{"id":77041,"date":"2025-08-12T12:08:50","date_gmt":"2025-08-12T12:08:50","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/fuel-smuggling-role-in-conflicts\/"},"modified":"2025-08-12T12:08:50","modified_gmt":"2025-08-12T12:08:50","slug":"fuel-smuggling-role-in-conflicts","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/fuel-smuggling-role-in-conflicts\/","title":{"rendered":"What role does fuel smuggling play in conflicts?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Fuel smuggling occupies a central but often underestimated place in many conflict settings. In West Africa, it sits at the intersection of the informal economy, corruption and armed dynamics, from the Sahel to the coastal countries. Understanding its role requires bringing together economic, political and security dimensions, rather than reducing it to a mere \u201cresource for terrorists\u201d.<\/p>\n<h2>A strategic resource, easily monetised<\/h2>\n<p>Fuel (petrol, diesel, sometimes kerosene) has several characteristics that make it a particularly attractive conflict resource:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Strong structural demand<\/strong>: road transport, generators, mining machinery, motorbike taxis, mechanised agriculture. Even in times of crisis, demand remains high.<\/li>\n<li><strong>A divisible and liquid product<\/strong>: it can be transported in small quantities, stored relatively easily and resold at retail, which facilitates the circulation of small sums of cash.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Large price differentials<\/strong>: subsidies, tax regimes and exchange-rate variations create price gaps between neighbouring countries, making cross-border smuggling very profitable.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Limited traceability<\/strong>: in many border or rural areas, customs and tax controls remain weak, which encourages the circulation of smuggled fuel.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>In several West African countries, smuggled fuel has become an ordinary part of the local economy. In Nigeria and neighbouring countries, studies show that this informal market accounts for considerable volumes, fed in particular by diversion, cross-border smuggling and, at times, fuel from illicit oil circuits.<\/p>\n<h2>A key link in war economies<\/h2>\n<p>In conflict zones, fuel smuggling is often part of what researchers call a <em>war economy<\/em>, that is, a system in which armed violence and economic activity feed each other. Fuel plays several roles within it.<\/p>\n<h3>A source of funding for armed groups and hybrid armed actors<\/h3>\n<p>Non-state armed groups \u2013 whether jihadists, local militias or self-defence groups \u2013 profit from fuel in different ways:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Taxing flows<\/strong>: collecting \u201ctransit fees\u201d on tanker lorries, motorbikes or retail sellers crossing their areas of influence. These levies amount to a parallel tax system.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Controlling points of sale<\/strong>: imposing margins, quotas or local monopolies on retail sales, sometimes via commercial relays or affiliated intermediaries.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Direct involvement in smuggling<\/strong>: armed escorts for convoys, diversion of fuel intended for the administration or the security forces, or even involvement in cross-border resale circuits.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>This model has been documented in several contexts: border areas between Nigeria and Niger, Sahelian spaces through which commercial convoys and various forms of trafficking pass, and mining regions where fuel and artisanal gold mining are closely linked. Fuel then becomes a vector of recurrent income, less visible than other forms of trafficking (arms, drugs, gold), but often more stable.<\/p>\n<h3>A logistical resource for war and predation<\/h3>\n<p>Fuel is also indispensable to armed operations:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Mobility<\/strong>: 4&#215;4 vehicles, motorbikes, pick-ups and sometimes heavy machinery depend on diesel and petrol to transport fighters, weapons and goods.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Territorial control<\/strong>: the ability to supply fuel to forward posts, checkpoints or remote bases determines whether an armed presence can be sustained.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Resource exploitation<\/strong>: in artisanal gold mining or extraction areas, fuel powers pumps, crushers and generators. Controlling this fuel makes it possible to take a share of the value created.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Fuel smuggling is therefore not only a source of funding; it also structures the logistics of violence and economic predation.<\/p>\n<h2>Between the informal economy, corruption and fragile governance<\/h2>\n<p>The role of fuel in conflicts is not limited to armed groups. It also involves state actors, economic networks and local actors.<\/p>\n<h3>Entanglement with state apparatuses and the security forces<\/h3>\n<p>Numerous studies and investigations highlight the involvement of public officials in illicit fuel circuits:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Customs and police complicity<\/strong>: tolerating or facilitating the passage of cargoes in exchange for informal payments.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Diversion of subsidised fuel<\/strong>: siphoning off stocks intended for the army, public services or subsidised programmes, then reselling them in informal circuits.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Political use of networks<\/strong>: some smuggling networks maintain links with local or national elites, which limits the political will to dismantle them.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>This entanglement reinforces the perception of corruption and injustice, at times fuelling mistrust of the state and feeding the legitimising discourse of certain armed groups that present themselves as alternatives to an order seen as predatory.<\/p>\n<h3>An ambivalent social buffer<\/h3>\n<p>In many regions, smuggled fuel is an essential source of income for thousands of people: transporters, resellers, handlers, small traders. It acts as a <strong>social buffer<\/strong> in contexts of mass unemployment and poverty.<\/p>\n<p>This social function greatly complicates anti-smuggling policies. Brutal or poorly calibrated repression can:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>weaken already precarious local economies;<\/li>\n<li>fuel anger against the state, especially if the repression is perceived as selective;<\/li>\n<li>push some informal actors closer to armed groups offering protection or alternative outlets.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Fuel smuggling thus lies at the heart of an unstable balance between economic survival, corruption and violence.<\/p>\n<h2>Border areas and peripheral spaces: smuggling hubs<\/h2>\n<p>The border areas of West Africa \u2013 from the Sahel to the Gulf of Guinea countries \u2013 concentrate a large share of illicit fuel flows. Several factors combine:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Price differentials between countries<\/strong> (subsidies, taxation, exchange rates) that make cross-border smuggling very profitable.