{"id":77039,"date":"2026-10-02T08:22:24","date_gmt":"2026-10-02T08:22:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/niger-rebellion-mplj-fpl-cfln-2026\/"},"modified":"2026-10-02T08:22:24","modified_gmt":"2026-10-02T08:22:24","slug":"niger-rebellion-mplj-fpl-cfln-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/niger-rebellion-mplj-fpl-cfln-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"Rebellion in Niger: who are the MPLJ, the FPL and the CFLN?"},"content":{"rendered":"

On 15 August 2026, the Patriotic Movement for Freedom and Justice (MPLJ) claimed responsibility for an attack on a National Guard camp and a joint police-gendarmerie-customs post in S\u00e9gu\u00e9dine, in Niger’s far north-east, claiming to have killed at least fifteen members of the security forces (ActuNiger, 17 August 2026<\/a>). A few weeks earlier, two armed movements had sealed a coalition in Djado, and the leader of the Patriotic Liberation Front (FPL), just released in Libya, had gathered his fighters at the border. Three years after the July 2023 coup, the rebellion in Niger<\/strong> has once again become a front in its own right, distinct from the jihadist insurgency.<\/p>\n

This profile reviews Nigerien rebel groups in 2026: who they are, what they demand, where they operate, what they are capable of, and what this changes for organisations present in the north and east of the country. It complements our profile of Niger’s defence and security forces<\/a> and our profile of the Islamic State in the Sahel<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The rebellion in Niger at a glance<\/h2>\n

Since 2023, around half a dozen politico-military movements have claimed to be the armed opposition to the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP), the junta led by General Abdourahamane Tiani. Most demand the release of former president Mohamed Bazoum, detained since his overthrow, and a return to constitutional order. They are not jihadists: their declared targets are the security forces and the state’s oil resources.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Movement<\/th>\nLeader<\/th>\nArea of operation<\/th>\nClaimed modes of action<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
FPL (Patriotic Liberation Front)<\/td>\nMahmoud Sallah<\/td>\nNorth-east, Niger-Libya-Chad triangle<\/td>\nSabotage of the Niger-Benin pipeline (from 2024), remobilisation in Ahahi (July 2026)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
MPLJ (Patriotic Movement for Freedom and Justice)<\/td>\nMoussa Kouna\u00ef<\/td>\nAgadem oil block (Diffa), Bilma department<\/td>\nAttacks on the pipeline and CNPC sites, raids on FDS posts<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FPJ (Patriotic Front for Justice)<\/td>\nMahamat Tori<\/td>\nNorth-east, Djado area<\/td>\nStrategic coalition with the MPLJ (June 2026)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FAL (Free Armed Forces)<\/td>\nRhissa Ag Boula<\/td>\nNational claim<\/td>\nStated objective: overthrow the junta by force<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
CFLN (Coordination of the Free Forces of Niger)<\/td>\nCoalition<\/td>\nNorth and east<\/td>\nBrings together the FPL, FPJ, MPLJ, MADP and FAL, joined by the MPN in August 2026<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

A rebellion born of the July 2023 coup<\/h2>\n

Niger experienced armed rebellions in the north in the early 1990s and again in 2007-2009, led mainly by Tuareg movements and brought to an end by peace agreements and integration programmes. The current sequence is different: it begins with the overthrow of Mohamed Bazoum on 26 July 2023 and is structured around a national political demand, constitutional order, rather than a regional one (see the impact of coups on security<\/a>).<\/p>\n

It is nonetheless rooted in local grievances. In the desert north-east, several fronts recruit, according to available analyses, among nomadic and pastoral communities, notably Toubou, who denounce the marginalisation of regions that are rich in oil and gold. The MPLJ’s second-in-command, Brahim Mohamed Hagar, thus criticises Chinese oil operators for almost never recruiting in the region, an observation shared by a former deputy security manager of the Agadem pipeline (Africa Defense Forum, 10 February 2026<\/a>). On these dynamics, see our analysis of the role of nomadic communities in conflicts<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The regional context also weighs in. The break with France, the departure of US forces from Agadez in 2024 and the rapprochement with Russia have reshuffled the cards (see the impact of the break with France in Niger<\/a>). Niamey describes the rebels as “mercenaries” and regularly refers to foreign backing, without publicly providing evidence of it.<\/p>\n

