{"id":77029,"date":"2026-11-13T03:00:37","date_gmt":"2026-11-13T03:00:37","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/west-africa-geopolitical-economic-security-overview-november-2026\/"},"modified":"2026-11-13T12:13:33","modified_gmt":"2026-11-13T12:13:33","slug":"west-africa-geopolitical-economic-security-overview-november-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sahel.watch\/en\/west-africa-geopolitical-economic-security-overview-november-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"West Africa: geopolitical, economic and security overview \u2014 November 2026"},"content":{"rendered":"

November 2026 is a month best read through borders. Algeria voted to send troops to Niger, a first in decades, and opened a dispute with the European Union. Guinea expelled foreign artisanal gold miners, and thousands of Burkinabe returned home through Mali. In northern Mali, the front froze one month after the army retook Kidal, while the Islamic State in the Sahel struck camps around Menaka. This overview covers 13 October to 12 November 2026 and follows the October 2026 overview<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Security: a frozen front in the north, civilians exposed everywhere<\/h2>\n

Mali: Kidal held, Tessalit out of reach<\/h3>\n

One month after the Malian army and Africa Corps entered Kidal on 6 October, the advance has stopped. According to RFI (6 November), Malian and Russian forces hold Kidal, Anefis and Aguelhok, but have entered neither Tessalit nor Tinzaouaten, near the Algerian border. The army is carrying out air strikes in the Tessalit and Talhandak sectors, with no ground advance. Kidal remains almost empty: the governor and the administration have not returned, despite a vaccination campaign launched in late October.<\/p>\n

The Azawad Liberation Front (FLA)<\/a> has not laid down its arms. On 5 November it claimed drone strikes on positions of the Malian armed forces (FAMa) and Africa Corps in Anefis, a claim not independently verified. A Malian analyst interviewed by RFI described the withdrawal from Kidal as \u201csymbolic\u201d rather than military and pointed to a long, exposed supply line. A ground offensive towards the border would also risk the thaw with Algiers, covered in the next section.<\/p>\n

Menaka: the Islamic State in the Sahel strikes the camps<\/h3>\n

On Sunday 18 October, armed men on motorcycles attacked several camps around Menaka. AFP, citing security and local sources, reported at least 40 civilians killed; the executive office of the Daoussahak community reported 48 dead in Tagadayat and blamed the Islamic State in the Sahel<\/a>. On 24 October, the Malian general staff announced that 54 bodies had been found. A security source suggested reprisals for operations conducted with the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (MSA), whose leader’s residence in Menaka was also targeted, without casualties. The massacre fits the pattern described in our analysis of the JNIM\u2013ISGS rivalry in Mali<\/a>: communities seen as allied with the army become targets.<\/p>\n

Burkina Faso: fewer deaths, not fewer attacks<\/h3>\n

The Burkinabe government reports steady improvement. In late October, Prime Minister Rimtalba Jean Emmanuel Ou\u00e9draogo said that more than 74% of the territory was under state control (74.53% on 30 June according to official figures). ACLED data cited by AFP do show a sharp fall in deaths from violence: 612 in June, 195 in July, 231 in August, 29 in September. But the number of attacks fell much more slowly, and ACLED updates from late October describe continued JNIM pressure on towns, roads and military positions.<\/p>\n

On 4 November, Human Rights Watch documented two September attacks in Yatenga province (north): on 1 September, the JNIM assault on the Soubo artisanal gold mining site near Ouahigouya killed 24 civilians and injured at least 20; on 5 September, an explosive device killed three civilians, including a five-year-old child, near Mera. JNIM acknowledged the Soubo attack, saying it targeted Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP), which witnesses dispute. According to ACLED, cited by HRW, JNIM carried out 125 attacks in Burkina Faso from January to August 2026, killing 188 civilians.<\/p>\n

\n

Watch point<\/p>\n

A lower death toll is not a lower risk. In Burkina Faso, it may reflect a change of targets or weaker reporting from closed areas. For an exposed organisation, the right indicator remains the frequency of attacks on its routes and around its sites, not the national toll.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Geopolitics: Algeria steps into the Sahel<\/h2>\n

Algerian troops in Niger<\/h3>\n

On Sunday 25 October, the Algerian Senate unanimously approved sending a unit of the People’s National Army (ANP) to Niger, on a decision by President Abdelmadjid Tebboune. Article 91 of the Constitution revised in November 2020 allows it, with the approval of two thirds of the members of each chamber; Algerian doctrine had until then ruled out any military intervention abroad. Neither the size nor the duration of the deployment has been made public. According to members of parliament quoted by the Algerian press, the unit would protect projects of Sonatrach, which is exploring the Kafra block in northern Niger; this mission has not been officially confirmed.<\/p>\n

The vote follows the military protocol signed in Algiers on 21 October by General Sa\u00efd Chanegriha, ANP chief of staff, and General Salifou Mody, Niger’s defence minister: counter-terrorism, security of the common border and support for the Nigerien army’s capabilities. Our analysis of Niger\u2013Algeria relations<\/a> described an uneven relationship; it is becoming a security partnership, at a time when northern Niger remains affected by the MPLJ and FPL rebellion<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Niamey and Brussels clash again<\/h3>\n