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Limited state presence<\/strong> in rural and Sahelian areas, with few means of control, and secondary roads and tracks that are difficult to monitor.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Long histories of cross-border trade<\/strong>, in which local populations consider these exchanges legitimate, sometimes since well before modern borders were drawn.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>These border areas are also spaces where many armed groups and criminal networks operate. Fuel often circulates alongside other goods: livestock, foodstuffs, cigarettes, drugs, small arms, gold or minerals. Fuel smuggling then becomes one element of a broader portfolio of illicit activities, which strengthens the financial resilience of these networks.<\/p>\n<h2>Impact on conflict and governance dynamics<\/h2>\n<p>Fuel smuggling influences conflicts in several ways, beyond funding alone.<\/p>\n<h3>Strengthening parallel powers<\/h3>\n<p>Illicit fuel networks contribute to the consolidation of parallel powers:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>De facto authorities<\/strong>: network bosses, local intermediaries and community leaders associated with smuggling can acquire considerable political and social influence.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Capacity for co-optation<\/strong>: these networks can finance election campaigns, support local notables or maintain patronage networks, blurring the boundaries between the criminal economy and the political sphere.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Alternative norms<\/strong>: in some areas, the regulation of fuel flows by armed groups or informal networks becomes more effective or more predictable than that of the state, which strengthens their local legitimacy.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>Weakening public finances and trust<\/h3>\n<p>The development of the illicit fuel market results in significant tax losses for states (taxes, customs duties, VAT). This reduces the budgetary room for manoeuvre to fund public services, infrastructure or social policies, reinforcing a vicious circle:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>poor public services and infrastructure;<\/li>\n<li>social discontent and mistrust of the state;<\/li>\n<li>greater attraction to informal and illicit activities;<\/li>\n<li>loss of public revenue and difficulty in strengthening the state.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>In contexts already marked by armed violence, this weakening of public finances further complicates the security response and the rebuilding of trust between the state and the population.<\/p>\n<h2>Countering received ideas: fuel, terrorism and crime<\/h2>\n<p>The link between fuel smuggling and terrorism is sometimes presented in simplified terms. A few nuances are needed:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Multiplicity of actors<\/strong>: the main beneficiaries of smuggling are not always jihadist groups. State actors or well-connected economic networks can capture a significant share of the profits.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Survival economy vs. organised crime<\/strong>: a large proportion of those involved operate at subsistence level, with no direct affiliation to armed groups. Confusing them with terrorist networks can lead to disproportionate responses.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Interconnection rather than direct causality<\/strong>: fuel smuggling does not \u201ccreate\u201d terrorism, but it offers financial and logistical opportunities to groups that already exploit political, social and territorial fragilities.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>This distinction is essential for designing policies that target the most harmful networks without indiscriminately penalising already vulnerable populations.<\/p>\n<h2>Strategic issues for states and organisations<\/h2>\n<p>For states, international organisations and economic actors operating in West Africa, fuel smuggling is a cross-cutting strategic issue:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Security risk<\/strong>: funding and logistical support for armed groups, entrenchment of lawless zones, vulnerability of road corridors and sensitive sites.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Political risk<\/strong>: consolidation of politico-criminal networks, weakening of state legitimacy, tensions between centre and peripheries.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Economic risk<\/strong>: distortion of competition, weakening of formal operators, tax losses, uncertainty for investment in the energy and transport sectors.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Social and reputational risk<\/strong>: perception of collusion between elites, companies and illicit networks, public mistrust, risks to the image of institutions and companies associated, even indirectly, with these circuits.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The responses most discussed in the specialist literature stress the need to combine several levers: reform of fuel-sector governance, targeted strengthening of controls and transparency, development of credible economic alternatives in border areas, and more effective regional cooperation. Research nevertheless points out that these approaches only have a lasting impact if they are part of a broader strategy to fight corruption, strengthen the rule of law and reduce territorial inequalities.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Fuel smuggling occupies a central but often underestimated place in many conflict settings. In West Africa, it sits at the intersection of the informal economy, corruption and armed dynamics, from the Sahel to the coastal countries. Understanding its role requires bringing together economic, political and security dimensions, rather than reducing it to a mere \u201cresource [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"acteur":[158,156],"niveau":[173],"risque":[170,171,172],"thematique":[160,163],"zone":[],"class_list":["post-77041","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","acteur-non-state-armed-groups","acteur-states-and-public-institutions","niveau-analytical-level","risque-political-risks","risque-security-risks","risque-social-and-reputational-risks","thematique-economy-resources-and-trafficking","thematique-governance-and-political-transitions"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/77041","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=77041"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/77041\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=77041"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"acteur","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/acteur?post=77041"},{"taxonomy":"niveau","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/niveau?post=77041"},{"taxonomy":"risque","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/risque?post=77041"},{"taxonomy":"thematique","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/thematique?post=77041"},{"taxonomy":"zone","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/zone?post=77041"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}