The main armed movements<\/h2>\n

The FPL, a forerunner revived by the release of Mahmoud Sallah<\/h3>\n

The Patriotic Liberation Front emerged in the wake of the coup. It became known in June 2024 by claiming the sabotage of a section of the pipeline that exports Nigerien crude to Benin. The movement then weakened: dozens of its fighters laid down their arms at ceremonies organised by the authorities, and its leader, Mahmoud Sallah, was arrested in early 2025 in southern Libya by Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA).<\/p>\n

On 22 June 2026, the FPL announced his release, thanking Saddam Haftar. For Jalel Harchaoui, a researcher at the Royal United Services Institute, this was Benghazi’s response to Niamey, which had just sent some twenty Libyans detained in the Zinder region back to Tripoli rather than to eastern Libya (RFI via allAfrica, 24 June 2026<\/a>). The FPL says fourteen of its members remain in detention in Libya. On 25 July, the eve of the third anniversary of the coup, around a hundred fighters and eighteen pick-ups appeared in Ahahi, where the Nigerien, Libyan and Chadian borders meet, to announce the resumption of armed struggle. Support from the Haftar clan is mentioned by several sources but has not been independently confirmed.<\/p>\n

The MPLJ, the most active actor, focused on oil<\/h3>\n

Created in 2024 by Moussa Kouna\u00ef following a split with the FPL, the MPLJ is today the most offensive movement. Its strategy is economic: to strike the junta’s main source of revenue. “Destroying the pipeline means destroying Tiani,” its leader summed up in an interview with Jeune Afrique in January 2026. The movement names the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and its subsidiary West African Oil Pipeline Company (WAPCO).<\/p>\n

Attacks intensified at the end of 2025 (one in November, two in December according to the consultancy African Security Analysis), putting the pipeline out of service several times. In February 2026, the MPLJ attacked the Djibeila oil site in the Agadem block; the Ministry of Defence announced that it had repelled the assault, with the attackers withdrawing towards Chad. On 15 August 2026, it struck S\u00e9gu\u00e9dine, in the Bilma department (Agadez region), then on 19 August released a video of soldiers presented as captured. These tolls have not been confirmed by an independent source; drone strikes were reported in the area after the attack.<\/p>\n

FPJ, FAL, MPN: the galaxy brought together by the CFLN<\/h3>\n

The Coordination of the Free Forces of Niger (CFLN), created in October 2024, serves as a common framework. It brings together the FPL, Mahamat Tori’s Patriotic Front for Justice (FPJ), the MPLJ, the Armed Movement for the Defence of the People (MADP) and Rhissa Ag Boula’s Free Armed Forces (FAL). A former Tuareg rebel leader of the 1990s and former minister, the latter founded the Council of Resistance for the Republic (CRR), a political body, after the coup, before being sidelined and launching the FAL.<\/p>\n

Two steps marked the summer of 2026. On 28 June, the MPLJ and FPJ signed a communiqu\u00e9 in Djado creating a “strategic coalition” and calling on other groups to join them (Journal du Niger, 29 June 2026<\/a>). On 1 August, Mahamat Tinaymi’s Patriotic Movement of Niger (MPN) announced it was joining the CFLN, with its fighters due to join common operating bases (Sahel Intelligence, 2 August 2026<\/a>). The coalition nonetheless remains an assembly of movements with distinct leaders, bases and backers.<\/p>\n

Where the rebellion operates: oil and Saharan routes<\/h2>\n

The geography of the rebellion does not overlap with that of the jihadists. The Islamic State in the Sahel and JNIM concentrate their attacks in the west, in the Tillab\u00e9ri region and along the Malian and Burkinab\u00e8 borders (see how Niamey manages insecurity in Tillab\u00e9ri<\/a>), while groups descended from Boko Haram weigh on Diffa and the Lake Chad basin. The rebels, for their part, operate in three areas:<\/p>\n