On 30 October, European Commission spokesperson Anouar El Anouni said Brussels wanted to know the scope, objective and legal basis of the Algerian deployment. On 9 November, the EU’s acting charg\u00e9 d’affaires, Ola\u00ef Voionmaa, was summoned to the office of Prime Minister Ali Mahaman Lamine Zeine, Niamey calling the remarks \u201ccondescending and unacceptable\u201d. Niamey had already summoned the EU charg\u00e9e d’affaires on 12 March. On 11 November, the Nigerien authorities also released the Ivorian journalist Serge Mathurin Adou, detained since September 2024.<\/p>\n

Guinea: thousands of Burkinabe gold miners sent back<\/h3>\n

On 2 November, the Guinean authorities banned artisanal gold mining in several areas of the north-east and deployed security forces there permanently. According to a provisional count by a Burkinabe government source quoted by AFP, more than 8,000 Burkinabe were expelled. Burkina Faso’s security minister, Mahamadou Sana, said about a hundred buses had been mobilised, around fifty of them already heading for Mali, and reported injuries, some from gunfire; he criticised the lack of prior notice. A government delegation travelled to Bamako on 4 November, and Mali activated a reception system for nationals of several countries. Conakry had not commented on the departures as of 5 November. On 12 November, Guinea’s Court for the Repression of Economic and Financial Offences (CRIEF) opened a trial of about 1,200 defendants for illegal mining in Conakry, including 202 clandestine gold miners and 22 territorial administrators.<\/p>\n

The episode shows how much artisanal gold<\/a> shapes the region’s economies and migration, and how a sovereign decision taken in a coastal country affects the routes and reception capacity of the AES.<\/p>\n

AES and ECOWAS: a time for procedures<\/h3>\n

Ministers from Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger met in Ouagadougou on 11 and 12 November to review the Confederation’s year-two roadmap, adopted on 26 February 2026 (defence and security, diplomacy, development). The session, opened by General C\u00e9lestin Simpor\u00e9, Burkina Faso’s Minister of State for Defence, prepared the next College of Heads of State, for which no date has been announced; no decision was published. The three governments also warned against unauthorised fundraising in the name of the AES. Details of the institutions are in our guide to the Alliance of Sahel States<\/a>.<\/p>\n

On the ECOWAS side, the joint working groups set up in Dakar on 17 October<\/a> are preparing a framework agreement; the next milestone is the Abuja summit in December, which coincides with the end of chief negotiator Lansana Kouyat\u00e9’s mandate.<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Date<\/th>\nCountry<\/th>\nEvent<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
18\/10\/2026<\/td>\nMali<\/td>\nAttacks on camps around Menaka, at least 40 civilians killed<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
21\/10\/2026<\/td>\nAlgeria, Niger<\/td>\nMilitary protocol signed in Algiers<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
25\/10\/2026<\/td>\nAlgeria<\/td>\nSenate approves sending an ANP unit to Niger<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
02\/11\/2026<\/td>\nGuinea<\/td>\nArtisanal mining banned in the north-east, expulsions<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
04\/11\/2026<\/td>\nBurkina Faso<\/td>\nHRW report on the Soubo and Mera attacks<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
09\/11\/2026<\/td>\nNiger<\/td>\nEU charg\u00e9 d’affaires summoned<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
11-12\/11\/2026<\/td>\nAES<\/td>\nMinisterial session on the year-two roadmap<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

Source: AFP, RFI, HRW, La Nouvelle Tribune, Burkina Faso Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as of 12 November 2026.<\/p>\n

Economy: monetary stability, pressure on resources<\/h2>\n

The BCEAO kept its main policy rate at 3% at its 9 September meeting, a level in force since 16 March 2026. WAEMU inflation is rising slowly, from 0.4% in the second quarter to 1.2% in July and 1.7% in August, for an expected annual average of about 1%. The Union’s growth is projected at 6.1% in 2026, after 6.0% year on year in the second quarter. In Senegal, IMF Executive Board approval of the programme of about $2.2 billion, agreed at staff level on 1 September, remains the sub-region’s main budget issue to watch.<\/p>\n

Nigeria has proposed linking its financial market with the WAEMU regional stock exchange (BRVM) and with Ghana, and reported $4.1 billion of capital inflows in September. In Ghana, inflation rose to 5.5% year on year. These signs of coastal recovery contrast with the constraints on AES countries: escorted supply routes in Mali (see our analysis of the Bamako blockade<\/a>), tighter state control of gold since the 2026 nationalisations<\/a>, and now the forced return of artisanal mining workers.<\/p>\n

On 12 November, new reports named Sierra Leone and Liberia as hubs for European cocaine networks, consistent with the maritime route described in our analysis of cocaine trafficking in West Africa<\/a>.<\/p>\n

What this means for exposed organisations<\/h2>\n