"},"modified":"2026-06-22T08:24:14","modified_gmt":"2026-06-22T08:24:14","slug":"aes-unified-force-sahel-joint-army","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/aes-unified-force-sahel-joint-army\/","title":{"rendered":"AES Unified Force: where does the Sahel’s joint army stand against the jihadists?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Since the collapse of the G5 Sahel, one question has been troubling the security managers, NGOs and analysts who follow Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger: what military architecture will replace the arrangements inherited from the Barkhane decade?<\/strong> The answer now has a name \u2014 the Unified Force of the Alliance of Sahel States (FU-AES)<\/strong> \u2014 and a figure that keeps rising. Launched at the end of 2025, this joint army of the three countries of the tri-border area has established itself, within a few months, as the centrepiece of the new Sahelian security architecture. Here is what it is, what it changes and what it does not resolve.<\/p>\n

What is the AES Unified Force?<\/h2>\n

The FU-AES is the joint armed wing of the confederation born of the withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger from ECOWAS<\/a>. Launched in December 2025 and based in Niamey, it aims to pool the capabilities of the three armies and to coordinate counter-terrorism on both sides of borders that armed groups ignore. According to the Institute for Security Studies (ISS)<\/a>, it is the third attempt at a common security mechanism in the central Sahel, after the 2017 Multinational Joint Force and the G5 Sahel Joint Force, which became inoperative after the departure of foreign forces and the withdrawal of contingents<\/a> between 2022 and 2023.<\/p>\n

The AES, which became a confederation on 6 July 2024, has made it one of the symbols of its asserted sovereignty<\/strong> \u2014 alongside its common biometric passport, its investment bank and its currency project. On the ground, the stakes are concrete: after the end of MINUSMA<\/a> and the departure of Barkhane, the three states must provide on their own a security coverage that external partners no longer take on.<\/p>\n

From 5,000 to 15,000 troops: the 2026 build-up<\/h2>\n

The trajectory of troop numbers sums up the ambition. Announced at 5,000 troops<\/strong> in early 2025, the force was increased to 6,000<\/strong> at the end of 2025, with the Nigerien president justifying this reinforcement by \u201chigh-technology\u201d threats, according to the Anadolu Agency<\/a>. Then, on 16 and 17 April 2026, the chiefs of staff of the three countries approved a much sharper jump: a target of 15,000 soldiers<\/strong>, reported in particular by Africa Defense Forum<\/a>. In little more than a year, the joint force will thus have tripled its troop target.<\/p>\n

This build-up is not only about numbers. FU-AES units are designed to operate freely across the entire territory of the three countries<\/strong>, whereas G5 Sahel battalions were confined to a right of pursuit limited to around a hundred kilometres on either side of borders. It is a doctrinal as well as an organisational break.<\/p>\n

How does the AES force differ from the G5 Sahel?<\/h2>\n

The comparison with the G5 Sahel is not merely historical: it shows why AES leaders believe they will succeed where the previous arrangement failed. In five years, the G5 Sahel Joint Force conducted only around twenty-five operations and never managed to halt the spread of the threat, for lack of air assets, intelligence and sustainable funding, the ISS recalls. Three structural differences are highlighted.<\/p>\n

Integrated command and freedom of movement<\/h3>\n

According to the ISS, the FU-AES command would have full operational authority<\/strong>: it can deploy and employ its units without prior approval from national general staffs. This integration \u2014 and cross-border freedom of movement \u2014 removes one of the obstacles that had paralysed the G5 Sahel, whose operations depended on constant national arbitration. It remains to turn this theoretical asset into genuinely coordinated operations<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Sovereign funding\u2026 but uncertain<\/h3>\n

Whereas the G5 Sahel suffered from chronic underfunding \u2014 an annual operational budget estimated at \u20ac423 million, far above the states’ contributions \u2014 and a heavy dependence on external partners, the AES claims national funding. On 28 March 2025, the three countries introduced a 0.5% levy on imports<\/strong> to finance their confederal institutions, including the force; they also mobilise dedicated national funds (Patriotic Support Fund in Burkina Faso, Solidarity Fund in Niger, an equivalent fund in Mali). The breakdown of contributions has not been made public, and the sustainability of this model \u2014 partly backed by mining revenue \u2014 remains an open question.<\/p>\n

Diversified partners rather than a single sponsor<\/h3>\n

To avoid reproducing dependence on France, the AES is diversifying its suppliers: equipment and weapons come from Russia, Turkey, Iran and China. Russia, through the Africa Corps<\/a>, remains the preferred security partner, but in variable forms according to the ISS: participation in combat in Mali, training only in Burkina Faso and Niger. This diversification reduces dependence on a single actor \u2014 without eliminating it.<\/p>\n

On the ground: first operations and joint strikes<\/h2>\n

The force is not just an organisational chart. The AES armies have already demonstrated real coordination during the tripartite operation Y\u00e9r\u00e9ko 2<\/em> (February-March 2025) in Liptako-Gourma<\/a>, presented as directed against ISGS. Above all, in May 2026 the Alliance confirmed joint air strikes in Mali<\/a>, following attacks attributed to jihadists linked to Al-Qaeda and to Tuareg separatist groups. The growing use of air power \u2014 and the widespread use of drones<\/a> \u2014 marks a shift compared with the G5 Sahel era, when the lack of air assets was a major weakness.<\/p>\n

These engagements take place against a backdrop of a threat that remains intense, driven by the rivalry between JNIM and ISGS<\/a> and by groups capable of striking towns as well as roads \u2014 as illustrated by the fuel blockade imposed on Bamako<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The limits weighing on effectiveness<\/h2>\n

The ambition runs up against constraints that neither troop numbers nor statements are enough to remove. Analysts point to several converging weaknesses:<\/p>\n